My comments about “raiding”: There are those that raid. And when they universally find out that they have raided Northfield MN or
Coffeyville KS. raiding ceases to look attractive. I daresay that the tribal areas contain a few people who have not learned that lesson yet. Are these indentifiable as tribes, as members of ACM or just as ad hoc groups? I have no way of knowing that and do remember that I did say I was speaking in glittering generalities.

The fact that these elements do exist is why I estimated the need for long-term garrisoning and patrolling.

Enough, already. Let us move on to a new thread.

It was not that long ago that one could buy an old small tactical nuke warhead in Bulgaria, for about $1000. As a nuke it was unusable because it was old and degraded, but still quite useful for a dirty bomb.

I know the jihadis were chattering about that, but the logistics are formidable. Unless Russkiye would be really that deranged that they would supply some suitcase nukes to Iran that would try (actively) to get them to US to be ready.

Tere is another scenario that has a better chance of success. If you have enough radioactive material, you could create dirty bombs at some strategic locations, like major routes. Select 6 most important highways close to major cities and detonate dirty bombs at the same time. Not much physical damage, but the initial panic and consecleanup costs would, no dout, have serious economic consequences.

What the T E Lawrence figured out, and the British figured out in Malaya, is to figure out how indigenous forces can contribute to their own security. That includes their reasons for wanting to, what they are capable of, how they operate, and how they can cooperate.

Treating the indigenous leaders as partners and their forces with respect is another challenge for our conventional forces, who have an inbred sense of superiority that is inculcated while instilling a sense of elite esprit d’ corps.

The challenge of developing that spirit within a unit while still having respect for other forces is something that separates the conventional forces from the “quiet professionals” of the special operations forces. Why can we not move towards that “quiet professional” mode as a model for Big Army?

Can it even be done? Can the average grunt survive if he can’t look down on the rest of the world?

There are so many benefits to having such esprit, but the downside was very apparent to me as I operated with my Afghans, who were not the least bit in doubt as to the feelings of the elite airborne troops that they were supposedly operating “with.” Disrespect is a language all its own.

Partnering with indigenous groups who have motivation and ability to counter the ACM in Afghanistan can be very beneficial. One must be careful, however, not to simply be used as a hammer that one group uses to get the upper hand on another so that they can simply take over the turf or get a fly out of their own ointment.

We must avoid partnering with groups whose overriding goal is to overthrow the IRoA and take it over for themselves.

Sounds like President Bush wants to use Apaches to catch Apaches.

“I would guesstimate that the tribal areas of the Pakistan/Afghanistan borders will require garrissoning/patrolling for a generation or more.”

You are probably correct. The goal is to get the Afghan government to be capable of and motivated to take care of their own borders.

“When producing for a living starts better than raiding for a living, things will start to change. And when the latter produces nothing but increased poverty, change fast.”

Where is this raiding economy? Where did people get the idea that Afghans are like Tuskan raiders from Star Wars? That is not anything like what I saw at all. If it exists, it exists in a part of Afghanistan that I didn’t see. The Kuchis are not even raiders. They are nomads who primarily herd livestock.

“At any rate, Afghanistan can no longer be used
as a “privileged sanctuary” and staging area
for organized terrorist groups. That is good enough for me. To carry my above analogy a step farther, the equivalent of Commancheros
can no longer operate there in the unmolested fashion they must have.”

You are right about the first part, but the second part should be clarified; the “commancheros” are the ACM groups like the Taliban, the HiG, and Jaish. Typical Afghans do not behave like commancheros at all. Only the ACM skulk around, sometimes staying in their home range, sometimes they would rely on the hospitality of the locals for their shelter and food. The strictly criminal elements didn’t seem to operate that way much, because their support from the people would have to be strictly through intimidation. They moved from one criminal cell to another, rather than just showing up somewhere and asking/demanding food and/or shelter.

The neighborhood tryant wants power to enforce their opinion of what is right on others. Homeowners Associations are famous for this. Neither is motivated by religion. Religion is ofter the tool, not the reason.

The rest of us just don’t want others to have power over us.