The Specter of Muslim Disloyalty in America
Muslim disloyalty in the military is becoming commonplace, but how prevalent is it in society — not to mention in the U.S. government?
September 13, 2010 - 12:03 am
Nor is Muslim loyalty simply limited to the fear of killing fellow Muslims; rather, it is loyalty in the tribal sense (not surprising, since Islam transferred the tenacity of Arab tribal loyalty onto the umma, whereby Islam became a “super tribe,” transcending race and language). Thus, for helping convict five Muslims who were plotting to kill American soldiers in the Fort Dix terrorism trial, Mahmoud Omar has been ostracized by the Muslim community. Why? Because “in a twisted way … their [the terrorists’] actions are understandable in the Muslim community.” Omar adds, “For Muslims, we are all brothers, and I betrayed a brother”— echoing Muhammad’s ancient injunction: “A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim.”
Prominent American Muslim jurists have further proclaimed that “it is forbidden to work for the FBI or for U.S. security services because these harm Muslims.” Another Muslim jurist said it is permissible for Muslims to serve in the U.S. military — provided they are not “involved in fighting, harming, or even bothering Muslims at all.” Similarly, the authoritative Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America issued a fatwa stating that it is “not permissible” for American Muslims to send aid, even food, to American troops serving in Muslim countries.
At this point, one may justly ask: if Muslim disloyalty to non-Muslims is a ubiquitous phenomenon, why are most examples limited to the military? Simple: Islam is primarily concerned with actual deeds; and the military is one of those rare institutions that requires people to demonstrate their loyalty through action, that is, by going to the frontlines and, if need be, combating America’s enemies — even if they be one’s coreligionists. It is therefore only natural that Muslim loyalty/disloyalty is primarily revealed in military related scenarios, including instrumental support via food or other aid. Concerning this latter, Muhammad said, “One [Muslim] who equips a person on his way to raid [the enemy’s camps] in Allah’s path [jihad] is considered to have the same status as the raider [jihadist].” The willing Muslim financial enabler of the infidel American soldier thus acquires the same infidel status.
As for all other instances that require Muslims to indicate their loyalty, the doctrine of taqiyya, which revolves around deceiving non-Muslims, offers relief, and is in fact essential for Muslim minorities living in America who want to uphold the doctrine of loyalty and enmity. Indeed, the Koran’s primary justification for deception is in the context of loyalty: “Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah — unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions” (Koran 3:28). Tabari explains this verse: “Only when you are in their [non-Muslims’] power, fearing for yourselves, are you to demonstrate friendship for them with your tongues, while harboring hostility toward them. But do not join them in the particulars of their infidelities, and do not aid them through any action against a Muslim.”
In other words, when necessary, Muslims are permitted to feign friendship and loyalty to non-Muslims, or, in the words of Abu Darda, a pious companion of Muhammad, “We smile in the face of some people although our hearts curse them.” Nearly fourteen-hundred years later, American Muslim Tarik Shah, after being arrested for terrorist-related charges, boasted: “I could be joking and smiling [with infidels] and then cutting their throats in the next second.”
At any rate, such is the symbiotic relationship that Islam’s doctrines share: when the deceit, the charade is to no avail and the lives of fellow Muslims, whom are deserving of loyalty, become endangered, Muslims must then stand their ground, come what may. Thus an Akbar, Hasan, or Abdo may appear as perfectly loyal American citizens, until being required to prove their loyalty against Muslims. As Zawahiri puts it in his treatise, the Muslim may pretend, so long as he does “not undertake any initiative to support them [non-Muslims], commit sin, or enable [them] through any deed or killing or fighting against Muslims” (The Al Qaeda Reader, p.75).
The ramifications of this doctrine are clearly troubling, especially since the only factor that determines Muslim loyalty/disloyalty — being enlisted in the U.S. military and asked to deploy to Muslim nations — is rare, and experienced by far less than .1% of America’s Muslims. Where do the rest’s unspoken loyalties lie? Moreover, it is one thing if the average American Muslim harbors loyalty to fellow Muslims, including terrorists such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. It is quite another if that Muslim happens to be in a position of authority in the United States. This observation naturally leads to a president who up to 24% of Americans and many Muslims believe is a clandestine Muslim and who at least appears to have been raised a Muslim: Barack Hussein Obama.
While there is no proof that he is a Muslim — indeed, no less an authority than Jeremiah Wright, the fellow who used to bellow “God damn America!” recently vouched for Obama’s Christianity — the point here is simple: if an American president was a secret Muslim, and if he was lying about it, and even if he was secretly working to subvert the U.S. to Islam’s advantage — not only would such an approach comport with Islam’s doctrines on loyalty and deception, but it would have ample precedents, stretching back to the dawn of Islam. Such as when Muhammad commanded one Na‘im bin Mas‘ud, a convert to Islam from an adversarial tribe that refused to accept Islam, to conceal his new Muslim identity, go back to his tribe — which he cajoled with a perfidious “You are my stock and my family, the dearest of men to me” — only to betray them to Islam.