An Orchestrated Campaign Against Toyota in Overdrive?
An unsettling series of events before its leaders’ congressional testimony points to just that.
February 25, 2010 - 12:00 am
On Sunday, Toyota learned what it was like to be one of Detroit’s Big Three in the days before they hit upon hard times and Uncle Sam formally entered the car business.
Some are treating what Toyota is going through in its fight to deal with the gas pedal- and floormat-related sudden acceleration issues raised by consumers and the government as a bit of a justifiable payback. After all, they argue, the company received kid-glove treatment from car quality reviewers for so many years, perhaps well after they truly deserved it.
To a small degree, they may have a point. Even before Japanese transplants Honda, Toyota, and Nissan began making cars in the U.S., there seemed to be a bias against Big Three cars in magazines like Consumer Reports. Prodded largely by its Japanese competitors, Detroit had left the worst of its quality problems behind by the mid-1980s and generally began making very good cars, while quality reviewers occasionally seemed a bit over-enamored with foreign makers, particularly Honda and Toyota — companies which, despite their own very large size, were somehow perceived as underdogs to the big, bad Big Three.
I believe that Detroit has significantly narrowed the quality differences between its and others’ output to the point where in most cases it lags by so little that it’s virtually unimportant. However, the public’s perceived quality difference between Detroit and foreign makers, even of foreign makers’ U.S.-manufactured models, is far wider than it should be.
But one of the big reasons for that perception gap has to do with how the hard-news press, with substantial assistance from the plaintiffs’ bar, treated the Big Three during previous decades.
Yes, to name just a few examples, Ford Pintos had serious problems with exploding gas tanks. Yes, GM equipped some of its vehicles with transmissions that turned out to be suitable only for the flattest of terrains, and a few of its cars and trucks would pop into drive while idling. Yet as much as the tort bar would like to convince pliable juries that big companies, except for their unwillingness to spend a little money, can achieve perfection with every product that comes off the assembly line, it just isn’t so.
The legal and media narratives in many of the lawsuits that arose from these and other matters almost inevitably morphed from “the company made a serious mistake and should pay for it” to “this evil company and its evil executives were perfectly okay with seeing people continue to die, so they need to be sent a message and empty their coffers as punishment.” Meanwhile, at least until the late 1990s, trial lawyers tended to leave foreign makers alone, at least partially because U.S. CEOs supposedly imbued with excessive capitalist greed made better targets for sympathetic jury verdicts than supposedly less corrupt and more accommodating foreigners.
But going after the Big Three, or at least two of them, isn’t what it used to be. During the last half of the decade, the financial viability of each was often in serious question. Now that the government has effective control of GM and Chrysler, any trial lawyer trying to go after either now knows that he or she will be facing a defendant backed by potentially unlimited resources and with lots of potential dirty tricks up its sleeve — tricks that it didn’t hesitate to use during the two companies’ respective encounters with bankruptcy.
Thus, that Toyota would eventually become a target of choice is not surprising.