This is a subject which has been under-discussed, both in the public and in military circles. I have a unique perspective on this issue, having been a combat arms soldier assigned to work with the Afghan National Police.
My experiences were a microcosm of the larger conflict and demonstrated well the lack of mechanisms to deal with these issues in a coherent manner.
Your assertion that insurgent organizations, and particularly Islamic terrorist organizations, need to be criminalized is absolutely on target. This is a phase that needs to be reached during the conflict. One cannot criminalize these elements simply by declaring them to be criminals. What matters is the perception of criminality versus “freedom fighter” or “righteous Jihadi” in the eyes of the population; the center of mass.
One assertion with which I disagree is that there were no military actions taken against al Qaeda prior to 9/11. I believe the one military action directly against al Qaeda to have actually inspired 9/11. I am talking about the cruise missile attacks on suspected al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan following the embassy bombings in Africa. Michael Moore may blame President Bush for 9/11, but these attacks provided impetus and inspiration for the actual method used on 9/11.
Al Qaeda responded to our weak, yet direct, military response by sending the three largest cruise missiles ever deployed in hostile operations against targets in the United States.
The Army struggles to adapt as a counterinsurgent organization, as this requires an enormous shift in organization, training, and conditioned responses at all levels, down to the soldier level.
Police agencies involved in dealing with active armed insurgencies cannot behave like American uniformed street cops. They behave more like organized militia or MP’s. They carry automatic weapons, they conduct security, presence, and combat patrols, They perform a lot of cordon and search operations, often in conjunction with Army units who typically provide outer cordon security while the Police to their work.
They still die at a rate ten times higher than the death rate of Army troops. This is a key indicator of their centrality in counterinsurgency.
American law enforcement agencies working overseas are often very detached from the ground-level troops. I was aware of American law enforcement personnel, but they were “spooky,” and rarely involved at the Provincial level with the Police we mentored. I never saw them involved at the District level.
Often the only evidence we had of any American law enforcement presence was a request for information about a specific individual or a BOLO for a specific individual or vehicle.
My assertion and deeply held belief that the Police are the key to local security and take an increasing role in the actual criminalization and eventual dismantling of insurgent/terrorist cells rings like a tiny bell in the ear of senior officers. They openly declare their belief that the Army is the main effort and I have heard with my own ears a senior officer say, “I know that GEN Lima says that the Police are to be our main effort, but I believe that the Army is the key to winning, so we’re just not going to do that.”
There were no repercussions to this refusal to follow the commander’s intent. My shock is everlasting.
The Army/Marines do not fully grasp the importance of the Police in counterinsurgency from the local to the international level. The Armed Forces are capable of contributing greatly to this aspect of the fight, but it requires a paradigm shift in the minds of many senior officers. There is a disconnect and territorialism between the Armed Forces and Federal law enforcement that prevents effective unity of action; part of which is parochialism and part of which is due to a lack of unity of command.
We could do a much better job of this. This is an excellent example of winning in spite of ourselves.
I could write pages on this topic; it is an essential recurring tile in the mosaic of global insurgency/counterinsurgency that we are presented with. This is an excellent topic.
