dph; Point of order: Name-calling and ideological baiting are not customarily regarded as especially enticing invitations to “thoughtful debate.”
In a very small nutshell, the main strategic task which faced the US after 9/11 was to put pressure on the feeder streams of global Jihad, to engage those in the Muslim world who abetted or at least tolerated the virulent and violent strain of takfiri Islamism which had struck us, and to induce them to change their behavior.
Clearly the main source of the Jihadi ideology and resource stream lay in Saudi Arabia, and its ruling clan’s Saitan’s bargain with the Wahhabi clerics and operatives which exported Jihadism abroad. Unfortunately, even leaving aside the devastating effects of military action in SA on the global petroleum markets, the simple fact is that if a bunch of kufirs put boots on the sands of the land of the Two Holy Cities, then we could expect a global Islamic rising the likes of which we can only imagine in our most dreadful nightmares.
Saddam’s Iraq was a pestilence waiting to be unleashed on the world as soon as the sanctions regime fell. Something was going to have to be done about it sooner or later. In addition to this, a bold system perturbation in the heart of the ancient Caliphate would send a message to the Saudis without the need to strike directly. This was the main justification for toppling the Baathist regime, and the fact that it was commonly accepted that Saddam had WMD provided a far more palatable proximate cause for action, regardless of how (apparently) unfounded those near-universal estimates turned out to be.
Shortly after the fall of Saddam’s Baghdad, the Saudis ramped up their anti-terror cooperation, Libya abandoned its nuclear program, and Iran apparently shelved its nuclear weaponization programs. Also, Lebanon expelled its Syrian military controllers, and a raft of pro-democracy movements appeared worldwide. Jihadis, shamed by the rapid conquest of Iraq, swarmed into Mesopotamia to oppose us, and were thus forced to fight at a time and place of our choosing. The fact that the guerrilla nature of that conflict was very badly misread by Rummy’s model of post-invasion Iraq does not invalidate the initial strategy any more than the myriad tactical and strategic blunders throughout WW2 invalidated its central goals.
The prospect of a stabilized, democratic Iraq (albeit clamorous and spasmodic in its birth-pangs) is making totalitarian regimes worldwide (and most particularly those with an Islamist bent) VERY nervous. This is a good thing, even if their efforts to make the project fail will cost much and bring much misery. Those whose actions or inaction would embolden these regimes (and the violent non-state actors which they employ) miss the point, to the peril of us all.
Documentaries like this present the opportunity to engage in dialogue on matters of the utmost importance. It is when they degenerate into partisan polemics that we lose out on the fleshing out of these crucial narratives. Both sides have important points to make, but if this continues to be seen as a bitter zero-sum shouting match, the only beneficiaries will be our foes.
