The flip side of your analysis Mohammed is what does all this do to the SIIC as an organization. Where this faction ends up in the end, and what sort of organization it ends up as, is an open question. On the one hand, it is unlikely to become a political party in the Western sense, but is there anywhere in the Middle East where such parties truly exist. On the other hand, they definitely aren’t anything near the Iranian funded and backed opposition in exile they once where. They could have chosen Iranian backed direct control over the south and the Americans would have found no allies during the insurrection of 2004. Instead they spurned direct control by Iran and worked toward governance with the Americans. This doesn’t make our goals coincide, it makes it an alliance of necessity for both sides. The Americans haven’t gotten the sort of government in Iraq that they really want but possibly have gotten one they can live with.
The necessity of governing and protecting itself has had a profound effect on the SIIC and DAWA. The inability to protect themselves and their reliance on the Americans has already pushed them away from Iran and to moderate their views. Not what we would call moderate but not where they began either. If they wish to further their aims in governing Iraq, they will have no choice but to adapt. So you say the various government ministries are incompetent, factional and largely non-functioning. I agree, but I must point out that last year the government ministries were little more than armed camps for the various militias. Not exactly a resounding improvement but at least you have some progress clearing criminal gangs out of the government buildings and starting to pay salaries and starting rudimentary tasks.
So once again what does all this do to SIIC. It finds itself in the process of transforming from the dominant militant faction to the dominant governing faction. It’s more of a change than many suspect. It’s probably more of a change than the SIIC suspects. Some effectiveness will be expected, they will have to learn to govern. The other question is a governments exclusive monopoly on armed force. I think they will have to accommodate on security too, and don’t think they will get an exclusive situation anytime soon. They will eventually need allies, deals, and compromises if they wish to achieve that though. Some will have to just be dealt with by force. I don’t think either JAM or the criminal organizations that operate as Sadr’s armed faction will be amendable to any sort of political accommodation. Sadr may well survive as a political figure but I doubt if most aggressive armed parts of his organization can be tolerated.
So how will the awakening play into this. I agree that both the SIIC and American interests would like to see it aimed at Sadr’s people. At least for now. Whether the SIIC will be able to avoid scrutiny is yet to be seen. Like any other ruling party at some point they risk their base of support if they consistently come short of supporters expectations. They will find themselves in a position where they will either accommodate others wishes or rule by dictate. I’m not so sure the entirety of Iraq can be ruled by dictate anymore. I’m not even sure to what extent the portions of Iraq are rule-able by dictate. At least not without some sort of mandate even if that is only at the tribal level. Then there is the problem of Baghdad, the mixed center of Iraqi society. There are a limited number of options to rule in Baghdad, find some sort of accommodation, or have a huge force of hundreds of thousands, or take that plunge into the violent abyss. If the Shiites even try to rule Baghdad strictly by force they will have another uprising on their hands.
The real peace is a long way off and the real war has hardly begun. Let’s hope Iraqi’s having seen the abyss will turn away from it.
