You had me interested until you got to the vouchers. Consider two points.
First, most special education determinations are made at the school level by an IEP team, typically comprising a parent, a regular education teacher, an LEA representative (often a school administrator), and a special education teacher.
Second, especially in the case of possible SLD situations, it is likely that the student in question has been struggling. As you say in your article, the primary motivation to label a child “special education” may very well be to access additional resources to help the child.
So how does the “threat” of a voucher discourage local teams’ identification of students? The school has likely already used some additional resources for the child in question (e.g., tutoring, one-on-one work with a teacher assistant, small-group work with a reading teacher). If that school-based team knew that SLD identification would mean that the student would qualify for a special education voucher—i.e., the student might end up leaving the school to go somewhere else, thus freeing up the additional resources that had previously been employed—how would that serve as a disincentive? Couldn’t the opposite come true—that IEP teams see LSD identification, and the vouchers that come with that identification, as a way to get struggling students out of their individual schools (especially given that struggling students often also translate into lower standardized test scores)?
In addition, would we see new private schools cropping up that focus exclusively on LSD students, setting up a multi-tiered system with special education students being served in separate schools from their non-disabled peers (pretty contrary to the intent of IDEA)?
I found your explication of increases in the special education population quite insightful, but I would appreciate a much more detailed and persuasive explanation of how special education vouchers would represent an effective practice.
