Snippet writes:
“What they are saying is, in effect, if X cannot be measured – even theoretically – then:
a) It does not exist in any meaningful sense, or, more important:
b) It cannot be an object of scientific inquiry.
The “faith” at the root of the scientific worldview is fundamentally different from the faith that props up religion.”
I don’t think this was aimed at me but it is worth clarifying a few things, should anyone posit a specific connection between this post and the thread JA and I have going:
b) Yes, definitely (and obviously so, given that measurable – in the material sense I presume – and scientific inquiry go hand in hand).
a) Define “meaningful sense.” If the definition is “physical” or “material” (perhaps “directly” would be a good modifier) then, yes and we’re back to b). If not, then I would suggest “meaningful sense” is open to debate. I (and a few others) have addressed this more specifically, but there are clearly some things that meaningfully exist in this universe (ideas, emotions, theories, abstractions, ethical principles, certain axioms) that scientific inquiry cannot get at, beyond a reductionist approach that relies on a great deal of speculation.
The faith (or soft faith) that Snippet refers to is really not “faith” at all. Rather it’s a kind of reaction to consistent experience. I agree that, certain postmodern and skeptical philosophies aside, that reliance upon “the faith that amply confirmed observations are reliable things upon which to base one’s belief system, for the time being.” I would point out that, as constructed, religious experience could point to similar conclusions. So, we’re talking about material/natural observations and only in the context of scientific method. I wouldn’t use the word “faith” in this context.
The use of the word “faith” implies some metaphysical connotations. If by the use of the word you mean, “faith that there is only the material” then I could agree that “faith” is the operative word and would also contend that such a faith is no stronger or better than a faith grounded in certain metaphysical concepts or principles. It is one that is easily reinforced by most direct experience but not by all (nor everyone’s).
In other words, the natural world is easier to get at, but that doesn’t change the fact that faith that the natural world is all there is (or is meaningful), is not any different from faith in meaningful things that exist metaphysically. The core assumption of that faith relies upon something that cannot be directly proven by the methodology the faith is based upon, science.
So the “faith” that props up a materialist (or materialist-oriented) worldview is not actually significantly different. I’m not sure if “category error” is the correct description of this misconception, but clearly the faith is not the same as the science, even if it relies on science. Metaphysics can point to science also to a certain extent, and not simply the gaps. The faith you describe is not the same as science and therefore cannot claim the same type of power that comes from testability and other tenants of the scientific method.
