TO: Ben
RE: The Weakness
“The biggest weakness of this proposal is figuring out who would supervise all these draftees.” — Ben
The backbone of any organization, corporal or corporate, has always been the weakest part. Or the strongest. It depends on the component parts.
I was a young sergeant in the early 70s. I was a young lieutenant in the mid-70s. I know what a disaster befell the Army in what it had done to its NCOs during Nam. Later, reading a book recommended by every general officer who came to speak to the assembled classes at Benning School for Boys, a.k.a., the US Army Infantry School, I learned how the long slide into disaster started….the infamous Doolittle Commission after the end of WWII. It emasculated the entire NCO structure, vesting all REAL authority at the level of full colonels. As a result, when Korea occurred, the only place men stood and fought was where the few full colonels were standing too.
The book is titled This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. Written by a high school history teacher who as called-up during Korea, served through the entire war, was demobilized, went back to school and wrote this book. It’s an EXCELLENT read. Pay particular attention to chapter 25 Proud Legions.
“I’m an NCO, and supervising is my bread and butter. Any given NCO can typically supervise 3 to 5 elements. So a 5 men make a team, up to 3 teams make a squad, 3 squads + weapons squad make a platoon, there are 3 platoons + HQ in a company, and there are maybe three companies plus HHC in a battalion. You wind up with about 20% of the enlisted men being NCOs.” — Ben
True. And the need for them, young corporals through crusty middle-aged first shirts, is all important.
Where do we get them?
At first, in such a program as CNS, in the military options it would no be easy. But, it wasn’t easy rebuilding the NCO corps from the late 70s through the 80s and into the 90s. But it could be done, if the incentives were there to keep the young soldiers after they finished their obligation. And I think we could develop those incentives.
“The whole point of all these draftees and the work corps and the punishment corps is that none of these guys are suitable leaders. So however big those groups are, figure on finding 20% of that, but they have to be leaders capable of maintaining good order and discipline and training these guys in their jobs.” — Ben
For the military options, I agree; as I stated immediately above. However, for the clerical and other such non-military options, I don’t think it would required the ratio of a combat infantry company. Things, I should hope, are not quite so demanding or hectic in the GSA. Maybe the Postal Service when one of their people is having a ‘postal’ sort of day, but hopefully not others.
“It’s tough to be an NCO. The only way I can make it through the day is because my soldiers and I share a sense of purpose. I can’t imagine how I’d feel if I was stuck in charge of a bunch of dirtbags, never accomplishing anything but digging holes and filling them in again, constantly listening to them count down the days, constantly dealing with malingering and lying.” — Ben
I think that under the CNS system, you would not have so many of the malingering sort, as most of them would have volunteered, for the adventure. Furthermore, as I expressed earlier, NCOs would have more authority to deal with such. Even to the point of getting such pains-in-the-fourth-point-of-contact shipped off to the proposed ‘punishment’ formations or discharged under less than honorable conditions; no college fund, no benefits.
“I’ve been stuck supervising our extra-duty guys and it just sucks the life out of you.
I can’t imagine where you would find people who would do that job willingly, and if you drew from the military how it wouldn’t destroy morale and readiness.” — Ben
Like I said, the NCO’s would be able to weed the dirt-bags out of the system, more readily.
Regards,
Chuck(le)
P.S. Keep up the good work, Sarge!
Wish I could be there. I’d turn in my commission and take a bust down to staff sergeant, if I could lead a mech infantry squad in Iraq.
