Merkur,

I agree with your point that if WMD did not exist, it would be impossible to account for them: one cannot prove a negative.

So by itself, the logic of the inspections didn’t “work,” a logical faux-pas I found troubling even as the inspections were being undertaken.

And if all we had to go on was Colin Powell’s UN testimomy, I’d almost certainly agree with you in retrospect, especially given the logically-impossible requirement underlying the inspections that the Iraqi government “prove a negative.”

But the determination that Saddam Hussein had WMD was made long before Mr. Powell’s testimony, dating well back to the mid 90′s: it was the strongly-held consensus of virtually every intelligence agency who investigated the matter, and was the official position of the UN (which is why that august body approved sanctions).

In this connection, we know that France, China and Russia each had strong historic ties with and economic interests in Saddam’s Iraq, and saw it in their best interests to avert an invasion, preferring to see sanctions simply fizzle away over time.

If they had had any second thoughts about the existence of WMDs in Iraq, why would they not play that card in order to avert the invasion that threatened to cost them billions?

So — Colin Powell’s comments merely supplemented (albeit most dramatically and persuasively) what was already known. In my opinion, it was so plausible, and so consistent with what their own intelligence services were telling them, that those 3 countries in particular saw no basis to claim otherwise.

I’m afraid I don’t find either the vintage of the weapons or the “small amounts” of them to be insignificant: they were significant precisely because Mr. Hussein had admitted to having them, but had not accounted for their destruction.

Having failed to account for such “small amounts”, one had to wonder why they were not accounted for; whether or not they had been maintained; and whether or not other WMD had been newly constructed or acquired and hidden along with the pre-91 weapons. The obstructionist behavior of the Iraqis towards the inspectors was also troubling.

So IMO the “failure to account” was highly significant, far more so than either the vintage of the weapons found, their condition or their numbers or amounts.

I notice I misspelled “Merkur” in my last post. Sorry — it was unintentional.

Brian