JA writes:
“In other words, the truths metaphysics seeks to explain are inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense. “We” know they are there, of course, because “we” are here. But we’ll never be able to “think” these truths, or say them.”
I appreciate the patient and polite discourse JA offers and endeavor to continue in that vein. It seems to me that there are two key weaknesses in the line of reasoning JA posits.
First off, there is little that can be explained in a “perfectly precise sense” if one looks closely enough at the thing being explained. Mathematics for example, claims precision, but exists as an abstraction of the reality it describes. A simple example is the concept of 1 + 1 = 2. This is “perfectly precise” in the abstract, but complicated once we decide to apply the equation to two real objects, say apples (if only to keep the Genesis thread fresh in our minds 
. One apple plus one apple equals two apples, but the apples themselves are unique. The equation only serves to describe the precision of counting the objects, which again is an abstraction of the things themselves.
In language, we resort to a number of similar tactics to convey meaning (and Wittgenstein is of course a major authority on how some of this happens) but the assumption that because a truth cannot be expressed in language that it cannot be got at is a falsity.
Thought is another matter, but only because we tend to think in terms of our experience. Yet, reason allows us to reach greater levels of truth in the exploration of the material world, and not always based on direct experience. We synthesize and imagine and draw upon our specific experiences of mind as well as senses to envision certain conclusions.
Take Descartes famous observation “cogito ergo sum,” for example. This is not a simple material formulation. Descartes is addressing a sense of being, and in the context of his philosophical investigations, particularly one that is not necessarily connected to a material reality (though he reached that natural conclusion soon enough). The sense of being is as much a metaphysical truth as a physical truth. Whether or not one believes in metaphysical truths is immaterial, for if they exist, Descartes is clearly onto one.
It is the disagreement in the existence of metaphysical truths that JA latches on to, and this is an assumption, not a methodically proven fact.
Approaching this idea of “perfectly precise” (which is itself an imperfect formulation, but fair enough in a general linguistic sense) physics and the other material sciences offer much that is far from perfectly precise, but is broadly accepted. Evolutionary theory is full of imprecisions (from the origins question regarding DNA to speciation to the question of mind itself), yet practical applications abound. Physics probes deeper and deeper into the minute recesses of material reality and there are many questions left unresolved and even the speculation that reality may be unresolvable in terms of a fundamental material substance/particle/wave.
Yet science clearly presents useful and practical outcomes and observations, and many scientists, partly on faith it would seem, are comfortable ruling out or limiting metaphysical truths based on this far from this “perfectly precise” standing.
One may argue that science is “more precise” than metaphysics but it is arguable that it is not necessarily more practical where some things are concerned. Moral truths/imperatives, for example, do not rely on physicality for their power. There are physical outcomes to the application of these truths, but the truths themselves are not expressly determined by the methodological interrogation of material reality.
In other words, just as science finds some consensus on material matters, humans have found a fair amount of consensus on some matters that could be classified as metaphysical – laws, sense of being. Saying that these are not precise in no way dulls their power or their meaning.
In other cases, such as religious experience, there is a fair amount of testimony. Certainly, one may disbelieve (or believe) such testimony, but the question remains one of one’s faith in the experience and not one of access to the truths of those experiences. We come full circle then to the acceptance (of at least the possibilty) or rejection of metaphysical truths. The assertion that one can not get at their preciseness is itself a kind of word game, divorced from the experience of many.
Finally, the historical aspect of religious experience, of which Christianity provides the strongest example in my opinion (one of many reasons it is my faith), cannot be disregarded as lightly as it is here (and tends to be in philosophy of a secular bent). Yes, there is a variety of such experiences and surely many cannot be true if one of them is. Yet, if one is, then metaphysical truths are among us. That they rely upon faith to draw the viewer to them does not diminish their power as truths (and not simply experiences).
To put it in direct terms, if a man sees God, no matter how many who are not there tell him he is a fool and a liar, the truth remains with him. If others believe in that truth, it reamins the truth, even if the others rely upon faith to access it.
And while this truth may not be falsifiable under the terms of the scientific method, or “precise,” that individual who recognizes it understands their place in the cosmos to a degree that physics and biology cannot reach.
That others deny this does not change the nature of the truth or the way in which it may be reached.
