An analogy: General Foulkes said that Germany was foolish to initiate the use of gas warfare on the Western Front, because the wind usually blew towards them.

The Allies would almost certainly not have used it, if the Germans had not used it first.

As the man who ran much of Britains gas warfare efforts, he ought to have known.

That is one of the five saddest things I have ever seen…

Society is truly ill.

Jim

But spray-painting the Earth or star sensors is probably just as good if not better.

Another option would be to attach a device that could be triggered at will to disable the enemy’s satellites. That way in the event of hostilities you could, in one move, wipe out the opponent’s capabilities. Effectively they would be blinded and rendered deaf and mute.

To see how strange things get with strategic assets, check out the following related program:

Sometime in the early to mid ’60s, a National Research Council committee on anti-submarine warfare hatched, and allowed to leak, the following idea:

Drop small robotic devices near Soviet submarines as they left base (where we always had patrols). These devices would attach to the submarine. Periodically they would seek out the long trailing wire antenna on the submarine and cut it.

Why?

The committee was tasked with finding ways to prevent Soviet first strike attacks on the US. Their logic went as follows:

1) To make the strike successful (in those days), missiles must be launched from subs near our shores to minimize warning time

2) The submarines carrying the missiles had to be under positive control. The “go” code had to be transmitted by the highest authorities only when it was time to launch. Nobody wanted to hand a sub commander orders to start a global thermonuclear war in 10 or 30 days sailing time!

3) To minimize detection, the submarines needed to stay submerged, with no periscopes, antenna masts or buoys (I hunted submarines in those days from a P-3 Orion, btw). Thus the communication had to be by VLF or ELF. In either case, a very long trailing wire underwater antenna was required to get the radio signal.

4) If their was significant doubt about enough submarines receiving the go signal, the mission would not be launched.

5) The releasing of the information about this program was to create that doubt.

Note: Whether the devices were ever built and deployed was highly classified and probably still is.