I agree with what I have read above, including Mike, with whom I have disagreed before on certain issues, except to say that I simply don’t know what happened concerning the auto that day. It appears to me that the room clearing followed ROE. We have to remember that LCpl Justin Sharratt was a veteran of the 2nd battle for Fallujah, a SAW gunner. This incident, in fact, was not so long after the 2nd battle for Fallujah, and the TTPs in use were essentially the same.
Further, concerning room clearing procedures, many veterans of the 2nd battle for Fallujah became DIs (in boot) and instructors at SOI, and teach the same things that they did in Fallujah, as well they should.
As to cordon and knock, very well. Do it that way, and I have no problem with it. It appears that in Haditha that day and around the time of this incident, the level of hostilities and danger made it such that the decision had not been made to engage differently. Anyone can second guess this approach, but since it is in the past, this is not the point.
Again, I don’t know what happened concerning the auto. These parts of the reports are the least clear. The clearer reports come from roon clearing, and it appears that they all followed standard TTPs in use at the time. So says Lt. Col. Paul Ware.
