The “clear” phase is a military responsibility. There is an impressive number of military personnel in Afghanistan today. I have not seen a breakdown of the ratio of infantry to support troops but suspect that the infantry number is, on a relative scale, low. There are two basic ways for the infantry units to operate in Afghanistan. One is to live and work with and among the people. The other is to live on and operate from, Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s). The former is the course of action more likely to bring positive results. The latter, appears designed with force protection as the dominant factor. I have often wondered if, somewhere, there is an analysis of the infantry strength living among the people and the infantry strength operating from FOB’s.
Despite probable inefficiencies in the use of available infantry units to clear areas as they operate from FOB‘s , the fact remains that the “clear” portion of the strategy could be executed with some degree of success.
The “hold” phase is where the strategy’s serious problems start. There are not enough infantry to clear an area, then hold it for reconstruction projects. Resultantly, the Afghan National Police (ANP) are the logical force to hold a cleared area. Despite the millions of dollars expended to train ANP, there appears to be a shortage. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the bulk of the population, with ample reason, considers the ANP to be a corrupt, untrustworthy, and illegitimate organization. This problem is compounded by the fact that the bulk of the population also holds the same view of the Karzai government. They consider the central government to be a corrupt, irrelevant entity. The result is that large segments of the population want nothing to do with the ANP or other representatives of the Karzai government intruding on their lives.
The “build” phase is now largely a figment of the imagination. Neither the major companies operating from FOB’s nor the more agile, smaller companies who live and operate with the Afghan population can operate in the absence of a “hold” force.
In the final analysis, the three prong national strategy has two broken or missing prongs. It is a charade summing to the point that the problem and its cures are essentially in the political, vice military, realm. It becomes an even greater charade when the world, including our enemies, knows that the U.S. will start withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in July of 2011. The most disgusting reality of all is that the charade and its continuance mean that the lives of American military patriots are being squandered, ruined and/or wasted for no valid reason.
