Defeat at Sea: The U.S. Naval Implosion of 2050
In the popular imagination, a naval fleet is diminished by the loss of its ships in combat. Over the past quarter-century, three valiant efforts by the crews of U.S. Navy ships that suffered grievous damage in the Persian Gulf – the results of a missile attack, a mine, and a suicide bomber — prevented the loss of a U.S. naval combatant at the hands of an enemy. Such a loss still has not occurred since World War II.
However, there are two other ways to diminish a navy, and both commence from within: decommissioning ships; and failing to build them.
The U.S. is engaged in both, as the recent naval communication (excerpted below) and figures about naval shipbuilding noted immediately beneath demonstrate. The scenario that follows offers one possible consequence of the United States’ prolonged naval disarmament. There are many others. All lead to the same place: a self-inflicted loss of America’s great power status as a direct consequence of its navy’s inability to shape events, to project power, and to defend American and allied interests at a distance from our borders.
1. Unclassified
Mar. 12, 2012
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: All Hands
Subj: Projected Ship Inactivation Schedule Fiscal Year 2013
The Projected FY13 Ship Inactivation Schedule … is promulgated as follows:
USS Crommelin (frigate, or FFG)
USS Underwood FFG
USS Curts FFG
USS Carr FFG
USS Enterprise (aircraft carrier)
USS Klakring FFG
USS Reuben James FFG
USS Cowpens (cruiser, or CG)
USS Anzio CG
USS Vicksburg CG
USS Port Royal CG
2. The usual life expectancy of a naval combatant is upwards of 30 years. Knowing how many ships will be built over the next three decades gives a rough idea of how large a fleet to expect at the end of that period. The Navy’s 2013 budget plans to spend 11.9 billion (constant 2012) dollars each year for the next five years on shipbuilding. If this level does not decrease because of possible sequestration or budget cuts that a re-elected President Obama might propose, or reductions demanded by the expense of servicing a rising national debt, and if the cost of ships continues to average 2 billion dollars while annual spending on shipbuilding remains constant, the Navy will be able to afford about 180 ships over the next 30 years. The size of the current fleet is 282 ships.
AP, November 24, 2050 — Washington: Nearing his 80th birthday, former U.S. President Marco Rubio warned that the unfolding tragedy in southern France highlighted the consequences of Congress’ failure to reverse the U.S. decline in naval power. The former president noted that the naval decline began at the end of the Cold War:
“With less than a 200-ship fleet and three ships needed to maintain one permanently deployed, the U.S. today can keep a little more than 50 ships on patrol around the world. And we can’t even manage that,” said Rubio, long a supporter of strong naval forces. “Most of our fleet is holed up in American waters and only dispatched if politicians can agree there’s a crisis overseas that’s worth a response. And even then, it’s a problem since someone always argues that sending U.S. naval force will heighten rather than reduce tension.”
Rubio’s comments followed a ballistic missile attack launched from the Middle East that partially destroyed the French city of Nice yesterday, killing nearly 10,000 residents. France has said it will retaliate as soon as it is certain where the launch occurred. Iran has denied firing the missile, but defense analysts agree that Iran is the only possible source of the attack. Paris’ decision in the late 2030s to stop building naval combatants equipped with ballistic missile defenses has left France with only two such vessels. One of them was in dry dock when the attack occurred. The other was participating in NATO’s annual exercise in the Baltic that consisted of four frigates, one each from the UK, Germany, Italy, and France.
Tensions between Iran and France have increased dramatically over the past few weeks following the French government’s national crackdown on radical Muslims who took to the streets in France’s major cities, setting neighborhoods on fire; killing police, fire officials, and civilians randomly; attacking businesses in broad daylight; and calling for new elections. The riots began when a Muslim candidate for the presidency was narrowly defeated in a run-off election. Large centers have been hastily constructed outside Bordeaux and Marseille to contain those awaiting trial on criminal charges associated with the riots.
Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the supreme leader of Iran, had warned days earlier: “Iran would not stand idly by and allow Muslims to be oppressed and placed in concentration camps anywhere in the world.” French political parties and the influential newspaper Le Figaro demanded a full-scale NATO retaliation, and observed that France was still exposed to additional ballistic missile attacks. Former President Rubio told the New York Times that the withdrawal of all U.S. naval forces from the Mediterranean a decade ago as a result of budget cuts had been a mistake: “The ballistic missile defenses carried aboard U.S. naval vessels in all likelihood would have been able to thwart the attack on Nice,” Rubio said. Iran possesses ballistic missiles that can reach the entire continental U.S. The American military’s alert posture was upgraded to DEFCON 2 following the attack, as President Aaron Schock called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council and dispatched his secretary of defense to a hastily called NATO meeting in Brussels.
New York Times, November 26, 2050: As riots spread across Europe to Holland and Britain and included Germany’s large Turkish-speaking population, NATO’s General Secretary Hakim Langsam admitted that European members lacked the ability to defend themselves against possible future missile attacks. He called on the U.S. to honor its Article Five commitments to NATO and to deploy eight destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defenses to the eastern Mediterranean at once.
At the White House, President Aaron Schock told a press conference that “the U.S. will stand firm with its NATO allies.” But the Schock administration so far has offered no official response to the general secretary’s request for U.S. ships equipped with ballistic missile defenses. American forces in Europe have gone on high alert while an additional two ships have been deployed to join the carrier strike group currently deployed to the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon announced that one of these ships, the U.S.S. Gabriel Giffords, has been fitted out with modules that allow it to sweep for mines, while the other ship, the U.S.S. Saul Alinsky, is equipped with the Navy’s ballistic missile defense system. Both ships are over a decade beyond their planned service lives. The 12-day transit of these small combatants from the U.S. East Coast will bring to a total of eight the number of U.S. vessels in the 93,000 square mile Gulf. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the official Iranian news service, issued a statement calling U.S. naval deployments “belligerent.” It quoted an unnamed senior ayatollah who threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and destroy “the U.S. aggressor” if the two additional U.S. ships so much as “approached” the Strait.






America is being eaten by termites and we can’t seem to find a qualified exterminator.
“EXTERMINATOR??” Are you out of your mind? Only EPA approved methods should be used (i.e. catch-and-release).
In an age when powerful anti-ship missiles and their fire control systems can be assembled into containers, making it possible to convert a container ship into an arsenal ship, and AIP conventional subs can penetrate a task force’s ASW patrols, maybe the USN is pursuing an obsolescent path, putting too many eggs in one CVN basket?
Perhaps we’re seeing a lack of vision here. Do we really need CVNs to support UCAVs? Do we need 15,000 ton “destroyers?”
The answer is, “It depends on what you are trying to do at sea”.
“Arsenal ships” full of anti-ship missiles are a lot like submarines. They are primarily commerce raiders, intended to ravage an enemy’s commercial traffic. While they can certainly attack major surface assets, their survival time after getting off their first missiles is probably measured in minutes at best.
If the mission is to protect “sea lines of communication”, it requires the ability to create a secured volume of space. The usual way we do that today is with airpower. Place a carrier battle group anywhere in any ocean. Now draw a circle of about 500 miles (800 km) radius around it.
That’s about how large an area it controls; anything which moves into it that the CVBG commander doesn’t want there, dies. By the same token, it can identify, and protect, or simply ignore, non-hostile vessels, etc., in that “battle space”. Ships armed with nothing but missiles can’t do that. They can attack, or ignore; they cannot “control”.
Regarding UCAVs, taking the pilot out of a combat aircraft only really leaves more room for fuel, sensors, & etc., and allows it to pull G’s higher than a human can survive. To haul ordnance, it has to be of a certain size and have a certain number of hardpoints to hang the stuff that goes “bang” on. If it’s intended to be “stealthy”, it has to be big enough to haul all the goodies internally so they aren’t acting as corner reflectors outside. There’s nothing sillier than hanging an anti-ship or air-to-air missile under the wing of a stealth aircraft. While the aircraft is busy absorbing and deflecting radar emissions, the fins, wings, and body of the missiles are all shouting, “Hi, Enemy Radars! Here We Are! Shoot Us!”
All of which adds up to, if you want an aircraft with the capability of an F/A-18E Super Hornet, it’s going to be about the size of a Super Hornet. Whether the pilot is sitting just behind its nose radar, or 12,000 miles away, at the far end of a satellite link, in a command center under the Pentagon. Anything else is going to require miniaturization, and I’m talking about the movie “Fantastic Voyage” (1966), or the Saturday-morning cartoon show that came after it, not the sort we got with cell phones.
And if you want to project force with Super Hornet type airpower, you need a base to project it from. While foreign basing is possible, it generally has political problems. Such as the people you want to borrow bases from being in cahoots with the people you want to project force against. See Somalia and the Persian Gulf for examples. Even putting into port “locally” can be bad enough; see the U.S.S. Cole.
In short, if you want the capability of a carrier battle group, you need a carrier battle group. Not an arsenal ship full of missiles. On the other hand, a CVBG is a great “cure” for anyone with an arsenal ship and a grudge.
As for 15,000 deadweight tonnage destroyers, I agree that calling them DDs is a bit of a stretch. The Arleigh Burke class are called DDs mainly because “Thirty-One-Knot Burke” was our greatest destroyer commander during World War Two. In most respects, however, the Burkes are cruisers, specifically tasked with a dual role’ of surface combat and anti-submarine warfare. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s “Kongo” class are basically modified second-flight Burkes, and the JMSDF calls them “cruisers”, naming them after their biggest battlecruisers of WWII.
They combine the missions of the previous Spruance-class destroyers (ASW), and Ticonderoga-class cruisers (surface engagement and air defense support of the CVBG). To do both jobs requires a pretty big ship; the Burkes are built on the same hull as the “Ticos”, which itself is a slightly-lengthened and beamier Spruance hull. Considering they do the job of two fundamentally different predecessors, the only surprising thing about the Burkes is that all this capability is somehow shoehorned into a single hull at a displacement under 20K DWT.
The moral is, what kind of ships you need depends on what you need them to do. Sink ships? Kill commerce? Subs and retasked container ships full of Silkworms are adequate.
Stop either of the above? You’ll need at least nuclear fast-attack submarines. Aircraft carriers are even better, especially with serious, high-firepower escorts.
Like what the U.S. Navy has used for the last half-century or so.
Technology may change. But national goals rarely do.
The sea never does.
clear ether
eon
Very well informed post eon.
A couple of comments; Regarding arsenal ships, the USN has converted four Ohio class SSBNs to SSGNs. Basically replaced the SLBMs with Tomahawks and added Spec War support capability. Our “arsenal” ships are in fact submarines (SSGN). 154 Tomahawks coming at you can be daunting, to say the least.
Regarding Burke class destroyers. Burkes are not built on Tico hulls. The Burke hull-form is actually based on Soviet designs (wide beams for better sea keeping). Think Soviet Krivak class. Tico’s were/are built on Spruance hulls with different superstructures. Tico’s and Spruances had narrow beams (I served on both and their sea keeping ability sucks). While the Burkes were actually inspired by the Soviet navy’s wider beam ships. I did the acceptance trails on many Burkes and they have superior sea keeping ability.
We forget Mahan’s Sea Power lessons at our peril.
Thanks, and thank you for your service.
I’m glad to see that the Ohio SSGN project is going ahead. If you’re going to build an “arsenal ship”, making it nuclear-powered and keeping it submerged is the way to go. Even the old Russian “Yankee Notch” would be a problem, in that respect. As a shore-bombardment platform, I think the Ohio SSGN should give any would-be Saddam within Tomahawk range of a fifty-fathom curve sleepless nights. Which I strongly approve of.
I didn’t know about the Burke-clas hull design. I was going by what it said in Combat Fleets of the World when the first Burkes were being built. Just goes to show that you can’t always rely on even the best of “open-source” data resources.
cheers
eon
But, if for now, the ASW and missile defense wars have tipped back in favor of the conventional sub (SS) and anti-ship missiles, then the CVN centered Battle Group concept is in trouble; do we really want risk losing a CVN and 3000+ sailors at the hands of a sneaky Kilo follow-on?
Maybe we should just settle for being able to wipe other nations’ navies and commerce from sea and stop worrying about controlling a volume? Or maybe our warfighting concept should only be for one major theater at a time?
As for “hanging ASMs” off the wings of UCAVs, I think most of them are built with weapons bays. And high performance combined with no pilot has other benefits like being able to take off and land using methods that don’t require a target over a 1000 feet long…
The conventional diesel-electric boat (SSK, not SS anymore) is very slow and has limited endurance submerged, unless it’s running at periscope depth using the snorkel to run its diesels instead of running on batteries. A snorting diesel boat gets noticed quickly by ASW units. If identified as hostile, it dies right after that.
Running on electrics, at depth, the SSK is slow, as stated. So much so that it cannot pursue a battle group effectively, only lie in wait for it. One term for an SSK popular among ASW types is “semi-mobile minefield”, and in fact minelaying is one way an SSK can cause serious problems from a battle group. (Answer; mine-warfare ships, which we have accompanying CVBGs.)
But even if the SSK skipper wants to “Run Silent, Run Deep”(or at least as deep as he can survive, which for a Kilo is about 250 meters max, with 100 being a lot safer), he still has to “come shallow” to fire missiles or torpedoes. Doing so puts him in pretty much the same quandary that he is in when snorting.
Also, CVBGs are escorted under the water by SSNs. Nuclear fast-attacks vs. diesel-electric SSKs are like sharks vs. dugongs. That is, faster, meaner, and they don’t have to come up for air. (The dugong is a relative of the manatee, a mammal, not a fish of any sort.) If the SSK “stays down” to wait until the CVBG goes overhead, and then comes up to fire “up its kilts”- the last thing the SSK’s crew will hear is the howl of the propulsors of a pair of Mark 48 ADCAPs from the escorting SSN, coming up THEIR stern. This is the point at which anybody on the passive sonar on the CVBG ships takes their earphones off, because the BANG of an ADCAP warhead detonating can pop your eardrums if you don’t.
SSKs vs CVBGs are generally a losing proposition. Keep in mind that the U.S. Navy knows all the tricks of submarine warfare, and ASW, mainly due to having invented the majority of both during WW II, and learning those they didn’t invent on the ASW side from the Royal Navy at the same time. Technology changes; the laws of physics don’t.
Speaking of physics, no matter where you hang the bombs on a strike aircraft, you need something with enough runway length to get it in the air without stalling and crashing. Even the Harrier needs a deck run to get off with a heavy ordnance load. Catapults come in handy, too.
“Small carrier” concepts have been around since the beginning. In WW II, they were called “escort” or “jeep” carriers, and acted as convoy protection and close-air support bases for amphibious operations. The main problem, then as now, was that they were limited in the size and weight of aircraft they could operate, because their decks and hulls just could not accommodate bigger aircraft.
In the Seventies, the buzzword was “Sea Control Ship”. (I know that’s a phrase, not a word.) The idea being, build “jeep carrier” type ships in large numbers rather than a smaller number of full-grown carriers, and replace conventional takeoff and landing aircraft with V/STOLs like the Harrier.
Exactly one was ever built, the Spanish “Principe de Asturias”, based on the U.S. Navy “SCS” proposal. The Spanish Navy found that not only was it sharply limited in capability compared to even a rebuilt WWII British “Light Fleet” carrier (like HMS Hermes of Falklands War fame), it really wasn’t all that much cheaper to operate. And being smaller, it was less able to absorb damage if hit with anti-ship weapons. For examples of what modern anti-ship weapons can do to lightly-protected “rationalized” ship designs, look up the Battle of Falklands Sound.
The British “Invincible” class “Through Deck Cruiser” is basically the Sea Control Ship under another name. It was in Falklands Sound, too, and then and now it was found to be severely limited in what it could do, due to not being able to operate heavy CTOL strike ad air-superiority aircraft. By the end of the war, most of the RN’s command structure were mentally kicking themselves for putting that ski-jump and Harriers on the Hermes, and taking the catapults and F-4 Phantoms off.
Yes, the British won, but they’ll tell you it was what Wellington would call “a damned close-run thing” when it didn’t actually have to be if they’d had better airpower, with heavier throw-weight, available. As one pilot who flew Harriers there told me, the Falklands was a lesson in the old saying that if you’re fighting over your own decks, you’re about one notch from losing the battle.
Aircraft carriers aren’t big just to impress people or waste money. They’re big because the real world has shown that in this area, small just isn’t enough to get the job done. No matter how good it may look at budget time… to politicians.
cheers
eon
You’re right. The vaunted AIP Stirling Cycle engine is only good for 5 Kts and 14 days; probably a lot less at higher speeds.
Still carriers seem to be in serious danger from any nation that afford the swarm of ASMs to defeat the AAW elements of the battle group.
But, come to think of it, there are not many countries able to do so.
With their limited endurance, I’ve always thought the best way to defeat diesel/AIP subs is this. The CVBG hangs a couple hundred miles in deep water where it’s SSNs and helos have the advantage. Meanwhile, the air group pounds the hell outta the ports and any sub-tenders. In about 2 wks, the SSK are outta food and fuel. At that point, they’re kinda screwed.
Kevin;
Bingo. In WW 1, when the German zeppelins began making nightly bombing raids on London, the British government handed the job of dealing with them to Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the Royal Navy’s foremost gunnery expert. He had been largely responsible for the development of central post command, coordinated fire control for the Navy’s capital ships, as opposed to the older system of independent control by each turret crew. He was also a pioneer in the systems of fire control for anti-aircraft gunnery.
Being such an expert in gunnery, the government expected that Scott would ring London with anti-aircraft guns to bring down the Zeps. Thus, they were dumbfounded when he recommended instead that the most effective way to deal with them… was to use the Royal Flying Corps’ newly-developed heavy bombers, such as the Handley-Page 0/100, to go out and bomb their bases flat. Like diesel SSKs, zeps were SOL without their supply infrastructure. BTW, that was exactly what the British ended up doing, and it worked.
As the old saying goes, amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics.
Bravo for thinking like a pro.
cheers
eon
This is a chilling story, and one not too far from the truth. Nothing good comes from naval weakness and you will only have other nations, like China or Iran or North Korea, try to flex their regional muscles if they know the United States cannot send enough ships to their part of the world. My biggest fear is that we will end up like England. England once had the greatest navy in the world, bar none, and look at it now. The Royal Navy is down to no fixed-wing air power or aircraft carriers and only about 20 frigates and destroyers and a few nuclear submarines. Things have gotten so bad, that now India, its former colony, probably has a bigger navy than England. Now THAT is sad. Aside from the few ballistic missile submarines in the Royal Navy (I think they have four of them), England cannot even mount a Falklands-style amphibious operation anymore. The once mightly Royal Navy is a mere shell of its former self and we should make sure this does NOT happen to the American Navy.
We also must avoid this stupid “quality vs. quantity” argument in the US Navy. The cowardly Democrats who keep reducing the size of our Navy keep brandishing the same old “quality vs. quantity” argument, stating that we have a lot fewer ships, but they are a lot more capable than any other ships in the world. Bunk. Ships still can only be in one place and at one time. And if we lose any, it will literally take years to replace them. And these multi-billion dollar ships CAN be sunk or severely damaged. Just look at the USS Cole. A billion dollar destroyer was almost sunk by two men in a speedboat filled with explosives. The USS Stark was almost sunk by two Exocept missiles and the USS Samual B. Roberts was almost sunk by a mine. All of these threats are still out there and have not gone away. Fortunately, those ships remained afloat, but it took years before they were repaired and able to re-join the active duty fleet. As Lenin once said, “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Nobody ever thinks that we could actually sustain losses in a naval war, but we still can.
We need ships, and a lot of them, if we are going to maintain our global commitments. If we end up like the Royal Navy, the simple fact is that some other nation (like China) will step in and fill the security void. So if you want that to happen, then maintain the course that we’re on. If not, if you want to insure that the vital oceans on this planet remain free, then we need to increase the size of the Navy NOW. Because it still will take years to build and man these ships. Gone are the days during World War II when we could build a warship in a few months. We need to act now because, if we don’t, we WILL end up like the Royal Navy, relying on the kindness of strangers for our very own security. And I don’t think any of us want that.
Agree totally. What good is a “quality” ship if it’s not in the fight. If we didn’t spend so recklessly on fraud and waste, we wouldn’t have to choose between the two.
If we would hearken back to the lesson the Royal Navy learned with the excution of Admiral Byng, we might not have to suffer from as much fraud, waste and abuse.
The USCG’s “Deepwater” program springs to mind, the 27 billion dollar program that resulted in brand new, and unseaworthy, 123 foot patrol cutters.
No-one has been court-martialed for this absurd travesty…not a one.
It used to be that a captain who had lost his ship faced a Board of Inquiry from his superiors, today a commodore or an admiral can scuttle an entire squdron or fleet and retire to a well-paid job at the companies whose pockets he helped line.
As Voltaire wrote of Admiral Byng’s execution:
“in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others.”
The biggest gripe I have with this scenario is that it’s set in 2050. Many of the relevant trends will have played out by 2020, and certainly by 2030. Heck, the US will reach a $20 Trillion national debt by 2017 by current trends, and a 1-2% increase in borrowing rates will only bring forward the reckoning. Some European states will have Muslim leadership long before 2050, including in Russia (assuming the Muslim Republics haven’t already broken away). The birth demographics suggest Belgium will be among the first in Western Europe to fall. China will likely have their 600-ship navy by 2020, much of it ironically funded by US interest payments.
In a similar vein, the writer assumes that much will remain as it is for the next 38 years: Taiwan still unresolved, Putin still in power in Russia, the Ayatollahs in Iran still threatening the Hormuz, NATO still functioning, etc. All stretch credibility given already evident trends.
Plus this scenario has got the wrong President.
By 2040 or so, Angelina Jolie will be POTUS.
A big part of the problem has been the incredible price increases in Navy ships. When the fully loaded (R&D and construction) cost of a DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer is $7 billion, you can’t afford to buy very many of them. Subs are more than a billion dollars each and aircraft carriers are around $10 billion. Rather expensive.
Alternative scenario: Today, Chinese authorities announced that one of the ships in its Mediterranean fleet shot down a ballistic missile launched by Iran at France. A spokesman for the Chinese armed forces later announced a combined land/sea/air invasion of Iran was in progress under the Chinese/French mutual defense treaty signed in 2035. Meanwhile in Washington, the President signed a bill reducing Homeland Defense spending to $100 billion dollars. Critics claimed the President was clearly signaling the demise of Homeland Defense just as the 2042 budget eliminated the Department of Defense.
our entire atlantic carriers are all based in norfolk. one successful attack could disable them.
Or we could very easily see the end of surface navies as we know them.
What is a Carrier? Against an orbitally deployed Kinetic Energy Weapon, nothing more than a fat, slow target. We have the technology to do that right now. So do the Russians and the ESA, and Japan could probably give it a good try. China will have the capability within ten years, at the rate they’re going. And we have no defence – no interceptor missile either currently deployed or on the drawing board could stop 30 tonnes of reinforced steel from punching through a carrier from flight deck to bilges. Expense wise you’re talking in the tens of millions per shot, but that’s stil cheap compared to what they’ll kill.
What is an orbitally deployed kinetic energy weapon? A single bomb non-reusable bomber who costs as much as a carrier. Also in WWII Japanese carriers routineley escaped high altitude bombers by the simple method of “outmaneuvering” the bombs. Even the slow and clumsy Kaga was still able to avoid the falling bombs.
You’re actually comparing modern targetting systems to World War Two gravity bombs? Weapons that could barely hit a city block in daylight versus ones that you can fly down the ventilation shaft of a specific building on an overcast night? Please, our way of war today has nothing to do with the actions of more than a half-century ago.
First, no, a KEW will NOT cost what a carrier does – it will only cost a few million dollars. Far too much for less important targets, agreed but since surface warships cost in the billions, a bargain for killing them. Second, you cannot dodge something coming at you at MACH 25, even assuming it’s unguided and you know it’s coming – neither of which would I stipulate. In fact, I would expect it to be guided by the best electronics we can mount in it’s nosecone, simply due to the cost of the projectile – what’s a few thousand more whan it’s the cost of lifting the object to orbit that will incur the real expense?
There are other ways to “destroy” a Navy. Prior to WWII, the Italian Navy was heavily critisized and highly ineffective for having more ADMIRALS THAN SHIPS! Anyone check the count for the US Navy?
“We forget Mahan’s Sea Power lessons at our peril.” -TommyTee2012
Indeed we do, but let us ALSO not forget what the last half a dozen naval wars have taught us, and that is that what had been ASSUMED to have been the premier weapon platform was neutralized by new technology, and this has usually come as a great surprise to naval commanders and strategists of the conflicts.
The sailors manning the Cumberland and the Congress had no idea that they were serving aboard floating anachronisms until the CSS Virginia hove-to out of the Elizabeth River.
The Royal Navy had invested millions of pounds on their battlecruisers until the accuracy of German gunnery at Jutland demonstrated that only ARMORED battleships are fit to stand in line of battle against other armored battleships.
In World War II, the “Gun Club” battleship admirals, who had learned the wrong lesson from Jutland and invested millions in armored “dreadnought” type
battleships saw their majestic ships turned into hazards to navigation from aircraft…a lesson that the US SHOULD have learned first, given that General Billy Mitchell had shown the vulnerability of battleships to bombers.
(In fairness, every OTHER naval power in the war had to learn that lesson as well).
The pre-eminent naval weapons systems of World War II ended up being the aircraft carrier and the submarine…and lest naval types overlook us merchantmen, (as is their wont), the convoys of Liberty and Victory cargo ships…because once you HAVE supremacy at sea…what do you DO with it? Denying its use to the enemy is only HALF of what Mahan preached. The other half of the formulation is to use the sea lanes for your own advantage.
We are a congenitally conservative and backward-looking lot,us seamen, and it serves us well, since as eon has pointed out, the sea never changes, but in naval warfare, we face other seamen, and therein lies our weakness, because our other common character trait is that we are amazingly quick to adopt and exploit an opportunity…our commanders at the naval base and our bosses at the company office, maybe not so much, and sadly, almost ALL of the “Big Ideas” in our calling come DOWN from above.
The Arsenal Ship concept is one such…I remember when this boondoggle was first floated, and concluded that all that an arsenal ship would accomplish would be to give enemy submarine commanders raging erections at the thought of the resulting explosion when their torpedoes impacted upon the Arsenal’s hulls…you might as well paint the things entirely in International Orange since being a humongous target, (and one without the escorts usually afforded a CVN), is what they would be.
From where I float,(on a sub-sea construction vessel chartered to the “Cajun Navy”/”Oil Patch”), while we will always need a substantial “Blue Water” fleet, the effort we SHOULD be focusing on is littoral combat vessels…small and fast and armed with “ship-killing” ordnance,(Harpoons)…and LOTS of them, to be deployed at the inter-oceanic “choke points” to effect swarm attacks on enemy ships.
The sine qua non of naval warfare is maneuver…if the enemy is interdicted from projecting HIS power into an ocean because of that nest of “PT boats on steroids” in the Indonesian or Phillipine archipelagos,(for one example), then we have half won the battle…the other half is for us to project OUR power into HIS waters.
And from there we leave Mahan and operate under the tenets of von Clausewitz.
Thanks to the author and the previous commenters ! Reminds me of the non-stop weekend reading Gen. Sir John Hackett”s description of a potential WWIII. Just how many anti-ship missiles have the Chinese and others supplied to Iran over the last 30+ years? What might be the potential ratio of anti missile armament load to possible incoming in various sectors of the Gulf ? The accelerating time-line compression of the last several years seems to indicate that the critical dates are a lot closer than 2050. If the Euro craps out, and the Chinese do actually have their own bubble about to pop, and US budgets are slashed because of the increased cost of debt service, the curves can cross in the next decade or less. Perception enters somewhere. When will someone decide that it is worth rolling the dice against the US since the current admin is on an isolationist path? In that aspect, if the incumbent is trailing badly in the polls by October, does that increase the chances of an attack before a prolly more defense oriented President is inaugurated ? A surprisingly large amount of US Naval and Air assets were already in place before 7 December 1941. What is the current time frame from a Congressional vote to “battle ready” status for a new carrier or other ships ? I am getting a bad feeling that in the old N. B. Forrest scenario the day is approaching when the US will not be first, or have the most. For a great retelling of the 1940 “dice roll” : http://www.amazon.com/Inside-Nazi-War-Machine-Blitzkrieg/dp/0451231201 It frequently seems IMHO that the current admin is planning based on warm and fuzzy wishes about the intentions of others, not planning based on the actual [ and near term "in the pipeline" ] capabilities. GBUSA
Concur with just about all the comments and with the article.
But I would add that the situation is even worse if you look not only at hulls-in-service but also the quality of manning.
To what extent current training provides sturdy and robust crews and officers is greatly open to question. Consider a) the general cultural trends toward entitlement and consumerism (I as recruit am a ‘consumer’ of military boot-camp training and officer training) and then b) the profound derangement of operational standards consequent upon various Service responses to such tangential agendas as feminism and victimism: military service is a ‘right’ and an employment opportunity, focus on performance is ‘elitist’ and ‘discriminatory’, ‘macho’ concerns for discipline and competence are old-hat, and – anyway – it’s all a matter of computers now and the machines will do everything.
If these dynamics continue as the reduction in effective hulls is slated to continue, then there will be a manning problem (at the command as well as crew level) as well as a hull problem.
From Breitbart.com: http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/04/15/world-view-4-15-12; China is claiming full sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. “The island has historically been part of the Philippines, but China is demanding sovereignty over it and all the islands in a huge region in the South China Sea.” We may not have to wait for 2050.
The only problem with the story was the time line. From my point of view it could happen in the next term if Obama is reelected, or maybe at most 10 years in the future if he is defeated, that is assuming we do not make a drastic course correction on our spending and future.
That’s wrong. The English name is Marseilles, with a final “s”.
Mines don’t strike ships, ships strike mines. That’s the point of mines.
Are you also postulating the break up of the U.K., in just the few days between November 24, 2050 (when you have “… four frigates, one each from the UK, Germany, Italy, and France”) and December 5, 2050?
There are several errors here:-
- The cause and effect went the other way around, with commerce protected at sea but funding and driving naval efforts; commerce came first, logically and chronologically.
- That’s not what happened to Venice anyway. Venice’s loss of commerce wasn’t caused by Ottoman sea power but by a combination of Ottoman closing the land routes and other countries opening new sea routes; its sea power’s decline followed.
- England had long been subsumed in the U.K. when Holland faded.
That last is why “… an era that began with the naval superiority that England established during the Napoleonic Wars” is nonsense. This is no quibble; much of British sea power rested on Scottish bases and industry.
Not only does this repeat the material error of conflating England and Britain, it is codswallop, thus:-
- Britain didn’t give it up and pass it to the U.S., this was a consequence of U.S. attrition of the European maritime empires, not a British choice.
- The European maritime empires, including Britain, did not share the same principles and strive for a similar international order, they were into paternalistic colonialism and making the world safe for that.
You miss what I think is the obvious question – why should the US be responsible for the defense of prosperous modern nations? Why can’t France or Europe as a whole spend the necessary money on their defense?
The U.S.A. has to defend them because this is just precisely the strategic world the U.S.A. wanted and got, one in which they can’t fend for themselves. European powers got put on a short leash by the U.S.A., a leash it showed was a choke chain during the Suez Crisis. I’m not going into the rights or wrongs of that incident, just pointing out that the U.S.A. won’t let them have that sort of strength or even let them use what they have independently. So why try? And it follows from that that, if the U.S.A. wants them kept viable, that’s got to be up to the U.S.A.
“I’m not going into the rights or wrongs of that incident, just pointing out that the U.S.A. won’t let them have that sort of strength or even let them use what they have independently.”
The major reason for it, from the POV of the United States other than the State Department and the likes of Wilson, Obama, et al., is Western Europe’s tradition of governmental cupidity.
Simply put, no Western European government can be counted on not to turn on the United States when said government sees an advantage in doing so. By the same token, Western European “alliances” are at best sometimes things, which can turn into backstabs in a heartbeat. (Two words; Vichy France.)
This has absolutely nothing to do with the average Western European man or woman in the street’s opinion of the United States, as Western European governments for the last century plus have been composed of a self-defined “enlightened ruling class” who really don’t give a damn what their citizens think about anything. (The only notable exception? Sir Winston Churchill.) These “intellectuals” have given us socialism, and “accomodation” with people nobody in their right mind wants to try to accomodate (coughHitlerahemKhomeiniclearsthroatneedIciteanymoreexamples?), solely for the purpose of “not rocking the boat” so they could pursue their domestic “social engineering” goals. Which they also foist on their own people whether those people want them or not.
It has nothing to do with supposed party affiliations, as the mindset is enduring across the spectrum of supposed party differences in Western Europe. John Kerry once observed that all of the various European parties, from right to left, would fit comfortably within the liberal wing of the Democratic party here. (They have more than that? News to me.)
Prior to World War Two in Great Britain, James Ramsay MacDonald was a Labourite, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were Tories, and all three worked together to make Britain a “thought leader” in creating a socialist “perfect state”- and deeply resented Germany’s actions forcing the last two to pay attention to anything else.
The reason I re-iterate “Western Europe” here is that Eastern European countries have spent the last century or so looking to the U.S. as a source of hope. And predictably, successive American administrations, and State Departments, have repeatedly ignored them, double-crossed them, and in extremis tried to pretend they simply did not exist. Obama’s latest “deal” with Russia over missile defense, which pulled the rug out from under Poland, is just the latest example.
As with Western Europe’s “enlightened elite’”, our own seem to take great pleasure in playing Lucy to everyone else’s Charlie Brown where the football is concerned. The fact that the consequences can be much more severe seems not to matter to them.
I’m wondering what it would take to make them care enough to change their behavior. That is an answer I do not have.
And unfortunately, the consequences are too grave to allow us to simply assume that it is, in fact, “forty-two”.
clear ether
eon
Just wanted to say that this was one of the best articles I’ve ever read here. I thoroughly enjoyed it. Thank you!