Well folks what has the “surge” shown us so far.
1. A counterinsurgency strategy of clear, hold, and rebuild, is working in Sunni parts of Iraq were the strategy is applied rigorously. General Petraeus’s strategy now is very different from previous years in that it is now an effort to secure population areas. This is opposed to the former practice of patrolling from large hub bases and reacting to insurgent activity. The former practice made targets of our soldiers and did little to influence insurgent spread into communities.
2. The counterinsurgency campaign is not producing a large increase in US casualties as some expected. In fact casualty rates are still similar to the second half of last year when insurgent activity was at it’s peak.
3. Insurgents forced out of Baghdad have popped up to take over cities in the North as feared by many detractors. New IA units have now backfilled for units taken earlier from northern Iraq for the first part of the “surge” in Baghdad. Effective intelligence operation have decimated attempts at increasing insurgent activity in Mosul, Baiji, and Tikrit. Insurgent are now restricted to rural areas and pockets in and around major population centers.
4. Local allies can be made especially in Anbar provence. In fact there seems to be no shortage of allies to be made in controlled areas. Whether this develops into the roots of local governance only time will tell.
5. Self policing has been much more effective in Sunni areas than anyone dared imagine. This only works in a rigorous security context where the locals receive consistent support from US and IA forces.
6. Areas of control are slowly expanding from Anbar into the Western fringes of Baghdad. The security situation for most areas of West Baghdad are improving with south west Baghdad still being a sore spot. The Thar Thar – Taji irrigation canal is somewhat of a boundary with areas to the north between Taji and Balad contested or still under AQI control.
While a lot has been accomplished with security operations against Al Quada in Iraq efforts against Sadr and JAM haven’t been nearly as extensive thus far. The US and IA simply don’t have enough forces to aggressively pursue both at the same time. Right now there is a policy to hold JAM in check and to go aggressively after bombing and rocket cells. Than there is the political situation surrounding the Iraqi government, which is a lengthy topic for another time.
