The Air Surge Is Working, Too
Several weeks ago on January 10, U.S. air strikes dropped 40,000 pounds of bombs in ten minutes on targets south of Baghdad. The strikes occurred two days into a new offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq in an operation dubbed Marne Thunderbolt, which is part of a larger nationwide offensive, Phantom Phoenix. Two B1 bombers and four F16 fighters took part in the attack.
An Associated Press account recalled:
U.S. warplanes unleashed one of the most intense airstrikes of the Iraq war Thursday, dropping 40,000 pounds of explosives in a thunderous 10-minute onslaught on suspected al-Qaida in Iraq safe havens in Sunni farmlands south of Baghdad.
The mighty barrage-recalling the Pentagon’s “shock and awe” raids during the 2003 invasion-appeared to mark a significant escalation in a countrywide
offensive launched this week to try to cripple remaining insurgent
strongholds.
A blogger at liberal blog Firedoglake huffed in response:
I’m sure this means we’re winning…
…That the insurgency — five years after “Mission Accomplished” — is still powerful and entrenched enough to draw airstrikes of that size, that close to Baghdad, should tell Americans everything they need to know about how completely futile this war is.
At The Moderate Voice, Swaraaj Chauhan wheezed:
After shamelessly proclaiming from rooftops that situation is normalising in Iraq, the US administration would find it difficult to explain why it has to resort to “shock and awe” strategy even after five years of occupation of that country.
In the minds of these bloggers and in the minds of some journalists (especially in some Arab news outlets), the size of the air strike in the rural date palms and farmland south of Baghdad is evidence that the “surge” of U.S. forces in Iraq, the counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine being implemented, and the overall war in Iraq, is a failure.
Not quite.
In fact, they’re dead wrong.
According to Col. Terry Ferrell, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID, the intelligence to plan the Jan. 10 air strikes came from local Iraqi civilians “protecting their own, protecting their towns” from al Qaeda in Iraq. The purpose of the Jan. 10 strikes was to eliminate defensive positions, including weapons caches and IEDs (including HBIEDs–structural bombs, homes rigged with heavy explosives) targeted at approaching coalition forces.
Local Iraqi civilians collected enough intelligence over the last several months to pinpoint more than 40 targets.
According to Col .Steven Boylan, many of the bombs dropped during the strike targeted deep-buried IEDs. Boylan also noted that many of the strikes triggered “numerous secondary explosions confirming the hits.” He also confirmed that this was “very sparsely populated area,” and that Iraqi civilians were evacuated in advance of the strikes.
On January 19, Bob Deans of Cox News Service noted that far from being a sign of failure, the new air campaign in Iraq is a sign of success of General Petraeus’ COIN doctrine. Deans wrote:
One day last week, forces from the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division
spotted a set of bunkers south of Baghdad identified as training sites
for al-Qaida recruits.No firefight followed. No American troops were killed. Instead, the bunkers were destroyed by 34,000 pounds of satellite-guided bombs dropped from a B-1 Lancer flying high overhead…
…Although the public and political focus over the last year has centered on the addition of some 30,000 U.S. ground troops in Iraq since last spring, the air surge appears to have played a vital role in reducing American casualties in recent months and helping to disrupt and demoralize insurgents and terrorists, military officials say.
“Keeping soldiers off the ground keeps them safe,” said Maj. James Wilburn, daytime chief of operations in Iraq for the 2nd Brigade combat team of the 3rd Infantry Division. “So we make every effort to use air assets when circumstances allow.”
You’ll note that this was a separate strike than the Jan. 10 strike, but that it had similar results: no U.S. casualties, no known civilian casualties, and the destruction of al Qaeda targets. The use of air power to help secure the area for coalition forces was followed up on the the creation of a new combat outpost.
Critics of air power are quick to assert that the use of aircraft is sure to increase civilian casualties. That assumption is built upon the old technology of “dumb” bombs and far-less-exact intelligence gathering methods than those currently being used. In the same article, Deans quotes Marc Garlasco of Human Rights Watch:
…the air surge has not caused “an appreciable loss of civilian life.”
“It is very deliberate; they are very careful,” Garlasco said. “The way that the Air Force is fighting there now is in lockstep with the hearts and minds strategy on the ground.”
Similar air strikes against fixed targets identified by Iraqi civilians and U.S. intelligence have continued over the past few weeks, but have garnered far less media attention. On Jan. 20, 19,000 pounds of precision bombs destroyed 35 targets. By that point in Marne Thunderbolt, close air support strikes targeting weapon caches and IEDs had destroyed 99 targets in Arab Jabour, with no known civilian loss of life. Such targeted strikes have continued on an admitted smaller scale, with almost no media attention. According to Air Force Link, coalition aircraft flew 51 close-air support missions in Iraq on Jan. 29, including strikes that targeted a HBIED.
Perhaps critics of the “air surge” will take the success of Iraqi-provided targeting as a sign that the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq is indeed working… but I wouldn’t hold my breath.
Bob Owens blogs at Confederate Yankee.
The commenters from the left side of the “Let’s win this fight/Let’s lose this fight” bipole will NEVER be persuaded or understand that they do not know what they think they know. For example, to the “airstrikes of that size, that close to Baghdad,” I’d ask them what is the lethal radius of 500#, 1000# and 2000# JDAM’s, respectively. And how close to the laser designator do they actually strike? I am certain their response would be condemnation of JDAM’s, including snots and sneers. And the “why it has to resort to ‘shock and awe’ strategy”, I’d ask, why is it a “resort”? And I’d also ask, what are the various other options for destroying such targets, strengths and weaknesses, etc. And the snarky question, “So, if we’d sent in soldiers or Marines instead of aircraft, you’d accept US casualties in a trade off for potential civilian casualties?” We know their answer to this one. As Van der Leun says, “Their teeth will catch fire”. I work with someone who, having just said “It’s only about the oil” answered my question, “Well, where’s the oil” with an angry, “They screwed that up too!”. Really. If socialized medicine, er Universal Health Care can cure BDS, …hmmm.
Let me take a stab at it.
Iraqis with intelligence to target Al Qaeda in Iraq and subsequent successful missions is a sign that Iraq is lost.
Darn. This is beyond X-files logic
40,000 pounds might sound like a lot, but how many bombs is that actually? Don’t bombs weigh like 1000 pounds? So it was 40 bombs? If they weigh 2000 then it was 20 bombs. Doesn’t sound like a massive raid.
While I appreciate the sentiment in this post, and while it is also interesting and contains good information for the reader, it is somewhat misleading (although unintentionally, I’m sure).
The heavier use of air power has nothing, per se, to do with the surge. Nor does the USAF call what they’re doing a surge. This is part and parcel of an overall strategic implementation of air power in small wars, something that had been debated as far back as last year in the air force by the likes of Major General Dunlap:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/06/05/air-power-in-small-wars/
While my blog is a “ground-pounder” blog, and while air power can NEVER supplant the infantry (the infantry is king in small wars), its use was welcomed (by me and others) and was intended to get the AF back in the COIN fight and re-engage their people in the global war.
I’m saying that it is a doctrinal development rather than simply part of the surge in Iraq. There is official and formal effort going on within the AF community to formulate this participation in small wars into doctrine at the highest levels of the AF. They overplay their hand and claim too much, but their increased participation should still be welcomed by the Army and Marines to the extent that they are useful and can control collateral damage.
If they (the AF) have to write doctrine that tells them that they’re important to the GWOT in order to sell their increased participation, then so be it. Doctrine is just that. What’s important is leveraging all assets.
Just like it has nothing to do with the surge, it also has nothing to do with losing or other leftist talking points (the left is here apparently just behind the times about a year – they should be reading my blog and other Milblogs). The doctrinal development of air power in small wars and COIN will continue in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places where our forces are deployed.
Also not discussed here (or in the post I link) is that part of this has to do with the fear (probably justified) that unless the AF re-engages in the fight, they will lose their standing to UAVs controlled by the Army. In fact, the AF has tried to take over responsibility for UAVs from the Army, something on which they have received pushback from the Army — obviously.
But of course drop[ping bombs does those in the air no harm. But today, the day this was posted not one but two women suicide bombers killed a heck of a lot of people. The real issue is not surge working or not working but the obvious fact not talked about that there is nothing like a political settlement and the infrastructure and the needs for electricity, water etc are worse now than they were before the invasion.
And if you read with care reports from Afghsnistan you will see that the people are now beginning to welcome help from the Taliban and hat group of misfits is once again making headway in that poppy-ridden nation.
If they invite you to a conference in Key West, don’t go.
Regards,
Ric
I can’t help noting that the author of the source articles saw fit to note the poundage of explosives (implication: 19,000! gasp! carpet bombing! dead brown babies!), not the number of bombs or the precision of the strikes
Folks, 19,000 lbs is only 38 500-lb. bombs, to destroy 35 targets…precisely in lock-step with the hearts-and-minds strategy of the infantry.
What force made Japanese give up the way of the Bushido and the Prussians give up their Heidelberg dueling scars? Military force and total defeat. We did not appeal to be better angels of their nature. I do not know what motivates the Taliban or Al Queada and their suicide bombers, but I do know that our sudden retreat will not cause them to disavow their despicable ideology. Joseph Kennedy, our ambassador to England during the blitz, saw in Churchill not the face of Western Democracy(which he was) but the face of British Imperialism(which, to some extent, he also was). Kennedy recommended detachment from the cause of the British. Those leftists who see only imperialism in our presence in these distant lands are as blind as Kennedy.
Mr. Hill: I trust that you aren’t drawing too much of a conclusion based on the two bombs (I don’t think remote detonated bombs on the retarded count as ‘suicide’). Taken in the context of trends, past situations, etc. gives this event much less traction (though it DOES indicate that perhaps eager martyrs are getting tougher to find these days… but, for myself as well, it’s too few data points to draw too much of a conclusion). The power situation in Iraq is, if not a canard, at least rarely spoken of in the correct context: for those that would point out too little power, they should also say how much demand has increased (you know, for perspective). Since Iraqi power isn’t metered, you or I can only make a guess, but having put my own eyes on a lot more consumer electronics and A/C units in 2006 than in 2004, I know which way -I- think the demand is trending. Point being: context. In the realm of a war, no matter how small, 40k lbs of bombs isn’t a big deal. Proximity to Baghdad is only interesting for those looking for a gripe… two or three times the ECR and it’s only important in terms of news cycles. If you are comparing the infrastructure and government capabilities of Iraq and Afghanistan, and trying to draw conclusions on either one based on the other, I’d suggest that you are on the wrong track and likely haven’t witnessed either one in person (not that only those that have been there can comment on such things, but just that it really is apples and oranges in all but the most general of terms… and seeing it helps with, again, perspective and context).
So I’m not saying anything that you said is incorrect… but I would say it is incomplete.
“Joe Hill,”
Land sakes, buddy, I thought you were hanged in Utah way back in 1915. Good to see you’re still alive. How’d that IWW-thing turn out anyway?
As for your assertion, “the [Afghan] people are now beginning to welcome help from the Taliban…,” please define “help” for the rest of the class. For example, is it kind of like when a “wiseguy” offers his “help” to a store owner in return for a weekly cash payment?
Inquiring minds want to know.
Mr Hill:
Perhaps the reason why you don’t hear much talk about a political settlement is because the media is blinded to any success in Iraq. All the military folks know that only a political settlement will work, and that they are only providing stability in Iraq until Iraw can provide its own security and develop its own political settlement.
We military types know that war is the use of force to help achieve political objectives, as Clausewitz first put into words two centuries ago. Contrariwise, if the use of force won’t help achieve political objectives, then don’t use force! (or the military)
So has anyone ever stated what the political objectives are in Bosnia or Kosovo that the military is aiding? Or how the military is aiding any political objectives? At the time, after we went in, John McCain correctly identified maintaining the credibility of NATO as a reason for REMAINING, but to my knowledge, no one has ever identified how the use of force would aid any specified political objective.
Our Lefties were delighted when Clinton and Wes Clark bombed the crap out of Belgrade, killing 2,000 innocent civilians (But no Americans were killed! Oh, joy!). But now they complain about precison strikes to kill non-Iraqi AQ and destroy their infrastructure. How trite.
I’ve tried to engage two lefties recently about current events in Iraq, and both refused to discuss what’s going on. AQ is losing and so are their Leftie stooges.
ATO for the day says that Mr. Bone shall be a dumptruck. Guess what? Even though not very glamorous, Mr. Bone will show up with a full load-out, Sniper pod, full bag of gas, and all the time in the world to rain hell down on the enemy.
What’s not to like? HELL, I LOVE IT!
Left? Right? Who cares; so long as the BAD guys LOSE!
My recollector, sometimes faulty, says the frag pattern of a conventionally-fused MK-82 500 lb bomb is about 500 meters. Bigger bombs don’t frag appreciably farther. Daisy cutter fuse extends some, not too much. Frag pattern does not equal lethality or C E P.
Swaraaj Chauhan is far left truffer fruitcake. Featuring him over at the (not-so)”Moderate Voice” is his friend Joe Gandelman, who thinks we shouldn’t be too hard on him for is idiocy because he’s a “nice guy.” Never mind that his “work” is conspiricy theory dreck of the first magnitude. Saying he “wheezes” is a compliment. It must have been one his “better” days.