And that is the balkanization of Pakstan. The ‘country’ neatly divides into four squabbling provinces and the problem province of NWFP further cleaves into competing tribes. If Uncle sam cannot cleanup the mess in this part of pakstan, then there’s always the option of containing the mess to within pushtu dominated NWFP.

US contacts can always pump in ever more quantities of guns, drugs and grieviences among the hotheaded pushtu tribes and cause enough infighting there to contain the raging testerones to within their own loins.

But alas. Never credit the state dept with original thinking. Breaking up Pakstan also yields phenomela side-benefits apart from AlQ’s slow-roasting – that is that the so-called islamic bomb will effectively be defanged as no province of Pakstan can afford to organize R&D and military spending enough to keep the N-option alive. Also, India and Israel (and even Russia) will be all help in breaking up Pakstan. Besides, Pakstan has been broken up before (today’s Bangladesh was carved out in 1971 by India), so its not as if Pakstan will mind too much. They were overeager to surrender and compromise back then too.

Just my 2 pence and all that.

Masters had a remarkable life. Son of a British military family with strong ties to India, he was educated at Wellington and Sandhurst. Going out to India, he became an officer in the 4th Gurkhas. He fought on the North West Frontier and, with the coming of WWII, saw action in Iraq (where many of the places he mentions: Basra, Haditha, Falujah are names newly familar to us) Syria, Persia and Burma (where he served with the Chindits).

With Indian independence, Masters’ military career was cut short. He immigrated to America and became a successful novelist.

His autobiography is an outstanding work. It is in three volumes: “Bugles and a Tiger” (up to WWII), “The Road Past Mandalay” (WWII) and “Pilgrim Son” (post war).

Looking back over what I have written, I feel compelled to add that, No I am not getting paid to promote to the work of John Masters. Just think his experience has some relevance to our current situation and he was a hell of a writer.

Although I’m not sure we want to open up the smallpox option that Dan suggests, his point is on the mark. We need to fight with enough brutality and force that the civilian population gives up support for the Taliban/Al Qaeda. We have the superior numbers and the far superior weapons.

We just need to get the lawyers and left wing media out of the trenches and let the military fight to win.

I’m not advocating criminal conduct such as rape and murder of surrendering civilians or fighters. But to crucify our troops for going after the enemy that is being shielded by civilians is the path to disaster.

These tribes need to modify their tradition, before deadly force does it for them.

As well, the US can make a connection with Pakistan by opening itself up more to that country. Permitting more immigration builds person-to-person and family-to-family connections between nations.

Although Musharraf’s negotiations with the tribes resulted in flawed agreements, the more Pakistan can answer to the political needs of the people (including basic rights, including extending basic services), the less any insurgency less viable. Thus the idea of the tribes accepting the authority of the government, and in return getting an appropriate level of local autonomy (which includes a shared definition of criminal procedures, like how local governments work with the federal government in the US), is reasonable and Pakistan should push for it.

In the long run, it may be possible for the US to deploy troops in a limited basis, such as the US does in Columbia, where US troops don’t directly engage in combat but train and support local forces.

In 2007, after a century-long conflict, the Anglo-American world order is undermined by the Swati tribes of the Hindu Kush, among whom homicide is apparently the favorable mode of conflict-resolution. Moreover, they seem more impervious to any civilized dialogue and political accomodation than was previously imaginable – and which remains unimaginable to the left, among others, apparently.

This is a problem. “Many sons and a lot of guns” is the motto there; today’s tribes look exactly like the ones a young Winston Churchill encountered in The Story of the Malakand Field Force – only now they have AK47s and who knows what other heavier weaponry.

In such a situation, I’m afraid the solution cannot be “oh well we tried everything, let’s just go back to herding cats; maybe they’ll just calm down eventually.” And having tried everything, what then can you do?

The answer: smallpox on blankets.

People can flinch at this and their moral sensibilities can glower all they like but frankly there will never be another way. Kennan only met the Russians and proclaimed that they are “insensitive to the logic of diplomacy, but highly sensitive to the logic of force.” Well, it’s time to start punching holes in that wretched population with our nice B-52 fleet, at least. It’s not my fault that’s they way it is.

All valid points. To be clear, I do not believe this will be easy for the US, the West and specifically for Pakistan. If I was not clear, this will be a bloody, protracted battle. And the political accommodations needed to get to the point of fighting a COIN campaign may be unattainable. The point I am trying to make is that the only way to uproot AQ and the Taliban is to directly take the fight to them. Our strategy so far has been fragmented and filled with half measures.

I do not believe there will be instant success from a “hearts and mind” COIN campaign, I believe that may take decades to yield results. After terrible battles.

The ISI is a major power, and this will not be an easy fix. Making the political decision to do this will require leadership, courage and a strong base of support in the military. Bhutto may have the first two, Musharraf may have the last, but I doubt they can work together. Those “purged” from the ISI cannot be allowed to walk free, lest Pakistan be continued to be undermined by them.

This is a subject I am sure we could write a book on….

Whilst I agree with most of your analysis, I will make 3 points where I think our thoughts may diverge.

1. History
The region is steeped in a long-standing tradition of welcoming and protecting “guests”. Will it be easy to overturn 1000s of years of culture and align the tribal leaders as in Anbar?

In more recent times, America must take its fair share of the blame for the networks it fostered in Pakistan against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Some say the ISI actually developed off the back of US funding/training.

There is still unfortunately mistrust amongst the urbanised, middle class Pakistanis about America. Further out of the cities, the madrassas have been preaching their message for the last 15 years.

2. ISI
Although you mention it, I am not sure that you give it credit for the immense power it wields in Pakistan today. Responsibility for the latest border war with India (1998-99) can be traced to the ISI, and Benazir thinks that the ISI has sponsored the attacks to further destabilise Pakistan…so they are in control.

The new Chief of the Army is a former head (I think) of ISI. ISI is not just linked to the military – it is a law unto itself, and the power behind the throne on the wider political stage. Musharraff’s military allies cannot execute any “real” activities without ISI’s knowledge and acquiescence.

3. Pakistani politics
The country has been ruled since nationhood by a number of military dictators and a few democratically-elected kleptocrats. Benazir’s return in a country dominated by a military dictatorship echoes her father’s political campaigns in the mid-1960s.

Whoever becomes PM (whenever that may be) will have to make a deal with the ISI. The only option the world has to ensure that they can offer a better deal (one where the ISI has no choice but to put pressure on the fundamentalists) does pick up on the points you made, but I think the problem with Musharraff was his failure to deliver on any promises. Some sort of “performance indicators” need to be built into any political, diplomatic or economic aid given to the new ruler in Pakistan.

Coming from Indian perspective, I know that Pakistan is a highly complicated equation. You have done a good job of trying to break it down for everyone to understand.

Of course, there is always the possibility of a coup.