Last month, according to reports, an Iranian Revolutionary Guards-owned cargo plane was escorted to Diyarbakir airport and forced to land by a small formation of Turkish fighter jets. The plane, said to have been headed to Syria, was carrying 600 kilos of explosives, as well as rocket launchers, mortars, Kalashnikovs, and approximately $560 million. The government of Turkey claims several sources tipped them off, including one American military source, who requested that the pilot of the cargo plane be forced to land on Turkish soil.
Turkish authorities are said to have requested a list of the contents of the plane from the Iranian regime, in response to its demand for the return of its plane along with the contents. So far, the Iranian regime has not responded, likely fearing that providing such a list would be admitting that they actually dared to fly over Turkish airspace in order to deliver arms and money to Lebanon, Syria, and Hezbollah.
The question remains: How did the U.S. and international intelligence sources have access to such information? Have the most classified intelligence and security sectors of the Revolutionary Guards been penetrated? Dozens more examples have now come to light, making it clear that not only have the Revolutionary Guards been breached, but also the heart of the supreme leadership. For example:
The escapes of various nuclear experts and military commanders, such as former Revolutionary Guards’ Brigadier General Ali-Reza Asgari, who was also a former deputy defense minister.
The mysterious explosion in the suburbs of Tehran in the summer of 2008 which destroyed a Revolutionary Guards convoy carrying military equipment destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon, killing at least 15 people and injuring scores more.
A similar explosion in 2010 at Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missiles depot inside a Revolutionary Guards’ base located in the western Iranian province of Lurestan. More than 18 were killed and many injured along with the destruction of many missiles.
The Stuxnet virus, which infected the Iranian nuclear facilities, was most likely carried out by an asset on the ground.
Reports pointed to an informant inside the Guards after an illegal Iranian arms shipment of rockets and grenades destined for Gambia was discovered in Nigeria last October, and Quds Force commander Azim Aghajani, who was posing as a businessman, was subsequently arrested.