I think Joe Lieberman said it best.
“When we say that U.S. troops shouldn’t be ‘policing a civil war,’ that their operations should be restricted to this narrow list of missions, what does this actually mean? To begin with, it means that our troops will not be allowed to protect the Iraqi people from the insurgents and militias who are trying to terrorize and kill them. Instead of restoring basic security, which General Petraeus has argued should be the central focus of any counterinsurgency campaign, it means our soldiers would instead be ordered, by force of this proposed law, not to stop the sectarian violence happening all around them–no matter how vicious or horrific it becomes…
“The sectarian violence that the Majority Leader says he wants to order American troops to stop policing, in other words, is the very same sectarian violence that Al Qaeda hopes to ride to victory…
“The Majority Leader said on Monday that he believes U.S. troops will still be able to conduct ‘targeted counter-terror operations’ under his plan… By definition, targeted counterterrorism requires our forces to know where, when, and against whom to strike–and that in turn requires accurate, actionable, real-time intelligence.
“… the focus of our military has been on training and equipping Iraqi forces, protecting our own forces, and conducting targeted sweeps and raids–in other words, the very same missions proposed by the proponents of the legislation before us. That strategy failed–and we know why it failed. It failed because we didn’t have enough troops to ensure security, which in turn created an opening for Al Qaeda and its allies to exploit. They stepped into this security vacuum and, through horrific violence, created a climate of fear and insecurity in which political and economic progress became impossible.
“For years, many members of Congress recognized this. We talked about this. We called for more troops, and a new strategy, and–for that matter–a new secretary of defense. And yet, now, just as President Bush has come around–just as he has recognized the mistakes his administration has made, and the need to focus on basic security in Iraq, and to install a new secretary of defense and a new commander in Iraq–now his critics in Congress have changed their minds and decided that the old, failed strategy wasn’t so bad after all.
“What is going on here? What has changed so that the strategy that we criticized and rejected in 2006 suddenly makes sense in 2007?
“On Monday, Senator Reid gave several reasons [for the phased withdrawal on 1 Oct 07]. First, he said, a date for withdrawal puts ‘pressure on the Iraqis to make the desperately needed political compromises.’
“But will it? According to the legislation now before us, the withdrawal will happen regardless of what the Iraqi government does.
“How, then, if you are an Iraqi government official, does this give you any incentive to make the right choices? On the contrary, there is compelling reason to think a legislatively directed withdrawal of American troops will have exactly the opposite effect than its Senate sponsors intend.
“Second, the Majority Leader said that withdrawing our troops, and again I quote, will ‘reduce the specter of the U.S. occupation which gives fuel to the insurgency.’
“…where is the evidence to support this theory? Since 2003, and before General Petraeus took command, U.S. forces were ordered on several occasions to pull back from Iraqi cities and regions, including Mosul and Fallujah and Tel’Afar and Baghdad. And what happened in these places? Did they stabilize when American troops left? Did the insurgency go away? On the contrary–in each of these places where U.S. forces pulled back, Al Qaeda rushed in. Rather than becoming islands of peace, they became safe havens for terrorists, islands of fear and violence. ”
