On Negotiating with the Taliban
The United States has taken a crash course in counterinsurgency these recent years. It has not been a military affair alone. The confirmation that counterinsurgencies also require a political solution — and an indigenous one at that — has not so much been a lesson learned as a preexisting theory validated. In Iraq, for example, Gens. David Petraeus and Odierno relied heavily on the invaluable contributions of Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his team of professionals. Together their joint military-diplomatic tact, the Iraq surge, led to very, very good things.
There exists the possibility, however, that the Obama administration, along with our European allies, might extract the wrong lesson from the successful pacification of Iraq — and disastrously apply it to Afghanistan. I speak of negotiating with the Taliban. As this is written, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon are hosting an international conference in London, the purpose of which is to design a strategy and find consensus on how best to “buy off” the Taliban.
While the official American position has yet to be publicly divulged, U.S. officials seem to welcome the idea. Indeed, there have been reports that suggest it has been the West that is pressuring an otherwise reluctant Karzai to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban. Secretary of Defense Gates recently called the Taliban “part of the political fabric of Afghanistan at this point.” General McChrystal has said, “I think that the reintegration of fighters can take a lot of the energy out of the current levels of the insurgency.”
No one in principle should be against cutting deals with whomever we must to save American lives. After more than eight years of war, Afghanistan remains a lethal land. There were twice as many U.S. fatalities in Afghanistan in 2009 as there were in 2008; coalition deaths were up, as well. A cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan would be welcome in its own right and there would also be, hypothetically, a few strategic benefits to “calming” the war theater.
There can be no enduring peace in Afghanistan without addressing significant challenges in Pakistan. More significantly, there can be no peace in the “Af-Pak” region — and the broader Middle East itself — until the Islamic Republic of Iran collapses. So why up the ante militarily in Afghanistan, a mere proxy conflict, when we have yet to wholeheartedly throw our geopolitical weight around with the far more important Pakistanis and Iranians (or so the logic goes)? As Churchill once said, “To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.”
Needless to say, Afghanistan is a very complicated, complex place. Could such an olive branch with the Taliban be the key to winding down the war? There are three reservations, in particular, that should give our policymakers a moment of pause.
For starters, the Taliban have never given any inkling of indication that they are prepared to surrender — for whatever niceties we have offered them. The Taliban have already rejected the most recent attempt to hold peace talks with the United States and Afghan government. For years, the Taliban have continuously mocked and ridiculed the idea of negotiating with the West as “lunatic” efforts to “deviate their minds.” Why would we believe that their minds have changed? Delegations from the UN have been misled by people like Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, the former foreign minister of the Taliban, who surrendered to the United States in 2002. For years, Mutawakil has insisted he could convince the rest of the Taliban to follow his enlightened lead — and we have, unbelievably, believed him. The Taliban consider him nothing more than a coward interested in postbellum political power. It’s time we do the same. Mutawakil will not deliver peace.
Great analysis!!!
Even if the Taliban would somewhat agree with conditions set by the West, does it occur to anyone that the Koran teaches that it is ok to lie to achieve its end? It is permitted to lie to advance islam. Nothing they offer would end well.
I read the message differently. Luring the fighters over is different from capitulation. If you lure them when you are winning it is tactical shrewdness but when you are in a stalemate if you do that it is capitulation. The western powers have already lost grit and the willingness to fight. Afgahnistan will be Talibanised and so will the West be. It is only a matter of time, Insha Allah!
Re 2. Tactical shrewdness from a position of strategic defense can only result in a draw at best: stalemate. Ergo, it then is merely a matter of switching to a posture of strategic offense: take no prisoners. May I suggest the systematic liquidation of Islamic civilization, otherwise know as genocide? The West, the Orthodox East, and the Han have the technology, the history, and the expertise. It’s just a matter of will. See ya!
Inge, yes this has occured to me too. “Mutawakil has insisted he could convince the rest of the Taliban to follow his enlightened lead”. Sounds more like a trap. Apparently those who believe him don’t know what a wolf in sheep’s clothing looks like.
That the Taliban want nothing other than to be a “theocratic woman-brutalizing Taliban regime” in control of the country is absolutely right. Handing political power over to them in exchange for human rights (that’s what it’s about isnt it?) will bring the illusion of less violations but it will exist just the same. Instead of executions in public stadiums, they will simply go underground.
Jamir, is that a threat? The one thing the Taliban and Muslim countries in general do not have that Americans do have is women who have ‘grit and a willingness’ to fight. You see the worst thing about the Taliban is it’s subjugation of women. American women will never stand for it and we will do whatever it takes to protect our freedom. Our society is structured in such a way as to make this possible: education, The Bill of Rights, The Constitution, our own money and political influence just to name a few things that are on our side. Don’t forget courage. Oh, yes, and American men who won’t stand for oppression either.
Grit and willingness is not waning as much as some would like you to believe. The same was said prior to the troop surge in Iraq. Once the surge began to have it’s effect, the nay-sayers had egg on their faces. If this can happen in Afghanistan, thru troop surge or a “weaning” of the Taliban as is suggested, remains to be seen.
I’ve got a much better idea. Let’s have an eternal war in Afghanistan, where we can send our grandkids to lose limbs and make sure that they won’t have any kind of economy whatsoever to come back to. That’s a much better idea. Sigh. My hero.
Attempting to negotiate with a party who has no desire to negotiate is the ultimate fool’s errand, but again fools can receive Nobel peace prizes.