LAPD has forgotten how to properly deploy a Mobile Field Force (MFF) and the way we do it now it is neither Mobile nor in the Field nor is it a Force. We borrowed MFF in 1993 from Metro-Dade PD in Miami; they developed it in the 1980s to deal with “brush-fire” type civil disturbances, the kind that broke out in 1965, 1992, and last week. Traditionally police departments, including LAPD, have dealt with crowd control/riot situations that were fixed and static: think Lakers events, parades, Democratic National Convention, etc. We knew what the event was, where it was going to be, how many were going to show up, times, etc., and planned accordingly (where to place skirmish lines, where to push crowds, etc). It was rigid and fixed.
In the 1992 riots, besides the leadership/command failure (nothing changes), we learned that you can’t pre-plan for this type of riot using traditional (pre-planned) crowd-control tactics, so we adopted MFF which would make the police as mobile and flexible as the rioters. This placed decision making at the squad and platoon level and good MMF leaders could take their 8, 10 or 12 officers and break up a crowd, stop looting, etc., stabilze an area, and move easily and independently within their area to put out “brush fire” rioting, while following strategic guidance from the Incident Commander (i.e., “stay within these reporting districts”).
A great idea that has actually been done and worked, but typical LAPD- we have lost the spirit of MFF and can only now “do” the big, pre-planned events. Most of us do not even know what MFF really is anymore – we call any crowd control deployment “MFF” even when dealing with fixed events. MFF worked because it took the tactical decision making in riots away from the brass who, to be blunt, have no field/tactical/patrol experience or aptitude (brass should only make strategic, not tactical, decisions, anyway), and gave it to the “on scene” officers who could react according to the situation.
This brings us to another failure: LAPD patrol is a dying/lost art and your best MFF people used to come from patrol officers who dealt with the public every day, knew their beats and had street instinct (they could at least tell scared suburbanites fleeing from the Staples Center from real rioters), and who understood the dynamics of the street. Now, patrol is a second-class citizen in LAPD. Anyone want to disagree? Try to promote above Sergeant if you are a patrol cop. We have almost 10,000 officers and we are putting out only 3-4 patrol units on many watches. LAPD is committed to overspecialization (SWAT, counterterrorism, specialized investigations, admin, etc) and everything is they do theoretical until it hits the street. They train, but training is no subsitute for street experience.
Because patrol is the LAPD backwater patrol sergeants are mostly brand new and trying to get out (they just want to finish probation and get the hell out of the field and back to the building where their command staff sponsor will get them a SGT II spot for their “loyalty” and “service” to the career of their sponsor), and if they are tenured they are often fat, worthless, lazy grumpy types who scam the system, hide in the station, disappear when a supervisor request comes out, call in sick, etc.
As a group many of our current SGTs are incapable of providing the leadership/decision making required for MFF- LTs are totally worthless (but that should go without saying). Most are happy to have the micro-managing LAPD brass tell them exactly what to do (and that’s how you stay out of trouble). As you stated earlier, nowadays few in the LAPD above the rank of sergeant is a real cop anymore (very few exceptions to this) and knows how to deal with these situations, and most sergeants now are not up to the task (inexperience, incompetence and a culture that does not develop leaders).
This can only partly explain what happened last week.
