McChrystal, Tocqueville, and the Koran: The Postmodern ‘COINage’ of a Failed Policy
I have been saying since 9/11 that we have two foundational mindsets we can adopt towards Islam: coexistence, and use of our military power to kill all Muslims. These are ends of a continuum that can’t, practically, be pushed all the way in either direction. Some Muslims will always hate us, and the political will to kill some 100′s of millions of people does not and presumably never will exist.
With respect to Afghanistan, we are there, remember, to prevent the reemergence of the terrorist training camps from which the 9/11 attackers emerged. If they develop, we want to be able to hit them. If we don’t have the goodwill of the government, we have nowhere to “land”, nowhere to stage, and without Pakistan we have no good land or air route in there anyway. Look at a map.
I supported the surge in Iraq. I did not support the surge in Afghanistan, since they are two different wars. As someone with two degrees in South Asian Religion, I can tell you, too, that if you want to understand a faith, look at what people do, not what their books say.
What Afghans want, more than anything, is to be left alone. They want to live in their little backward villages, and not have anybody from anywhere screwing with them. They don’t want Afghan troops there. They want Americans even less. They don’t want the Taliban, since as fanatics they take everything too far, and most people just want a proverbial beer and ballgame come the weekend, not religous zealotry. Yes, they beat their wives, and molest young boys, but we are not there to right the wrongs of the world, so much as prevent them from coming to us.
In my view, we can never “occupy” Afghanistan. We don’t have the troops, the money, or the time. Given this, what we should have pursued was a minimalist strategy. We need to accept most of Afghanistan is going to go “native” again. We need to develop a modus vivendi with Kabul. Our shared interest is no more terror training camps. No more open planning of terrorism. This is in Kabul’s interest, since they are as likely to be targets as we are.
This point warrants underscoring. De Toqueville pointed out that believers are not to be killed. Modern Islamic supremecists kill Muslims. This IS categorically un-Koranic, and contrary to most historical patterns, although internecine violence goes back at least to Ali.
We need to avoid idealism, but we need likewise not fall prey to cynicism. No matter what their books say, Muslims are capable of exercising moral judgment in ways with which we are familiar.
Our task is to retain a wanted presence in Afghanistan, do what we can to deny the Taliban sources of funding and means of expansion, but equally to accept that we can’t change the cultural patterns of thousands of years, in countless thousands of hill-billy hollers, by any means other than expending lives and money that could go to better causes.
As far as the rules of engagement, obviously we are trying to be perceived as good guys. If we start shooting everything in sight, that won’t happen. What we need to do is just pull back to the cities, and defend defensible perimeters, and stay close to those who are our natural allies against the religious zealots. I really believe we should start pulling troops. We may wind up with an array of de facto fortresses in a sea of indifference and hostility, but if that is going to be the end result anyway, why not ratify it now?
And if we are unwilling to accept that reality, then we just need to leave, period, unconditionally.





