General on Benghazi Intervention: ‘We Should Have Tried… Always Move to the Sound of the Guns’
Could U.S. forces have reached the consulate in time? “We may have been able to, but we’ll never know," retired official tells panel.
May 1, 2014 - 6:12 pm
WASHINGTON – A retired brigadier general who served as deputy director for intelligence at the U.S. Africa Command during the 2012 attack on the consulate in Benghazi, Libya, told a House panel Thursday that military officials quickly realized the encounter was a “hostile action” by terrorists – not a protest-turned-violent as initially portrayed by the Obama administration.
Former Air Force Gen. Robert Lovell, who spent 33 years in uniform, told the House Oversight & Government Reform Committee that command headquarters in Germany didn’t know how long the Sept. 11, 2012, assault on the U.S. Consulate that resulted in four deaths, including that of Ambassador Chris Stephens, would last.
“Nor did we completely understand what we had in front of us, be it a kidnapping, rescue, recovery, protracted hostile engagement or any or all of the above,” Lovell said. “But what we did know quite early on was that this was a hostile action. This was no demonstration gone terribly awry.”
Lovell’s claim counters statements issued in the immediate aftermath by the White House and approved by the Central Intelligence Agency that asserted the confrontation arose as a result of an anti-Muhammad video that appeared on YouTube and led to widespread protests across the Muslim world.
The facts gathered by Africa Command quickly “led to the conclusion of a terrorist attack,’’ Lovell said.
Lovell is the first veteran of the Africa Command to counter the administration’s initial explanation of the incidents in Benghazi, rationales that have been criticized and questioned by Republicans since the time of the incident. But Jay Carney, President Obama’s spokesman, insisted on Thursday that citing the ant-Muslim video as the cause of the attack “was the best information we had at the time.”
“The fact that there were protests around the region threatening our embassies at the very same time is something that is often forgotten, but obviously affected the whole environment about how we perceived what was happening at the time,” Carney said. “And again, the implication is that we were somehow holding back information, when, in fact, we were simply saying what we thought was right. And when elements of that turned out not to be true, we were the first people to say so. It was based on what we knew at the time.”
Lovell also questioned the nation’s response to news about the attack, insisting that the State Department under then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton failed to ask the military to launch an operation to reach the Americans in distress, an action he said should have been taken even if that endeavor proved futile. Instead, the Pentagon reined in forces, asserting that personnel couldn’t have reached the scene in time to prevent any fatalities.
“There are accounts of time, space and capability discussions of the question, ‘Could we have gotten there in time to make a difference?’” Lovell said. “Well, the discussion is not in the ‘could or could not’ in relation to time, space and capability. The point is we should have tried. As another saying goes — always move to the sound of the guns.”
Lovell said there was “desperation” in Africa Command headquarters as military personnel sought to “gain situational awareness and to be able to do something to save people’s lives.”
“Basically, there was a lot of looking to the State Department for what they wanted and the deference to the Libyan people and the sense of deference to the desires of the State Department in terms of what they would like to have,” he added.