Gates May Scrap Marines’ Ship Project — As He Should
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has signaled that the long-awaited and seriously over-budget Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) may be the next high-profile project scrapped — the latest in a series of moves meant to streamline the Pentagon’s budget and refocus the military on future challenges.
The EFV, an amphibious armored troop transport, was designed to replace the tired AAV-7A1, a 1970s-era vehicle that has had its service life extended several times as the Marine Corps has sought a replacement.
Both vehicles occupy a specific niche that few vehicles in the world can (or try) to match. They are purpose-designed to transport Marines from the well deck of amphibious assault ships — “swimming” out the back of these massive carrier-like ships and carrying Marines ashore to conduct assaults on defended beaches. Once ashore, the Marine infantry pile out the back of the vehicles to conduct ground operations, while the armored amphibians use their tracks to crawl off the beach and provide close-in and mid-range fire support for the infantry through turret-mounted weapons systems. After the amphibious landing is over and the beach is secured, these tracked vehicles are used much as traditional armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.
On paper, replacing the AAV-7A1 with a modernized amphibious troop carrier seems a no-brainer. Such vehicles are closely tied to the image the world developed of Marines in World War II, which saw the use of armored tractors called LVTs. Used from Tarawa onward, the use of amphibious armor became an integral part of Marine Corps doctrine.
But does a doctrine last employed in 1950 still have relevance in today’s world, against current and future enemies, and the expanded use of “smart” weapons systems? Are the millions being invested in the continued development of the EFV being spent to create a vehicle that will best serve current and future Marines?
The theory behind the EFV is that the high-speed planing performance of the craft would enable it to launch amphibious invasions from “over the horizon” — 25 miles out to sea, beyond the range of shore guns and line-of-sight shore-launched missiles that could target the multi-billion dollar amphibious assault ships (and other costly vessels of our modernized, smaller Navy). But the “over the horizon” doctrine that was the rationale behind the EFVs costly and problematic amphibious systems was envisioned during the 1980s. Evolving threats 30 years later include guided artillery and fire-and-forget missile systems that make the EFVs potential sitting ducks long before they ever hit the beach — turning them into seagoing coffins.
Likewise, the evolving threats posed by ship- and shore-launched cruise missiles mean that the 25 miles envisioned for “over the horizon” operations is no longer valid. Naval vessels can now be struck out to 100 miles or more — far beyond the swimming range of the EFV.
Doctrine and entrenched attitudes are the hardest things to overcome.
Irony can be such a beautiful thing.
Is your crystal ball working better than mine, that you know what equipment and capabilities the US military will need in future conflicts?
Truman and his cabinet decided all sorts of ‘outdated’ military capabilities would no longer be necessary in the postwar nuclear environment, and cut them relentlessly. Then the Korean war broke out – and US troops paid a huge price in blood for those dollars saved in peacetime.
As I watch more and more of our conventional warfighting capability get pared away in favor of focusing on COIN operations, I can’t help but feel a sense of deja vu.
Save money now, pay in blood later; SOP for politicians.
Dissing Truman is like fighting the last war, no?
One of my favorite “weapons” is the czech hedgehog. It’s three strips of steel bolted together and stuck in the road and it looks like a jack. In WWII, placed correctly, it would stop a tank or even a column of tanks. Sometimes I think we forget how much ingenuity was used to win that war. Good article – what we need more than anything is fresh ideas.
bob, try as you may i’m not convinced; specially if the marine generals says they are required. the allied efforts in the second world war were a year late largely because they had no amphibious landing craft ready. amphibious assault is basic to warfare, not just an obsolete thing, as you say. you didn’t exhaust by a long shot all the times they would be needed, such as if we had to stealthily land in a country that has firmly joined the axis of evil, say venezuela or brazil, trading now in such a manner to break the sanctions against iran. amphibious assault is a key element in any number of scenarios involving countries that are smaller and limited in their weapons capability. you read churchill’s second world war – for chapter after chapter we were cursing the day for not having an ambhibious capability for thousands of troops. and you didn’t address their usefulness in a potential dunkirk situation; if we are at war with iran, or if only israel were (though I can’t imagine the u.s. not joining) then we are vulnerable to a couple million iranians flowing over the border at our troops that will need every vehicle to be able to evacuate iraq so we aren’t massacred. can’t happen? say that to general custer.
“Advances in defensive weaponry available to our possible adversaries (including non-state actors, as Hezbollah’s strike on the Israeli corvette Hanit proves) have rendered surface assaults from the sea obsolete, as well as surface-swimming amphibious armored vehicles.”
And “they” said after Egyptian Sagger missiles knocked out a couple of Israeli tanks that the tank was obsolete. That was in 1973. The idea that ASCM’s mean that we will never, ever make opposed beach landings again is simply foolish.
By the way that happened again in the last Lebanon war. Russian made anti-tank weapons took a heavy toll on the Merkava tanks the Israelis used. Considering that the Merkava tank is one of the best in the world, that result was very significant. Israel’s problems were never its equipment rather its tactics. Tanks are great when they are supported with infantry. Alone they are just big targets. In both wars, it was Israel’s reluctance to commit infantry that caused high tank casualties. Tanks are still necessary. The best weapon to stop a tank is another one.
Another sign the Marines are out of the amphibious assault business. One problem few want to face is that a country which deserves to be the target of a large scale opposed amphibious landing is probably going to have the means to make it as costly as Omaha Beach. The Marines big selling point has always been that capability and, if it is no longer feasible (in much the same fashion as a corps or division level parachute assault), the reasons for a three division Corps become fewer and fewer.
A lot of the Lefties would love a crack at reducing the Corps the way they can the Army in terms of the number of active divisions. The fact that the Iraq invasion saw the Marines used as just another corps of the Army is one more step on that path.
A famous General said as much after world war two ended and prior to the Army not being able to land an Army amphibious force at Inchon Korea.
The general then stepped down and called in the Marine’s.
By law, the Marines strength is set at 3 divisions. There would be a major fight if they tried to pass a law to reduce it down to two.
amphibious assault was deemed impossible after Galipoli;obsolete after WWII;something that we might want to hang on to after Inchon; and a viable means to fix Iraqi defenders in place during Gulf War I. I’m not defending the vehicle, just the tactic.
Well done, Bob.
Dane, you’re using a Cold War example from 60 years ago that involved a gap in fighting of approximately five years from the end of WWII — hardly relevant today and certainly not on point.
Sam, as Bob indicated, the fight for this capability is more related to their sense of identity (and their infamous insecurity re being recognized for what they are — soldiers, plain and simple). As such, it looks backward far too much and fails to focus forward far too often.
Kill it.
“But does a doctrine last employed in 1950 still have relevance in today’s world, against current and future enemies, and the expanded use of “smart” weapons systems? Are the millions being invested in the continued development of the EFV being spent to create a vehicle that will best serve current and future Marines?”
Bob, you have a very short memory. The mere threat of the landing of the 3rd MarDiv in the 1st Gulf War, pinned a dozen Iraqi infantry divisions on the Kuwaiti coast, not to mention the 4 tank division corps that was placed to support those Iraqi units on the coast. So there mere threat of a landing kept 1/4 of the Iraqi forces pinned near the coast. That was just a threat…did you forget that?
Also, Bob, have you ever been inside of an LVTP-7 (AAV-7 now)? they are huge…and move VERY slowly in the water. If you watch video of the things…once they roll off the boat deck of an amphibious assault ship, the crew and infantrymen open all the hatches…not because of ventilation…but because they sink…and it’s easier to egress with open hatches…Most of all, they move about 7 mph on the water…and take a very long time to make it to the beach…if you’re being shot at…moving 7mph is asking to die.
The new vehicle moves across the water 7 times as fast 35 mph+…thus, the Navy ships can be further off shore and the jarheads make it to the beach vastly faster than would be the case in the AA7′s. Addtionally, it has a much heavier weapn, 90mm gun and 2 .50 cal machine guns as well as far better armour, all of which make it a much better weapon system. The AAV7 is armed with 1 .50 cal machine gun or a 40 mm grenade launcher, which just doesn’t have the same impact as a gun that can fire armour piercing ammunition or high explosive shells…but I don’t suppose you’ve ever experienced that sort of thing. Just ask ANY Marine, current or former, which vehicle is better…seriously, don’t ask the damn bean counters, ask the men and women involved.
Richard A. Vail, LCpl USMC (Ret)
The last time I saw an EFV, it was being towed by an AAV. I haven’t seen anything redeeming about the platform. I have a lot of friends that are trackers, and they hate the EFV. I don’t doubt we might need the capability, but I don’t think this platform is worth salvaging after all this time.
Using the very same logic the author did, we should cancel the C-17 and C-130 airlifters who carry our AA divisions (82nd, 101st) into battle. They are subject to even more defensive fire.
This is what separates the US military from others: The Marines and Airborne always knew, that despite any amount of preparation of beachheads and in-country, we and the airborne knew a certain number of us would die during ingress/landing.
So then how do we project our power on an enemy? How do we take the fight to our enemies? This president (?) does not want us to be able to project our power abroad-nor take the fight to our enemies? Gates is only doing what he is told-not what is in the best interests of America.
You want to protect our Army and Marines, get the DOD to allow DARPA to come up with electroic jammers to jam the cell phone detonators of IEDs. Get the president to allow a change of the ROEs. And most of all allow our military to fight to win.
The cutbacks of our military are designed to weaken us and give more money to entitlements. He-Obama-is doing what he said he would-destroy America.
Agreed! I don’t think many here willing to scrap the EFV so readily are very forward thinking, including Mr. Owens. We all know war is not about smart weapons alone, but about the means of getting our war fighters where they need to be to have the greatest impact on a battle with the objective to win. Perhaps the EFV is not the answer, but any delays in getting this piece of machinery to the corps can be blamed on the ridiculous number of actors involved in the processes to get anything done today. Our supersized government, the factions of lawyers, lobbyists and armchair tacticians are doing us more harm than any current or future enemies.
So, how do you get the MPC ashore? LAVs and Strykers swim like rocks.
To expand on #2 Dane’s post the Truman administration as a cost cutting measure, discussed eliminating the Marines. They proposed the Army would specialize in land operations as the Navy specializes in maritime warfare. As budget pressures increase I expect this idea may resurface.
There are some obvious tactical and operational reasons to keep the Marines. I’ll leave that to others. But in any period of political instability (ours is coming whether from terrorists our economic distress) some in the military may be tempted to either seize power or support civilian agencies attempting to do the same.
The Marines are needed as a counter force to the Army should somone over there get any stupid ideas (ala Woody Allen, http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YTQ3MjhmNmI5MDA4MGVhMThkZTNiY2RmMDM1YWE3Nzk=) that a “temporary” dictator would move things along better than messy democracy. The Army with the Air Force counterbalances the Navy/Marines should the threat come from that branch.
Bob,
The Marines used amphibious entry in their initial insertion in both Vietnam and Somalia. More importantly, the threat of amphibious assault tied down several Iraqi Corps during Desert Storm. There is no way of knowing how many conflicts have been avoided because the threat of amphibious assault by the US was both real and present. Amphibious assaults are like pistols, you don’t need them at all until you need them badly.
I agree that the AAAV/EFV is over-engineered and over-priced. I quite dislike the reduction in capacity the complexity of the systems impose; with all those bells and whistles to polish, the time and budget for combat training has to take a hit. I am not in love with the idea of marrying the Marine Corps to this technology, if for no other reason than it represents already obsolete technology that will cost a lot to keep in production.
Nevertheless, US Marines need to be a threat from the sea. Despite the tactical limitations the complexity of the system present, the strategic advantage of interdicting sea lanes by capturing cargo ports is of paramount importance. There are better solutions out there, but no solution isn’t one of them.
Yep – Marine amphibious capabilities were a factor in Vietnam, Somalia, both Gulf Wars, and Grenada.
Excellent points by Capt. Herschel Smith, USMC-R at The Captain’s Journal on this very topic:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/05/17/marine-corps-prepares-for-budget-cuts/
I tend to agree with most of your analysis…but, if the Marines revise their doctrine and use LAV’s, just how will they get them onshore?
Those hovercraft (LCAC’s)? Very few of them, and AFAIK they aren’t buying (or building) any more. How many LCACs will be needed? Where will they be carried onboard the ships? What changes to the ships will there need to be? Different classes altogether of ships?
Its not as simple as just saying we’re not going to use those any more.
I remember seeing documentaries about the Korean war. The smart guys had determined that missiles had made guns in planes obsolete. So guns were removed. By the time the Korean war was a few months old, these same smart guys were being put to use trying to figure out a way to retrofit guns into planes that had been designed without them. One of the more ingenious kludges that I remember was to place a pod with a machine gun and ammo onto one of the missile hard points.
I’m sceptical whenever someone says that techniques and weapons that have been used for generations, have been made obsolete by new technology.
The marines will always need a method of getting men and heavy equipment to the battle. Whether or not this landing craft is a good match for that role, I not in a position to judge. I believe the author is being too cavalier in just declaring that new missiles have made landing craft obsolete.
Mark: Not to pick a fight, but wasn’t it the Vietnam War you are talking about?
….. That was Sunny Viet Nam where our fighters went in Gunless. Missiles were the best weapon; all the bureaucrats and chairwarmers agreed. Gun pods were eventually retrofitted. Problems with missiles were: 1) Kill rate was not that high, in combat conditions 2) Engagements were often fought INSIDE the effective range of the missiles ….. the distance the missile must fly, before arming, was less than the distance to the enemy plane. ………… ……….
…… Korea was fought with all gun aircraft: F-86 Saber Jet, F-80 Shooting Star, P-51 Mustang, F4U/AU-1 Corsair, F2H Banshee.
Right story, wrong war. Our planes in Korea were armed with 50 cal machine guns not missiles. Missiles saw their use in Vietnam. We quickly learned that we needed to mount 20mm or 30mm cannon on our planes for close in work. Missiles were great as a distance weapon. Up close the cannon worked much better.
The North Vietnamese Air Force didn’t give us much choice. Their main fighter aircraft was the MiG-17 – basically a much-improved MiG-15, a 50s-era jet dogfighter. Most of our fighters were built (and our pilots trained) for flat-out speed and the ability to launch long-range missiles. We needed to learn how to use guns and dogfight – obsolete skills according to current doctrine – all over again. What a waste of time, money, equipment, and lives.
The point is: We don’t really know for sure what weapons and tactics future conflicts will require. We’d better think carefully before we give up any capability because it appears “obsolete.”
Remember before WWII when most people believed giant coastal fortresses like Corrigedor were “impregnable?” Or that “the bomber will always get through?” Or that aircraft carriers were mainly good for escorting battleships? Or that semi-automatic rifles spoiled soldiers’ marksmanship and caused them to waste ammunition? People try to guess what the next war will be like, but they get it wrong about as often as they get it right.
Anyone else want to join in the dog pile?
I don’t have a crystal ball or anything, but having served on the USS Nassau, and deployed with Marines ashore as a communicator. I think the author may have a point. The days of giant shore guns are gone. I think, as he said at the end of the article, a stealth submersable version would be better. I’m vey skeptical of a weapons system whose design is over 30 years old. That is one of the biggest problems the military as a whole faces. To get a concept from drawing board to deployment before it’s obsolete. Such is the military industrial complex.
Mr. Owens:
“But does a doctrine last employed in 1950 still have relevance in today’s world, against current and future enemies, and the expanded use of “smart” weapons systems?”
Yes it does. And you should remember that the doctrine was last employed in 1991, NOT 1950. It was the threat of a Marine amphibious assault that kept the Iraqi Army in kuwait looking seaward, rather than to the West.
That stratagem was only possible because we had that capability. So the overarching question of amphibious doctrine being obsolete is way premature.
“On paper, replacing the AAV-7A1 with a modernized amphibious troop carrier seems a no-brainer.”
Again, I disagree. The AAV-7A1 is fine, there is no need to replace it.
“The theory behind the EFV is that the high-speed planing performance of the craft would enable it to launch amphibious invasions from “over the horizon” — 25 miles out to sea, beyond the range of shore guns and line-of-sight shore-launched missiles that could target the multi-billion dollar amphibious assault ships (and other costly vessels of our modernized, smaller Navy).”
Let’s clear up the picture a bit here. If you do not have at least air superiority over the target beaches, you do NOT attempt a landing. If you DO have air superiority over the AO, your next step is then to eliminate the enemy command and control systems, and then his heavy weapons like artillery and heavy missile systems.
IOW, you DON’T attempt a landing where the enemy still has operational shore batteries in sufficient numbers to sink your inavsion fleet.
That all said…
“Naval vessels can now be struck out to 100 miles or more — far beyond the swimming range of the EFV.”
Then the Navy might as well stay tied to the piers in Norfolk and San Diego.
There’s another doctrine that’s been part of the Navy-Marine team philosophy even longer than amphibious warfare, that of naval gunfire support. This was also last used in 1991 when hapless Iraqis got to taste the USS Wisconsin’s battleship 16″ batteries’ steel.
The Navy has to be ready to lose SOME of its’ vessels in a scrap. It would be a wonderful thing to have a war where the enemy didn’t get his innings to shoot at us, but that’s not likely to happen in any of our lifetimes, and so this idea that no ship of the Navy must EVER be sunk by enemy action is tantamount to an institutionalized “Ghormley Disease”. Build a bigger Navy
Scrap the EFV, keep the amtracs, and invest in some close air support aircraft both fixed and rotary wings, as well as missile defense systems for the ships.
I’d like nothing more than to see us bring back the Iowa class BBs. Retrofitted with RIMs and Sea Sparrows for defense and modernized. Problem solved in any littoral campaign. Somali pirates-evaporated. Strait of Hormuz-open indefinitely. Talk about the projection of power!
The AAVP7 is a very fine vehicle, it just doesn’t meet the requirement laid out in the MC 2025 vision strategy. It will remain around for a while longer though.
Don:
“The AAVP7 is a very fine vehicle, it just doesn’t meet the requirement laid out in the MC 2025 vision strategy.”
Ah, yes. The tyranny of “paper reality” as opposed to REAL reality.
You might want to research the Navy’s last great big steel boondoggle: The Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off, (LMSR) sealift ships.
It was determined, (correctly), that the US was in need of more and modernized sealift capability, utilizing the Maritime Pre-positioned Force concept.
All well and good, until the booger-eaters at the Pentagon got ahol;d of the idea.
What we ended up with were very large ships that burn stupendous amounts of fuel, (the ones powered by gas turbines), that have drafts too deep to access the ports they were envisioned to be using.
So now they have decided to concoct a “fix” to lighter these behemoths using incredibly retarded things like THIS:
http://www.macgregor-group.com/?id=12613
There’s video of this thing during it’s sea-trial tests, if you want to see some VERY BRAVE humvee, six-by, APC and Tank drivers in action.
All because they let Navy Admirals design cargo ships…(sigh), I’m sure they got medals and a commemorative plaque to cap off their glittering careers.
In fact, there’s a brace of ‘em tied up at the coal piers in Newport News VA, doing eff-all for our national defense but rusting away.
Don’t need to research sir, I can assure you I am well versed in the nightmare of defense aquisitions. I do however, knowing what I know, believe the EFV to be the real deal, and well worth the pain. This blog post, and most of the comments are based on outdated data and information. But alas I don’t get to make that decision in the end. We shall see.
You could just acknowledge that we won’t be projecting force overseas anymore and save a hell of a lot more money. Ground the C-5 and C-17, pull back from Europe, Korea, Okinawa and Japan. Cut the Navy, and the Air Force. What could possibly happen? Obama is in charge, and the world loves us.
The logical extension of your thesis is that the aircraft carrier is obsolete. Let’s save some real money. I was out of the Marine Corps before the LVTP-7 even entered service, so it’s unlikely I’m going to suffer if you’re wrong. Too bad about my kids and grandkids if we need it, but hey, we’re saving money to spend on ACORN, and the Dept of Education and farm subsidies and other essentials that we obviously need.
While we are at it, we could pull back from Hawaii and Alaska.
Gates has a poor record for forecasting future events. While head of the Russia section at CIA he failed to notice the decline and fall until after it happened. It was big issue in his CIA confirmation hearings. Secretary Gates seems to bent on fighting the last (or shall we say current) war. His logic seems to be that since we are fighting COIN today we will be fighting COIN tomorrow, the day after and forever. He is a prime example of a first order thinker. We are fighting COIN because nobody has alternative to the overwhelming superiority of American conventional military forces. If we begin to discard these advantages then somebody will get it into his head that we are now challengeable on the conventional level. This is how we end up fighting wars with methods that we have declared obsolete.
Amphibious warfare has been a part of military operations of maritime powers since at least the Peloponnesian Wars. Their usefulness has been affirmed again and again regardless of the offensive or defensive technology available at the time. I sure such operations will be successfully conducted in the future. This is another shortsighted, budget driven decision.
Note to Mark the Great: You’re describing the situation in Vietnam, not Korea. Air-to-air missiles were not introduced until 1957. Korean War era jet fighters were just WWII fighters that flew faster and higher. They were gunfighters.
My GOD!
I’m not alone in remembering his odious butt-smoochery to the Reagan NSC when he was DDI at CIA, resulting in the “Iran” end of the Iran-Contra debacle after all!
Good to see you…person.
Let’s hear it for those “moderate Iranian ayatollahs”, huh?
(I guess those were the ones who wanted to try us and then execute us, as opposed to the hardliners who wanted to execute us and THEN try us.)
What about Cuba? Won’t they need them there? Or least have the capability so as to scare the regime. And what about conflicts similar to Granada: An Island somewhere, American hostages?
The US needs no amphibious invasion capability for Cuba. We are already ashore at Guantanimo.
Doesn’t it make it easier for them if they know up front that there will be no amphibious attack? I mean they could concentrate all the defenses along the fence line?
What a nonsense article. Sounds like Louis Johnson / Harry Truman circa 1949. They wanted to disband the USMC to save money – and would have lost the war in Korea if they had.
How about we kill the F-35 and buy far more capable F-15SE’s instead?
@Old Soldier
Gates would be wrong if he wanted to eliminate Marines, but he doesn’t want to do that, at least not yet. I agree with him on this issue. He’s just talking about killing the EFV for now. As I said earlier, my take is that it would be better and cheaper to just buy some more LCAC’s to get jarheads ashore.
But I heartily agree with your other statement. Kill the F-35 clusterfarce, and buy a mix of updated F-15′s and F-16′s.
Actually when the Marines landed at Inchon, the Army fought its way all the way from Pusan to Seoul. Look up Task Force Lynch. Along for the ride was General Gay, who was sitting next to General Patton when the sad traffic accident took him to Valhalla.
At the Chosin Reservoir the Army protected the Marines of X Corps from the Chinese, earning a Navy Presidential Unit Citation. The Marines led the retreat.
Don, let’s not start an inter-service fight.
Many of the Marines who landed at Inchon came directly from Pusan where they plugged holes whenever it looked like the North Koreans were about to break through. Once there was a division of Marines behind the Korean lines, fighting up the peninsula became relatively easy. Can we call it a team effort?
As for the Chosin – General Almond was a complete fool and MacArthur not much better. The Marine advance to the rear saved what was left of Task Force Faith. You have to admit, the battles around Chosin where far better organized and in our favor than the shattered divisions and “big bugout” west of the mountains. Probably the worst US Army defeat in history – certainly on foreign soil.
We need amphib capabilities, but we don’t need this pork project. It’s way cheaper… and probably better for troop safety… if we just build more LCAC’s and get them to the beach that way.
Bilgeman,
The EFV does offer a nice quick-strike option that can overwhelm enemy command and control by showing up at their TOC and announcing the invasion has started. It is significantly more difficult to coordinate artillery when nasty Marines have taken your radios and ballistics computers and made you go sit in the corner with your hands zip-tied behind your back. (Marines will do just that kind of thing, they are quite rude at times.)
25 knots doesn’t seem like very fast until it is armed, armored, and coming at you with bad intent. While you can build defenses that can overcome the EFV approach, the cost of doing so is tying up a lot of forces in one place. At that point you run the risk of discovering what the Turks did at Aqaba and the British did at Singapore; strong coastal defenses means other approaches are more viable.
I don’t like the costs and complexity of the EFV, but the capability is quite strong. Pity we don’t have a commander in chief who is inclined to use such capabilities wisely.
My approach to an amphibious vehicle would use smaller fire team vehicles, each with cannon and machineguns. They could be linked together to get proper low drag and sea keeping qualities (better Froude number) and flotation pods latched to the sides that contain the water jets needed for propulsion. After hitting the beach the pods could be dropped, and the fire team vehicles could separate, for fire and maneuver while mounted.
A fire team vehicle would be a smaller faster target while on land, and would be free of the compromises necesssary to get high speed in water.
Interesting thought, but such a vehicle would not be able to withstand heavy sea states which is a requirement. A vehicle with pods such as you described would not have a self righting capability which both the current and future vehicle do have. The EFV also provides a heavier firepower capability (30MM) with advanced targeting systems and a Coax machinge gun for smaller targets. The vehicles you speak of could not house the valid requirements that the EFV answers, not to mention we do not have enough deck space to house that many small vehicles. Remember you have to have a minimum of 52 seats per infantry platoon to get them ashore, and this doesn’t include gun teams. So you are lookng at a minimum of 40 humvee sized vehicles just for 1 Company of grunts. This would take up far more space than 12 35 Ton EFV’s. Space is a premium on board Amphibs.
Mr. Laswell:
“The EFV does offer a nice quick-strike option that can overwhelm enemy command and control by showing up at their TOC and announcing the invasion has started.”
Well, given’ my druthers as one who has spent more time than I cared to “shaking and baking” in the back of an amtrac, I’d prefer we announce the start of an invasion by a few sticks of cluster and napalm J-DAM bombs dropped from a B-52 on the beaches, followed up by double-numeral caliber naval gunfire roaring overhead and impacting the target zone, and soe swarms of Cobra and Apache gunships buzzing about the area before I’d get to go “combat wading”, but maybe that’s just me…no-one ever accused me of being “subtle”.
“25 knots doesn’t seem like very fast until it is armed, armored, and coming at you with bad intent”
And that SHOULD not be a problem, excpet for some clown’s insistence that an amphibious vehicle must be able to do 25 knots.
What they need, and what would make the most sense is design an LCM-type Mike Boat to CARRY the AAV at 25 knots or more, and disgorge the amtrac to do it’s swimming bit for a comparatively short distance before it rolls up on the beach and turns into the APC/IFV that it essentially is.
Heck, a craft with an armored forward house, mounting some decent armament, and an open well-deck aft, using the float-on/float-off concept to disgorge the AAV out of the stern the cargo bay.
It would require some beefy engines and a honkin’ big ballast pump or two, but I could design the thing on a cocktail napkin for less than the Navy spends on base golf course maintenance.
Old Soldier,
How about some new A-10′s for the Marines? For the price of each F-35 you can probably get a squadron of A-10′s.
Marines have kind of a love/hate relationship with A-10′s (I was a young Marine on a FAC Team before I was an old soldier). A-10′s are great at close-air support. They also have a bad habit of killing nearby Marines (saw one destroy a LAV in ’91)
There will be a continued need for a V/STOL fighter in the Marines, but damn the F-35 is too expensive.
My only concern is that the Russians, and now the Chinese are building better aircraft all of the time, and selling them to countries that don’t like us so much.
We need to maintain a qualitive edge over anything our guys might have to face. Maybe we don’t need the F-35 now, but we will need something better than souped up F15s and F16s someday.
Like the F-22?
We are probably designing the last generation of manned fighter aircraft.
Remotely operated or autonomous?
Or perhaps some combination. The plane can fly itself, and once a target is selected, attack the target on it’s own, but actual target selection and live fire authorization has to come from a human.
Don’t you remember, one of the first things Obami did was to scrap the F22 program, too expensive. Instead they touted the F35 which they just dropped. Now we have nothing in the F22′s place and the Chinese and Russians are rushing to make their own.
I remember. Then they forced a production shut down instead of selling them to Japan – so now we can never build more at a reasonable cost.
It is my humble opinion that the large amphibious specialty fighting vehicles are too compromised in any one role to do well. They haven’t the armor they need to be fighting vehicles, they are large targets, and they are too slow in the water. In non-amphibious warfare, they are awful substitutes for real armored vehicles.
I think specialty landing craft that are high speed (40 kt) and can deliver tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the beach would be much better. Those armored vehicles could be made capable of deep water fording (most already are) to make it in from an unexpected sandbar.
Sometimes too many compromises just leaves you compromised.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) was always a waste of time and money. Enormously over budget and in development for literally years, it was being designed for the Cold War and NOT for the quick-assault “brushfire” wars that will be common in the 21st Century. When you talk about “Over the Horizon” assaults these days, you are basically talking about helicopter assaults or assaults made by the tilt-rotar Osprey. The initial airborne assault would then be followed up by LCAC Hovercrafts and then possibly the large LCMs the Navy still has on hand. But for the initial Marine assault to be made with armored vehicles is about as dead as battleships and it’s about time the Marines admit that. They really should save their money and invest in fast, light, easily-transportable, wheeled vehicles like the MPC, which represents the future of armored warfare. Some of the best armored vehicles today are wheeled vehicles (such as the MRAPs) and they require a lot less maintenance time than a conventional tank. I know, I know, you’ll never totally replace a tank for all missions, but for quick insertions and expeditionary warfare, wheeled vehicles seem to be the way to go.
Old traditions die hard, I know, but we must let them go if we are to let the next generation of fighting men and women have a chance in battle. The last thing you want is to go into a modern war with obsolete equipment.
“about as dead as battleships”
I will argue all day that the battleships are not obsolete – just in need of updating. Most of the Corps and old Sailors will back me up. We have zilch for shore bombardment capability now.
Like the Air Force with the A-10, the Navy likes it’s shiny new high-tech toys over the old stuff that works.
Typical kill the EFV article with no real facts or basis to back it up. So you say we cannot land well armored and armed EFV’s on a beach due to modern day defenses, but somehow a high speed, unarmored, unarmed ship to shore connector such as an LCAC can? Makes not one bit of sense. This article also assumes we would land on an opposed beach, but you see the cool thing about the EFV and it’s high speed is that it can very quickly bypass an opposed beach, and land in a less volotile area, then quickly flank the objective. This is what we in the Marine world call using the littorals as manuever space. Quit assuming the only thing it does is land WWII style, think of the Straits of Hormuz folks. The reason for an EFV is to provide an un supported forcible entry capability. EFV’s can launch, land, hit the objective, and withdraw with embarked infantry, with no support necessary other than standard air support if necessary which is Marine Corps doctrine. Wheeled vehicles require support from the beginning by needing multiple rides to the shore to land the entire force, and oh by the way they can’t move forward until all combat power is consolidated. As for protection, most gear being designed today will add armor in a modular approach as this give commanders some lattitude for different missions. You don’t always throw as much on as possible at all times as armor takes away speed, cargo, and passenger carrying capability. This vehicle will have bolt on bottom armor to help mitigate underbody attacks. The EFV, like the Osprey and F-22 is a revolution in design, and has been built from the track pads up. There was no precedent as the AAVP7 is a completely different vehicle. To make vehicles like these takes time, many man hours, and rare materials that are not cheap. If you think the Russians and Chinese are not attempting to produce next generation weapons and vehicles like this you are very wrong and ignorant. Go ahead and keep focusing on COIN and see what happens.
Other than the the use of a couple of nukes, has any modern conflict, be it war, battle, or skirmish, ever, EVER been settled without the Rifleman, whether Marine or soldier, being at the scene, up close and personal. Occupation will clinch the deal. You can bomb ‘em, barrage ‘em, drone ‘em, etc., but you will never finish the job by remote control. Occupation will seal the deal. Get our men and women on-site as quickly, efficiently, and safely as possible.
@25; not a bad idea, but is the A-10 carrier-capable?
In regard to disbanding our Marines any time soon, believe this: As long as there is a United States, there will probably be Marines; As long as there are Marines, there will DAMN sure be a United Sates.
Semper Fi
Consider that the United States did fine without a Marine Corps until 1834, with the small number of Marines onboard ships or guarding naval installations using Navy Regulations while afloat, and Army Regulations while ashore. Until 1921, the Marine Corps birthday was July 11, 1834. Only after WWI did the Marines Commandant decide that he was uncomfortable serving as a brigade in an Army division, and so backdated the birthday to prior to their dissolution after the revolutionary war. It should be noted that privateers, who provided most of the US maritime forces during the American Revolution, had no need for Marines to protect officers from enlisted ranks.
It is a profound mistake to restructure the U.S. military into an exclusively counterinsurgency/nation-building force. We have learned the political and military lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. We shouldn’t destroy the most lethal force in the history of the world in order to welcome and embrace the idea of occupying countries and rebuilding them for decades at a time.
Like we did with Japan and Germany?
I might add that in Germany and Japan, we didn’t have to deal with hostile countries actively training and arming insurgents.
Actually, we did. The Red Army Faction, Baader Meinhof terrorist groups were funded and trained by the Soviet Union. Before them we had significant problems with SS Deadenders.
Red Army Faction and Baader Meinhof were after the period of occupation. The SS Deadenders didn’t have outside support.
Not to say that all three did not create many problems and kill good soldiers, but they aren’t the same as having Iran and Pakistan train and support terrorist cells in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I’d rather see the money spent on airborne assault capabilities. Even in the early 1980 when I was a USMC E-4 intelligence specialist, I wondered why so much attention was given to amphibious assault craft. They’re slow and restrictive. I think it was something like 10% (maybe much less) of the world’s beaches are capable of being assaulted amphibiously.
I understand that the amphibious assault capabilities need to be maintained for logistical reasons and perhaps to keep an enemy off balance, but we don’t need EFVs for that.
Amphibious operations provides another tool for our commanders. To assume we will always keep air superiority, or have available ports to drop off the Army’s heavy junk is ridiculous. The Marine Corps exists to make an entry point where there wasn’t once one in the case it is needed. The AAVP7A1 RAM/RS can keep up with the M1 Tank very well by the way. You can’t really compare first generation gear from 1980 with 2010 equipment, we also don’t use the M-16 A1 any more either. (Just a friendly Jarhead jab there! Semper Fi!)
“Don..also don’t use the M-16 A1 any more either. (Just a friendly Jarhead jab there! Semper Fi!)May 18, 2010 – 12:47 pm”
Yea, that one still bothers me… [semper fi]
“Amphibious operations provides another tool for our commanders. To assume we will always keep air superiority, or have available ports to drop off the Army’s heavy junk is ridiculous.”
I presume you know better that to initiate amphibious operations without air superiority.
And what advantages do EFVs offer in dropping off the the Army’s heavy junk? I said that “amphibious capabilities need to be maintained for logistical reasons”, but I have difficulty imagining scenarios where exceptional amphibious assault vehicles offers a significant advantage over exceptional airborne assault capabilities with acceptable amphibious assault vehicles. Maybe my understanding is as outdated as the M1A1, but if Marines can be deployed more nimbly “behind” the beachhead by air, what advantage do these expensive vehicles offer to logistics, especially if their cost restricts the Marines to only frontal amphibious assaults.
I’d rather spend the money on airborne capabilities. An opinion from an old M1A1 Marine, for what it’s worth. ;^)
Self deployeing/Self Recovery capability with greater speed and maneuverability on the ground. Airborne assault requires a lot of airlift, with very expensive airplanes. I believe there is a valid requirement for both capabilities.
elfman:
I was a “bisexual” in the sense that I was issued a M16A1 poodle-shooter, a plate flak-jacket and a steel pot…and used Jeeps, but by the time I got out I was toting an M16A2, a kevlar vest, a neo-fritz helmet, and rode HUMVEES.
The M16A2 had one of my battalion commanders, and ass-clown by the name of “Pyle”, (I’m NOT kidding!), on the advisory board for the redesign.
This should tell you, without knowing Pyle, why the A2, (except for the sights), is a piece of junk.
The light colonel in the helo hovering 1000′ overhead agrees with the supply and logistics pogues that we grunts down here are “wasting ammo”…thus we get the 3 shot burst.
He also agrees with the data analysis pogues that our rifle range scores should all be higher, so we get a heavier bullet at faster rate of spin, which is MUCH better at punching holes in paper targets further away on the rifle range, but have the disterssing tendency to just drill neat little holes in the enemy, as opposed to tumbling around inside of him and liquefying his “Love Machine” so that his guts can be poured out of the exit wound into a bucket…as the M16A1′s terminal ballistics were wont to do.
Pyle was another sycophantic half-wit who earned his plaques and his Achievement Medal and retired with honor.
Easy to say knowing full well none of us will have to ride a substandard, slow amtrac up on some beach some day against an enemy that didn’t read the news about amphibious assaults being history.
I would invite anyone who wishes to cancel this vehicle to read about the battle of Betio and it’s amtracs.
I recall pilots flying jets in vietnam dogfighting in jets that had never been designed to do that task (dog fighting was considered history in the missile age) against small agile MiG 15/17/21′s that had been designed to get in close and shoot down their enemy with a gun or guns, something the modern American jets did not have.
One day we might just have to mount an Iwo Jima battle with all the amphibious bells and whistles lets be sure our young Marine’s have the tools to kick the door in and land the force on the beach intact.
An amphib landing from the ocean may never happen again (I think they will once the ground to air weapons update), but something like this would be very desirable for areas like Iraq, where irrigation canals run all over the place.
I saw the TV program on the Military channel about the high speed landing craft and thought what a Rube Goldberg contraption.It looked to me at first glance that if any of several systems failed to operate properly, the thing would become a sitting duck. Things like the front bow deflector or the engine/water jet not producing full power (It would never reach a plane and would lumber along at a crawl). I look at this capability of the Marines to have an amphibious landing the same way I look at deep penetrating bombers. And that would be primarily as a deterrent. If any nation did not fear a rapid deployment of Marines onto their shore before they could prepare they would have more money to use on other weapons systems. Weapons have always been about money. Every Democrat president and some Republican ones have cut military spending. I was in VN and I know the lies that Johnson and McNamara told during the war about our boys and their weapons. We never saw most of the weapons that they were saying we had and used daily. The best road to follow for the Marines is to have a limited number of fast assault vehicles to create doubt in the minds of any future opponent. Maybe not this one but definitely one better than the VN era craft.
Great article, but the author doesn’t take his point far enough. The fact of the mater is everything cited as reasons to kill the EFV program actually apply to the entire Marine Corps, itself. The U.S. is currently maintaining TWO land armies with redundant capabilities but with no perceptible benefit. If, according to Mr. Owen, amphibious warfare is obsolete then why do we need four Marine divisions plus all of its support and service, dedicated to it? I appreciate the unique culture and history that the Marines represent, but we are paying hundreds of billions of dollars to maintain competing procurement programs (Army and USMC), redundant schools, bases, facilities, training programs, deployment rotations, staffs, intelligence activities, and numerous other overlaps. If we were to truly modernize, we should assign brigades to train and rotate through an amphibious role, but eliminate the redundant back-end infrastructure that the Marine Corps represents, returning them to the traditional role of ship’s company.
MountainSniper31,
My Grandfather said that there are some people in this world will never be happy until the get a solid punch in the nose. The United States Marine Corps operates as the best customer service organization in the history of the world for those people deeply in need of a pop on the snout.
The US Army does not deliver quick jabs well because their culture mitigates against the expedients necessary for decisive actions far from support. Marines are used to thinking about what they can do with what they have or can steal from the enemy and less deserving. The Army is used to considering the consequences of the global geo-political balance. This is not to say that no Marine has ever gotten their head wrapped round the twist over irrelevancies, or that nobody in the Army ever went on a LRRP.
The Marines do handle contingencies better and because nobody wants to face the Army, contingencies will keep cropping up. The overwhelming conventional force of the Army serves its deterrence purposes well, but they cannot be the conventional force and the contingency force without compromising both missions.
Who would rescue the Army every time they screwed up if we didn’t have a Marine Corps?
Uncalled for.
The Army does it’s job as well as the Marines do theirs, and like all the branches of the Combat Arms, it pays in blood for the stupidity and short-sightedness of its commanders.
Please, show some class towards our gallant soldiers. They desrve it.
We’re all on the same team here.
I would say that the Marines have an older institutional drive towards individual action and stronger commitment to their own. The size of the Army works against the individual more usually than it does the Marines. The Army and the Marine Corps each excel in different areas, but the Marines tolerate specialization inertia less.
A lot of this is like arguing brands of super-premium booze, fun but beside the point. Both the Army and the Marines came up short of counter-insurgency readiness BECAUSE our enemies can not and will not face us in conventional warfare until they have overwhelming superiority. Insurgency is the only kind of warfare Superpowers lose against non-superpowers. In twenty years the descendants of warlords in China might care to try their hand at conventional war, if only to justify their jobs. Until then it doesn’t matter how much scotch you’ve got when the enemy insists on throwing a Hemp Festival.
Same team, agreed.
I think the Jarhead was teasing.
What’s a little branch parochialism among friends? As a recovering Army master gunner I’ve nothing but good things to say for alla the devil dogs I’ve ever had the privilege to cross paths with. And don’t you dare tell the pogey bait eating boneheads I said that.
It’ll be OUR secret, sarge…
“we are paying hundreds of billions of dollars to maintain competing procurement programs”
Competition is good.
So, How does the average US Army soldier feel about floating around for six months on Navy ships along with his entire Battalion for weeks if not months at a time without even making a serious landing?
It’s not so much the amphib part as it is the “Expeditionary Force” in waiting that makes the difference between Army troops floating around on ships and The Embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special operations capable) and up to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade with aviation assets and armor all under one Command.
Your talking Navy, Army and Air Force all combined to do the job the United States Marine’s already do with just the Navy.
Army would require Navy aviation for air support and for Navy gunfire support during the hauling/landing phase, then The Air Force from the high water mark inland provides TACAIR and re-supply. “To many cooks spoil the pot”
The United States Army does very well at air/ground wars once on the beach but when it comes to sailing around as confined Cargo on regular six month or more deployment you need a Marine Corps.
Semper Fi
Perhaps these vehicles were originally designed for a potential amphibious assault on North Korea and now that’s no longer seen as feasible due to the potential for defensive WMDs. Just a wild theory.
Bob,with all due respect you can’t defend any country with that kind of thinking. We must be prepaired for any kind of warfare.Freedom isn’t free.
MountainSniper31,
I could not disagree more with your assertion that the Marine Corps and the Army have redundant capabilities, beyond the basic capability to conduct ground based combat. The Marine Corps is built around a sea-air-land model with an expeditionary focus. These Marine Air-GRound Task Forces, or MAGTFs, are task organized around an infentry element of at least a battalion to be fully self sustained and supported for not less than 30 days of sustained combat and can be consolidated or reinforced to a full Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of a Division, Air Wing and full service suppport group. It is precisely this capability that was used in establishing the forward operating base in Khondahar in 2002, launched into a land locked country from an amphibious task force at sea. It was also the Marines’ amphibious servicve support elements that supported and supplied the entire build-up and operation during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It was also the threat of an amphibious brigade, the 4th MEB, landing on Kuwaiti beaches that forced Saddam Hussein to spread his divisions out in depth so that they were unable to mass a concentration in response to the ground strike during Desert Storm. To this day, North Korea maintains defensive positions across their entire coast line against a Marine landing, preventing even their million man Army of massing sufficiently to penetrate the DMZ in a meaningful way.
To the redundent nature of the schools, basic competance in armor, artillery, cooking and Military Police are all performed at Army training posts. We then provide additional training because we do things differently based on the differences in mission. Every Marine attends and compeltes a basic infantry training and every Marine is taught rifle marksmanship and fire discipline. Further, all of my Marines were trained as occupational field specialists as opposed to level of specialization that occurs in the Army. Did I mention, by the way, that the Marine Corps has a much higher ration of trigger pullers to supporting arms? And a 1:9 ration of Officer to Enlisted, the lowest of the Armed Forces even with three Air Wings where all the pilots are officers. Half of the Corps is LCpl (E-3) and below. For the record, the Marine Corps’ tail is about a third the size of the Army’s tail and Marine Staffs are smaller as well.
As a final point, the Marine Corps provides more than just an amphibious capability, it provides an expeditionary capability for projecting power in a hostile environment and for providing a rapid relief in humanitarian relief missions. The specific and unique equipment requirements to support this mission and role is the reason for the parallel procurement systems, but there is joint procurement for common items. A good example of this is the primary rifle and squad automatic weapon programs. The Marine Corps has a requirement for accuracy at a range of 500m, weight limits, and high capacity magazine/ammunition systems. The Army tends to fight in much closer so is looking at higher rates fire with, less accuracy or distance, with rapid reload capability as opposed to high capacity. Different purposes, different requirements, therefore different programs.
David Cooper,
I could not agree with you more without 12 weeks at MCRD my frame (and will) is no longer capable of enduring but I sincerely hope you are able to post your well-reasoned and articulate discussions with the aid of a spell-checker. The Firefox browser comes with this capability and if you are able to use it in the future, I implore you to do so. “Non Carborundom Illigitimi” applies to trolls who attack you on the basis of spelling as well. Don’t let the bastards grind you down about spelling when real issues are at stake. We live in a partially cybernetic world, let the computer do the fiddly bits for you.
Speaking from the position of one not involved in the military, I thought the current doctrine was one of moving fast and hitting hard. If that’s the case, I would think a swarm of inexpensive 3 or 4 man, lightly armoured, machine gun/mortar/rocket equipped jet skis would foot the Marines bill nicely. Back these up with an amphibious tank like vehical utilizing missles or rail gun, much smaller than the proposed equipment as it does not have to haul troops, the problem is solved. At a fraction of the development and production cost, I might add.
Smaller, faster, and armored LCAC’s or Large Armored LCAC’s may be the answer.
why not a semisubmersable LVTP?
A Columbian drug boat packed with jarheads, now there’s an idea…
I’mna thinking something armored, armed and fast like a rational EFV is just the ticket to get boots on the beach but to get inland they’ll need land-centric AFVs. The EFV’s failing is trying to be all things to all people. The competing requirements are not reconcilable. Once the beachhead is attained use the LCAC’s to bring in the stuff they’ll need to go inland.
A-hem…well, y’know, sometimes they DO submerge.
And sometimes they even resurface. That’s one of those cherished little moments when you get to reflect on your own mortality.
It brought me and my squad-mates closer to the Almighty, I can tell you.
In a previous life I useta be a(n)(amphibious?) Sheridan herder. I get it.