Engaging Extremists Doesn’t Mean You Agree with Them
On April 8, PJ Media carried an article by Patrick Poole attacking the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for dealing with individuals and organizations allegedly tied to terrorism.
In the process, he chastised several other organizations (ours being one) and individuals as well. Beyond a number of factual inaccuracies and exaggerated implications, there is a disconcerting theme underlying all that he says which deserves a thoughtful response.
Poole’s fundamental premise is that all who in any way associate with an organization or person suspected of wrongdoing are ipso facto suspect themselves. Extrapolating this kind of “guilt by association” would call into serious question the very act of diplomatic engagement with countries that are known (not merely suspected) to have committed unacceptable acts. Moreover, if part of our task is to address a clash of world views, it only makes sense to engage the other side.
For over a decade, Defense planners have been wrestling with the challenges of asymmetric threats like that posed by Bin Laden on 9/11. Regardless of whatever potential the newly conceived and highly promising concept of “Irregular Warfare” may have, it is clear that there is insufficient money in the U.S. Treasury to protect our country against the full spectrum of possible asymmetric threats to which disadvantaged opponents can resort in seeking to do us harm. What is needed is an asymmetric counter to these asymmetric threats, one that displaces the ideas behind the guns. This, in turn, requires engagement with those who can communicate with the extremists, if not directly with the extremists themselves. That is what our center, the International Center (not Council) for Religion & Diplomacy (not Democracy), has been doing since its inception 8½ years ago, with considerable evidence to show that it works.
This is what Abubaker al-Shingieti, who Mr. Poole attacks at great length, helped us do in Sudan as we worked behind the scenes to bring an end to the long-running civil war between the Islamic north and the Christian/African Traditionalist South. He was also instrumental in establishing an Inter-religious Council and a Committee to Protect Religious Freedom in Sudan which, as the U.S. Institute of Peace can readily confirm, has measurably improved the lot of non-Muslims in that strife-torn country. Having resolved that he could no longer abide many of the actions of his own government, Mr. Shingieti left government service in order to work with our Center where he has proven to be an invaluable asset.
Another attempt to tackle the ideas behind the guns is the work we have been doing in Kashmir to help defuse the world’s leading nuclear flashpoint. For the past seven years, we have engaged militants and non-militants alike in cultivating a cooperative spirit between and among next-generation Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist leaders of that troubled state.
On yet another front, we have been on the ground in Pakistan for the past four years reforming the madrassas (religious schools), with a particular focus on the hard-line Diobandi madrasas in Balochistan, which gave birth to the Taliban, and the Wahabbi madrasas in Punjab, that are feeders into al-Qaeda. At this point, more than a thousand madrasas have agreed to (1) expand their curriculums to include the physical and social sciences (with a special emphasis on human rights and religious tolerance) and (2) transform their pedagogy in order to develop critical thinking skills among the students.
This work, in turn, opened the door for us to play a pivotal role in securing the release of the Korean hostages from the Taliban last summer (featured in the January 9, 2008 edition of the Washington Times).
It was in recognition of this kind of potential, that IDA agreed to partner with us and with the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) two years ago in a project that focused on the American Muslim community (also severely criticized by Mr. Poole). The catalyst for this effort was a shared understanding that this community represents one of the more formidable strategic assets that our country can bring to bear in its global contest with militant Islam. The project involved bringing selected American Muslim leaders alongside an equal number of U.S. government security officials and foreign policy practitioners to determine how they could begin working together for the greater good. A key goal was to ascertain how the USG could capitalize on the considerable talents of this community and the extensive paths of influence that it has into Muslim communities overseas, many in areas of vital interest to us (and to them as American citizens).
Another goal of this project was to gauge how best to provide U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy with a Muslim perspective, one that could enable U.S. policymakers to avoid the adverse consequences of uninformed security and foreign policy decisions. In the early years of our Iraq involvement, for example, we all but totally ignored the overwhelming religious imperatives that dominated the concerns of most Iraqis, and we paid a huge price for doing so in terms of lost lives and treasure. That is why opening the doors of U.S. government agencies to its Muslim citizens is something to be sought, not avoided.
At the end of this project, Al-Arabiya television sponsored a panel discussion on the state of the American Muslim community. The panelists included a member of the U.S. intelligence community, an FBI official, the Vice President of IIIT and myself; and the program was broadcast to 35 million viewers throughout the Middle East. Any perception that American Muslims are a persecuted community plays directly into the hands of the terrorists, which is why attempts like Al-Arabiya’s to set the record straight are critically important.
I could speak at length about the many superb qualities of Abubaker al-Shingieti and others at IIIT and elsewhere with whom our Center has worked to advance these and other projects that directly benefit this nation’s security. Not only do they deserve the nation’s appreciation, but this kind of Track Two outreach is a vitally important complement to official U. S. national security initiatives. Whatever discomfort Mr. Poole may feel about this kind of intellectual and spiritual engagement and the questionable bedfellows it sometimes involves, there is no denying that the best antidote for bad theology is good theology.
Although Mr. Poole is undoubtedly a patriot whose criticisms are well-intended, this does not give him the right to impugn the patriotism of others who disagree with his approach. Even he would have to concede that the stakes are too high to ignore the proven benefits of direct engagement, especially in light of the looming specter of religious extremism married to weapons of mass destruction.
Douglas Johnson, president of the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy, is an expert in national security and pioneer of faith-based diplomacy
“This is what Abubaker al-Shingieti, who Mr. Poole attacks at great length, helped us do in Sudan as we worked behind the scenes to bring an end to the long-running civil war between the Islamic north and the Christian/African Traditionalist South. He was also instrumental in establishing an Inter-religious Council and a Committee to Protect Religious Freedom in Sudan which, as the U.S. Institute of Peace can readily confirm, has measurably improved the lot of non-Muslims in that strife-torn country. Having resolved that he could no longer abide many of the actions of his own government, Mr. Shingieti left government service in order to work with our Center where he has proven to be an invaluable asset.”
Muslims are still killing non-muslims in Sudan, the slaughter still goes on. The above paragraph in quotes (from the original article) suggests that their policy has worked, but in actuality it hasn’t.
Doug, you are walking past a bank on main street and suddenly two men come running out of the bank. They are waving guns and have bags that money is falling out of. They jump in a car at the curb and speed off, taking a right at the corner.
You realize that you have just witnessed a bank robbery when a cop car pulls up at the curb and a cop asks you “Which way did they go?”
You now have 3 choices; Right, Left or I didn’t see. Two of those choices help the bank robbers.
So it is with 4th generation warfare ( or insurgency, guerrilla, revolutionary, what ever you wish to call it). There are no neutrals in 4th generation warfare. That is it’s strength. Anyone trying to be neutral is actually aiding the enemy. The act of not getting involved gives aid and comfort to the enemy.
This is a fact and has been true for thousands of years.
Nothing you can do will change that. Anything except fighting the enemy will help them. Negotiating is treason, because you are giving aid and comfort to the enemy. One day you will grow up and realize this. How will you feel then about having helped terrorists murder innocent people?
Your use of “in any way associate with an organization or person…” near the head of the article is an inaccurate understanding of the original essay. Also, “engagement” is a slippery term, almost infinitely elastic. I see the point you are trying to make, and it is not unreasonable at one level – a competition between ideas does necessitate that the good ideas actually get to the table. You take this general and rather obvious premise to claim that what you are doing must be an effective – or even the best – way of doing that. That does not follow.
I would love for terrorists to encounter western ideas, but I am now convinced you and your organization should not be the ones doing it, due to lack of clarity of thought.
John, your analogy is flawed… there are simply too many unknown variables to make such a blanket comparison.
“The International Institute of Islamic Thought.”
Man, does that give you the creeping willies or what?
This organization has just about the most sinister name I’ve ever heard.
Western powers tried negotiating with Adolph Hitler, too. The ‘piece of paper signed by Herr Hitler’ peace accord in Chamberlain’s hand was nothing more than a prelude to the conflagration that was to engulf Europe.
Hitler’s manipulation of the German electoral process to seize power in Germany, gave him or the Nazis no credibility. In fact, had western European nations eliminated Hitler and his thugs, 50 million lives would have been spared.
The Nazis understood the evil they were to unleash. They went to great lengths to hide their evil and what their ugly ideologies were to birth.
Like or not, many in the Muslim world cannot even be bothered to hide their intent. To believe we can negotiate with then in the same way we negotiate with civilized nations is absurd.
You cannot negotiate with anyone or society for whom ‘We’ll finish what Hitler started’ is an acceptable form political expression, taught in schools, broadcast in media or preached from the pulpit.
Not even the inheritors of Chamberlain, et al, could possibly believe that.
“John, your analogy is flawed… there are simply too many unknown variables to make such a blanket comparison.”
Nonsense! 3500 years of military history prove you wrong. If you are interested in rectifying your ignorance, “War in the Shadows” by Robert B Asprey is a good place to start. Asprey, like most English historians is a Socialist/Communist and also like most English historians his research is impeccable. His facts are correct but his dogma prevents him from reaching the correct conclusions.
4th generation warfare is based on the fact that there can be no neutrals in certain types of conflicts. If neutrality was possible, there would be no Insurgencies, no guerrilla conflicts, no revolutionary warfare. All these types of conflict ( grouped together as 4th generation warfare by modern military thinkers)
use the principal of ‘no neutrals’ as a force multiplier.
Most people don’t want to get involved. So the anti-government forces use that to their advantage.
Guerrillas cannot stand up to government forces in direct combat, so they have to hide and strike from the shadows. So anyone who sees a guerrilla fighter and doesn’t point them out (get involved) to the government has helped the G.
Just like you helped the bank robber make his getaway. You may not think so, but the bank robber and the cops do. If there was a video camera that caught the robbers running past you, in some states you will be charged with ‘aiding and abetting’.
Unwitting aid is still aid.
Doug states — “What is needed is an asymmetric counter to these asymmetric threats, one that displaces the ideas behind the guns. This, in turn, requires engagement with those who can communicate with the extremists, if not directly with the extremists themselves.”
How’s that working out for you?
Johnston makes arguments that would sound good if I knew less than I do. The work he cites is in a country with an unstable Islamist government which is in turmoil. It his hard to assess whether he knows what he is talking about and how much success his organization is having.
His real weakness is that he sounds like generations of failed peacemakers starting (going backwards) with Carter, the failed peacemakers during Bosnia, the disaster in Darfur, Hanoi Jane Fonda, peacemakers from the 60′s, Tibet, the failed UN approach in Korean which resulted in a permanently divided country, the Pottsdam Conference, Neville Chamerlain, and the 1927 Treaty of Paris.
I’m not saying that he is wrong. I just find it difficult to believe that he is right.
I am sorry Mr. Johnston. You are wrong. You are simply enabling those who are beyond reason with your “diplomacy”. In Sudan, the south is relatively peaceful, not because of your efforts, but because the murderers in Khartoum are busy in Darfur. In Kashmir and Pakistan, you mistake the words of those who would cheerfully kill us for progress. You are to use another dedicated enemy of the West’s words, a useful idiot. Lenin knew his greatest resource was those who would not oppose his evil. The Islamic extremists know this also. Lenin expected his enemies to sell him the rope to hang them. You won’t even charge our enemies, you’ll give them the rope.