Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War — one of the history’s outstanding histories as well as one of the founding documents in the subject of history itself — was written by a member of the losing side.

Second, the war wasn’t lost by Athens so much because of those external factors, nor due to the plague, disastrous though it was, but as a result of the fact that Athens, brilliant though it was, was a miserable failure in finding a political, probably federal solution to transforming the original Delian League into the “Athenian Empire” — in a way that would satisfy its constituent cities/allies so that the enlarged state had cohesive staying power, like America from the thirteen colonies.

Lacking such a federal structure, the Athenians could not resist tampering in the internal affairs of their subject cities, interference which the least of them (not to speak of greatest) bitterly resented — with the result that, when push came to shove, the Athenian Empire simply fell apart.

Compare that experience with that of Rome, which during the Republic period granted to its Italian member cities rights of autonomy and self-government, which policy was later extended Empire-wide — with the result that Rome’s allies went to war with it (in the so-called Social War of 90-89 BC) in order not to escape Rome but rather force her to admit them into the Roman state! Which they won — or rather, lost, after which they were admitted into full, autonomous membership in the Roman Republican state.

Note the different lifetimes of the Athenian vs. Roman Empires — the Athenian disappearing in a few decades, the Roman the longest-lived state in history.

Good points, thanks. I hadn’t noticed the automatic “loyal opposition bit…hmm. Yeah I can think of cases on both sides of the Pelop. War where a “loyal opposition” worked directly against national interests for personal political gain.

I can see how the war can be warped to fit both ways. That might stem from Thucydides who was writing the first study in power politics as well as a history, giving his work an oddly universal tinge. Thus you can have democratic Athens/America undermined by factions and beaten by a totalitarian government able to operate with a single will, while at the same time a conservative Sparta/America relying on a firm and legitimate constitutional tradition and a self-imposed image as the vehicle for liberty and self-determination.

I’m not a big fan of saying America is the “new Rome” and all that, although we are the only Western Superpower (as Rome was). But there’s a definate parallel in so far as once a power starts fighting beyond its borders, it’s very hard to stop (Rome always had to fight the next tribe or people to secure what they’d just conquered) and pull back. For us, WWI led to WWII led to the cold war led to Korea and Vietnam.

I sometimes wonder what would’ve happened if we’d just sat the 20th century out (this would assume that a Germany still strong after WWI wouldn’t have let Hitler in).

Any thoughts on how to correct the “automatic subversion” (other than the moral cliches about acting selflessly)?

Important thing, tho, is with very few mental gymnastics, the Pelop. War analogy can be fitted either way. For example, the largest frame of all would be, which political system won? This of course is meaningless without the full panoply of stipulation (topography, economy, leadership, and so forth) –unless one can locate specific instances where the national effort was especially helped or hindered by the mechanics of the political system.

Long/short, even the most ancient history suggests a USA at war needs to quit now (1968 would’ve been better and would’ve saved enormous life and treasure, often for both combatants) the automatic political tactic of hyper-subversion of national foreign policy by the “loyal opposition” (why did i have to put that in quotation marks?).

Yes the American founding was an new codification of Enlightenment principles, but the Founders justified themselves within the English constitutional tradition at the same time. Jefferson’s “Summary View” (1774) was an appeal to King George based on the colonists rights as Englishmen, and even more telling, Edmund Burke (the philosophical father of conservatism and a British member of parliament) argued that America was justified in revolting because they were upholding their rights as Englishmen (a “revolution” connotes something returning to it’s original position, as in a circle). America like Sparta, had a revolutionary founding that has endured for quite a while compared to respective neighbors on a firm constitutional basis.

But above that, we’ve got a two-hundred plus year record of a stable political tradition. Ever notice that few European countries (for all their pride in their ancient heritage) can boast of that? Russia has a long cultural tradition yes, but it’s political tradition has been one of turmoil and revolution for the last hundred years. In that sense, they like Athens, are the revolutionaries. And their current system, a supposed democracy co-opted by a single strong-man, does parallel the demagoguery of Pericles and Alcibiades.

Spartan freedom of movement was important, but the ravaging of Attica did very little (see Victor Davis Hanson). Athens was dependent on its sea lanes logistically, the whole point of Pericles’ strategy was indirect, don’t defend Attica because they didn’t need to risk defeat against a superior military.

The Cavalry was a nice bonus in defending the Long Walls to the Pireus, but not ultimately intrinsic. Greek armies had no decent siege equipment to speak of (all sieges were won by investment and starvation/treachery, very rarely by direct assault).

Even after the plague, Athens had the better of things in the war, the Spartans were glad to accept the temporary peace of Nicias (c. 420 B.C.). Athens opened things up again with the Syracuse expedition (415 B.C.). That catastrophic failure more than anything else was what lost the war. Sparta never directly threatened the port until the final surrender of Athens.

The Golden Age of Greece began with the Athenian defeat of Persia (480/479 B.C.) and ended with the Pelopponesian War (431-405/4 B.C.). Alexander came seventy years later (c. 335 B.C.)

My whole point in bringing up this analogy was to show an example of indirect strategies (Liddell Hart) using leagues of allies to get at an opponents strengths without direct assault. Sparta couldn’t directly harm Athens (yearly invasions of Attica did nothing substantial VDH/Thucydides), but had greater long term success in chipping away at the Athenian hegemony, and the security to sit back and wait for Athens to make mistakes.

Which is precisely what happened when Athens decided to attack Syracuse, which did far greater lasting damage to Athens than even the plague.

This is what we can do with Russia. Moscow can only extend its power through heavy-handed dominance over the “near abroad” very similar to Athens once you look past the naval/land power paradigm. The US can play Sparta by adopting the moral high ground (the Spartans took the image of the “liberators” of Greece) and checking Russian expansion (Kennan 2.0).

This strategic defensive strategy forces Moscow to take the initiative, making Russia look bad internationally, and most likely forcing them into making mistakes (which Georgia will be in the long term, it’s already driven Poland/Ukraine into our camp just as Athens drove Corinth/Thebes into the Peloponnesian League).

“The desire of a few hundred thousand Abkhazians and South Ossetians to remain in the Russian Federation rather than Georgia may seem trivial, but Moscow is setting a precedent that will apply to tens of millions of prospective citizens of the Federation – most controversially in Ukraine.”

“…for the moment, I will offer the assertion that partition is the destiny of Ukraine.

Spengler even suggests that we should let it happen, as long as there is an adequate quid pro quo:

“My proposal is simple: Russia’s help in containing nuclear proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East is of infinitely greater import to the West than the dubious self-determination of Ukraine. The West should do its best to pretend that the “Orange” revolution of 2004 and 2005 never happened, and secure Russia’s assistance in the Iranian nuclear issue as well as energy security in return for an understanding of Russia’s existential requirements in the near abroad.”

Re hedging, it’s pretty clear that linchpin Turkey understands how our upcoming election could leave them high & dry if they were to saddle up with Bush now and then see Obama elected. In fact that’s a major, major weakness for us in this mess –if USA can no longer dependably sustain a foreign policy across an election, how in the world can we expect front-line allies to follow our lead? A critical weakness, really –empowering any adversary not similarly interrupted.