After 61 Years, Korean War Offers Modern Lessons
Sixty-one years ago, on June 25, 1950, North Korea “unexpectedly” invaded South Korea. As we remember our many military personnel who gave their lives during the conflict, we might also think about the reasons it happened and perhaps as well about how to diminish the likelihood of another, in Korea and elsewhere.
The events leading up to the invasion are now ancient history and so are little considered in evaluating current events. That is unfortunate. Stalin, Mao, and Kim il-Sung are dead but their spirits survive and continue to haunt us; we also have others with whom to contend, principally in the Arab lands.
China and Russia are quite different now than they were in 1950, although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains an enigma — headed for now by Kim Jong-il with an apparent but not certain successor in his son, Kim Jong-un. The course of the succession may not be smooth and that can lead to mischief. So can the DPRK’s miserable economic situation coupled with her probable nuclear capability and general weirdness.
Many documents became available during the “global warming” of relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Many if not most have been translated and studied by scholars. They show that North Korea’s Kim il-Sung had wanted to reunify the Korean Peninsula through force since 1948 but that Stalin had resisted until he became convinced that it would work, very quickly. He then provided substantial military assistance. China’s Mao was not generally consulted during the period leading up to the invasion. He eventually was and agreed to it despite his greater interest in invading Taiwan, which Stalin had pragmatically discouraged. In the end China bore the brunt, not of the initial invasion but when the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces retaliated by pushing into North Korea and soon reaching the Chinese border.
During the two years leading up to the North Korean invasion, Kim il-Sung spent much time in the Soviet Union attempting to persuade Stalin of the benefits of an invasion. It has been claimed that in 1949 Stalin began to have substantial concerns about an attack on North Korea from the South:
[W]hile Stalin tried to prevent a war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow, Kim il-Sung said: “We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means.” The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parallel and the possibility of American intervention.
Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang, North Korea could they try military unification by launching a counter attack. Then the Kremlin chief explained, “your move will be understood and supported by everyone.” (emphasis in original)
Circumstances changed and it was soon agreed that a falsely claimed invasion by the South would serve as a useful pretext for invasion by the North.
It seems that Stalin considered any improvement in U.S – China relations as very dangerous for Russia, potentially ruining his strategic calculations. A takeover of the South by the North would further establish a distance between the East and the West as well as perpetuate China’s dependence on the USSR. It would also be of use to the Soviet Union in the event of World War III. Nevertheless, Stalin remained to be persuaded that the North could win a quick victory and that there would be no U.S. involvement. When Kim il-Sung secretly visited Moscow between March 30 and April 25, he assured Stalin that his attack would succeed in three days: there would be an uprising by some two hundred thousand party members and he was convinced that the United States would not intervene. A speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12, 1950, was persuasive evidence. There, Secretary Acheson had omitted South Korea from a list of nations which the United States would defend if attacked. Stalin gave the go-ahead.
Although Stalin caved in to Kim’s pleas for permission to attack, he insisted on thorough preparation. Contemporaneously, there were exchanges of cables between Moscow and Beijing. They did not mention that Stalin had given his approval to the invasion. Stalin viewed the largely urban Communist situation in the USSR as different from and superior to the more rural Communist situation in China and had no desire for China to butt in:
Stalin . . . wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country.
Although Kim visited Beijing about a month before the June 25 invasion, it was more to inform Mao of what was about to happen than to solicit assistance. Mao had Taiwan to worry about and war in Korea was already inevitable. Mao gave his blessing, for what it might be worth.
Stalin’s role, unlike Mao’s, was quite significant at first:
Stalin’s decisive backing for Kim was shown in two ways. First, as soon as Kim returned from Moscow, Soviet weapons “in huge numbers” began arriving at the North Korean port of Chongyin, barely a day’s sailing from Vladivostok. Second, and at about the same time a new team of Soviet military advisors, including at least three major-generals with combat experience, arrived in Pyongyang to oversee the preparations for war. Pyongyang’s military manpower problems had already been solved for, early in 1950, Mao had arranged for the transfer to North Korea of some fifteen thousand ethnic, battle-hardened Koreans who had fought in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. These troops followed two earlier divisions of Koreans sent from China in 1949.
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The draft operational plan was written by the Soviet advisors and termed a “counterattack plan” using the tension along the 38th Parallel as a pretext for war. The nomenclature of a counterattack plan, according to one former senior North Korean general, was “a fake, disinformation to cover ourselves.” The Soviet advisors evidently accepted Kim’s belief in a southern uprising, for formal military operations were only expected to last three or four days with the capture of Seoul. Total victory was then expected in less than a month. Kim personally set the timing for the invasion at 0400 hours on Sunday, June 25, 1950 but his Soviet advisors were closely involved in this aspect of the planning as well.
The decision to attack had been made and it came on June 25. Seoul fell within three days as Kim il-Sung had anticipated; however, the popular uprisings did not occur. President Truman decided almost immediately to intervene, Secretary Acheson’s speech notwithstanding. The United States had little difficulty in persuading the UN Security Council to condemn the invasion and to urge that the U.S. be assisted by at least minimal numbers of international forces, which happened. Russia could easily have vetoed this but did not; it was too busy boycotting the Security Council on account of its refusal to seat mainland China in place of Taiwan (that did not happen until October of 1971). Might this have been a ploy to make sure that China would soon be kept busy with Korea and in line with Stalin’s world game plan? Stalin was a clever rascal; he could have given lessons to Machiavelli:
Mao, who had been marginalized in the final decision-making, quickly realized the implications of [the unanticipated] American intervention. As early as July 7, two days after the first clash between American and North Korean forces at Osan, Premier Zhou Enlai called a special meeting of the Chinese Central Military Commission to assess Chinese options in the conflict. So began the process through which China, not the Soviet Union, paid the major price for Kim and Stalin’s decision to launch the war.
On September 15, 1950, General MacArthur mounted his extraordinarily risky but also extraordinarily successful landing at KNPA occupied Inchon. To get to Inchon by sea from the port at Pusan, still under South Korean control and located on the south eastern coast, was a hairy adventure. Invasion by sea was the only possibility because the NKPA controlled most of the country to the north of Pusan. Perhaps the most problematic aspect was navigation of warships through the shallow and in some places narrow Flying Fish Channel, passing islands perhaps occupied by North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) troops. The tides there varied by more than thirty feet and, except at the highest of high tides, passage of an invasion fleet would be impossible. Had the invasion not succeeded in passing through the channel on September 15, the date of the highest tides, it would have had to be delayed for about a month; by then it might well be expected. Surprise played a major part in the success of the September 15th invasion. Seoul was quickly retaken and the U.S. and ROK forces reclaimed all of South Korea with the NKPA forces fleeing back north. All looked rosy. General MacArthur announced that the U.S. forces would be home by Christmas; it did not happen that way.
President Truman authorized General MacArthur to go north of the 38th Parallel but cautioned alertness for indications of the entry of China or Russia into the war. Korea was seen as part of the fight against world Communism and as possibly the first skirmish in a Third World War. General MacArthur’s troops promptly moved north. The Eighth Army headed up the west coast to the Yalu River while the X Corps made amphibious landings at Wonson and Iwon on the east coast and proceeded to the border with China. The war seemed to be nearly over. It was not.
There had been signals from China that she would send troops should any forces other than South Korean cross the 38th Parallel. However, China was being isolated politically and a warning she attempted to relay through Indian diplomatic channels was ignored. General MacArthur disregarded the risks and plunged ahead:
The best time for [Chinese] intervention was past, they said, and even if the Chinese decided to intervene, allied air power and firepower would cripple their ability to move or resupply their forces. The opinion of many military observers, some of whom had helped train the Chinese to fight against the Japanese in World War II, was that the huge infantry forces that could be put in the field would be poorly equipped, poorly led, and abysmally supplied. These “experts” failed to give full due to the revolutionary zeal and military experience of many of the Chinese soldiers that had been redeployed to the Korean border area. Many of the soldiers were confident veterans of the successful civil war against the Nationalist Chinese forces. Although these forces were indeed poorly supplied, they were highly motivated, battle hardened, and led by officers who were veterans, in some cases, of twenty years of nearly constant war.
General MacArthur was indisputably a military genius, as most recently demonstrated by his very chancy but highly successful Inchon invasion which had generally been opposed by the military establishment in Washington. However, he had an unfortunate tendency to rely heavily on staff officers (the “Bataan Gang,” members of which had been with him in World War II’s Pacific theater) who told him what he wanted to hear and reinforced his sometimes faulty views. General Charles Andrew Willoughby, General MacArthur’s G2 (chief of intelligence), was among them. He tended to tell General MacArthur things and, when General MacArthur accepted them, to provide no contradictory information. While often comforting, “yes men” are less valuable than officers who provide fresh information inconsistent with what they had previously provided. The same is true with presidents. There was apparently also a focus on expecting the USSR, China, and North Korea to behave “rationally” and a tendency to neglect aspects of their ideology and culture. What seems reasonable to the leader of a free people is often very different from what seems reasonable to a dictator far more interested in preserving and enhancing his own position. These factors must be kept constantly in mind in an incipient Korean — or any other — conflict, including in the Arab lands. Neither the United States nor the USSR, China nor North Korea had crystal balls and all had ideologies to consider. The fog of war limited the vision of all, something quite common. The problems went beyond that.
The massive Chinese intervention came very soon after the Inchon invasion, on November 1, 1950, and things did not go well; for a while, the U.S. and ROK forces were routed:
[T]hey came out of the hills near Unsan, North Korea, blowing bugles in the dying light of day on 1 November 1950, throwing grenades and firing their “burp” guns at the surprised American soldiers of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Those who survived the initial assaults reported how shaken the spectacle of massed Chinese infantry had left them. Thousands of Chinese had attacked from the north, northwest, and west against scattered U.S. and South Korean (Republic of Korea or ROK) units moving deep into North Korea. The Chinese seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN) troops. Within hours the ROK 15th Regiment on the 8th Cavalry’s right flank collapsed, while the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 8th Cavalry fell back in disarray into the city of Unsan. By morning, with their positions being overrun and their guns falling silent, the men of the 8th Cavalry tried to withdraw, but a Chinese roadblock to their rear forced them to abandon their artillery, and the men took to the hills in small groups. Only a few scattered survivors made it back to tell their story. The remaining battalion of the 8th Cavalry, the 3d, was hit early in the morning of 2 November with the same “human wave” assaults of bugle-blowing Chinese. In the confusion, one company-size Chinese element was mistaken for South Koreans and allowed to pass a critical bridge near the battalion command post (CP). Once over the bridge, the enemy commander blew his bugle, and the Chinese, throwing satchel charges and grenades, overran the CP.
It became a bitter and bloody retreat through and between snow covered mountains in sub-freezing temperatures for which many troops had not been provided adequate cold weather gear. In April of 1951, General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur, who had different views on how to conduct military operations than did many in the Pentagon and, of greater importance, than did President Truman. At times, General MacArthur appeared to be confused over who was the commander in chief. Changes in command during time of war can be dangerous. They had already become so five months before, with the massive Chinese intervention.
In August of 1951, a year and two months after the invasion and about one year after the Chinese push into North Korea from the Yalu had begun,
General Ridgway’s headquarters in Tokyo put out a statement designed to show a cleavage between Moscow and Peking. Russia, said the statement, had inveigled the Chinese into the Korean war in order “to slash the strength of China … because a strong China on Russia’s southern frontier is the Kremlin’s nightmare. … China fought and bled while Russia looked on. To Mao Tse-tung this could hardly look like bosom comradeship. … It may mean China eventually goes the way of Yugoslavia. … The Reds have been so busy looking for cracks in the structure of the democracies they have not noticed the perch they are sitting on is swaying and slowly crumbling. … They cannot survive.”
General Ridgway had replaced General MacArthur only a few months previously and this may have been little more than wishful thinking.
The retreat from the Yalu was difficult and bloody, with much loss of life. The conflict ended in a truce, still in existence although of dubious meaning, with the border between the ROK and North Korea drawn pretty much along the thirty-eighth parallel with some islands to the north of it desired by the DPRK.
North Korea is not our friend, and neither are China and Russia. They tend to look out exclusively for their own peculiar interests as they perceive them and will do whatever it takes to advance them. If the Obama administration fails to recognize these things, and to act on the basis of them, we, South Korea, and many others as well are in for very substantial problems. Indeed, they are upon us with the recent provocative attacks by North Korea on the South.
In many respects, things are even more complicated and less fully understood now than during the lead up to the 1950 Korean Conflict. Then, we had few insights into what might be happening in the “Hermit Kingdom” of North Korea; that remains the case. Then, many seemed to recognize clearly that North Korea, China, and Russia were our enemies; fewer now seem to have that clear a perception as to Russia and China. Additionally, China has developed quite dramatically as a world economic power, transcending Russia; she is a, if not the, principal banker to the United States. She also supplies much of the “cheap stuff” desired by American consumers and many others. In consequence, the United States has become far more subservient to her than ever before.
As other things have changed, North Korea has become an increasing threat internationally with her trade in offensive military material with Iran and others. There are also problems, current and incipient, in much of the Arab world and we seem to have few insights into how to deal with them to our best advantage. We are at sea in Libya and Egypt can become a major problem with the ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood. We now have a new secretary of defense and our president, principally for political purposes, is reducing our presence in Afghanistan.
As to Korea, much unfortunately depends on China and on our increasing subservience to her. If North Korea initiates a real war — perhaps by directing missile attacks against Seoul and her millions of residents — the likely response of China is unknown and perhaps even unpredictable, beyond that she will do whatever she sees as in her own best interests, defined as the interests of her rulers. Her response cannot be assumed to be what we would consider rational because China’s response will be a function of (a) how she perceives the precipitating events and of even greater importance (b) what the Chinese leaders consider their own best interests. I have very attenuated confidence that the folks at the State Department and elsewhere who are supposed to be watching the situation have many useful clues as to that sort of thing.
If you never go to another war memorial go to the Korean War Memorial. Built as sort of an afterthought to the WW2 and Vietnam memorials it’s far and away the best one I’ve ever seen. And yes I have been to Normandy. I cried at Normandy but the Korean Memorial left me speechless. I cry when I look at my pictures.
You left out the part where Truman ignores MacArthurs’ pleas and refuses to let him bomb the 3 or 4 million CCF massed across the border in Manchuria. He also refused to blow the bridges over the Yalu, and ignored the intelligence which told him the CCF was coming, and hard!The Chinese government finally admitted they had over one million killed in Korea. There were 300.000 plus pows and God knows how many wounded. China paid the price.
The point is, we had it won, and Truman lost it on purpose. We paid an awful price because POTUS lacked the guts to use maximum force. The same is now true in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We diddle and piddle and do not seek and destroy. My son is deceased, but were he alive I would never send him to be sacrificed on the putrid altar of some president’s amorality and cowardice.
Isn’t it strange that Oscumbo is the commander in chief of the most powerful military force ever assembled in the history of the world, and he absolutely no military education, training or experience whatsoever? How did that happen?
“We paid an awful price because POTUS lacked the guts to use maximum force.”
this is it in a nutshell
As a result of our belonging to the U.N. Since it’s creation in 1948, we haven’t fought many wars (only a couple skirmishes) to win decisively.
Either fight to win or don’t fight at all.
When we beat Germany, Japan & Italy in 1945, it wasn’t by going to the border and stopping, it wasn’t making our troops second guess themselves regarding some arbitrary rules of engagement It was by meting out massive death and destruction to the other side to the point that their leaders were faced with either unconditional surrender or total destruction. Since then we fight to preserve the invasionee, and negotiate a settlement with despots.
This was / is one of the best Korean War summaries I’ve read up until Mr. Miller makes the following statement:
“If the Obama administration fails to recognize these things, and to act on the basis of them, we, South Korea, and many others as well are in for very substantial problems.”
Barack Obama, nor any person in his administration has the brains to understand anything that is written in this article.
And even if by some miracle they did, Barack Obama nor any person in his administration would give a tinkers damn about what was said.
Mr. Miller’s statement should have read, “It is clear that the Obama administration has failed to recognize these things, and to act on the basis of them, which means that the United States, South Korea, and many others as well are in for very substantial national defense problems.”
“Barack Obama, nor any person in his administration has the brains to understand anything that is written in this article.”
They understand the issues in this article perfectly well. It is not their lack of intelligence leading to their behavior, it is their lack of allegence to freedom, democracy and ascendency of the U.S.
Nice article, but for the part about MacArthur having been a military genius. He was a mediocrity, at best.
Just from memory, I believe he was in command in the Philippines for 7 years, with the express mission of building up a Philippine army. Given the tools he needed, he still failed to prepare them adequately. He had no real plans for defense, no clear idea of the potential enemy, and no real assessment of the abilities of the Philippine army. They were crushed easily, and it was entirely predictable. His response to the invasion was slow and weak. He was sent there to get him and his huge ego out of the way of everyone else.
During the rest of WWII, he was given command of the west side of the theatre. His handling of it was mostly a failure. The only time real progress was made was whenever they shifted the border line further west, to allow others to do the attacks. The setbacks were in his area.
The landing at Inchon was not his idea, but the idea of a Marine colonel years before. MacArthur finally seized on it when it was presented as his only chance to salvage the situation. When it succeeded, he was full of hubris. He was completely unaware of the intentions and capabilities of the potential enemy, and he did nothing to prepare his men for any eventuality. His response was slow and feckless.
This was clearly a theme with him. Hubris. Lack of preparedness. Poor response to changing battle conditions.
Contrast this to Patton. Before the Battle of the Bulge was launched, Patton knew something was up. He made sure he was ready in his area, should they hit him. he figured rightly, though, that the party would be north of him, and ordered his staff to make counter-attack plans. When they held a meeting of the Army Generals and above, they asked Patton how soon he could counter-attack? 3 days! Impossible! He did it, though. He had already made plans. He had accurately assessed the capabilities and intents of the enemy and prepared. His response was strong and decisive.
The situation in Korea was retrieved by a better man, Ridgway, MacArthur having been sacked for insubordination. MacArthur was simply a failure. He was too busy strutting and soaking up the limelight to do his job properly. He was all hat and no cattle. He was a product of media hype. He was Obama as a military man, a dilatory General.
If I may be allowed to throw in a few pieces of rawhide to chew on??
At least 24 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor Mac still had his planes lined up on the runway (Philippines) to be destroyed by the Japs (Am I allowed to use that word even if it is historically correct and I swear that my house is filled with Japanese goods?). After the attack he was also “unavailable” to his staff for several days. No explanation I’ve ever read has seemed plausible.
As the Japs (dang there’s that word again) moved through the main island of the Philippines Mac had huge food stores destroyed insuring that those moving to Coregidor and Bataan would shortly, be short of food.
While heading the occupation forces in Japan he gave a mixed groups of liberals, conservatives, civilian and military a ten point outline and orders to produce a constitute for the Japanese–one they still have today. One of the points was equal rights for women… but the other points were well taken.
He was extremely well regarded by the Japanese until he made a speech in the US saying something along the lines that the Japs were not a very mature little people.
I believe there were two US divisions in Japan in 1950. They were very poorly trained and the excuse for this was that there wasn’t any room for training, that in a country that had previously trained many millions of troops. I read once that fully 20% of rifles were missing parts or broken.
In Korea he and his staff ignored reports of Chinese troops. You might recall that the CPA made a hard thrust and then “disappeared” for ten days. A warning? I’ve never read a definitive explanation for this either.
As far as Inchon and the Marine colonel, I am reminded of a story. Hindenburg won a great victory at the beginning of WWI; Tannenburg. But after the war the story got around that he hadn’t won the battle after all because it had been thought of by a colonel on his staff and years yet, the story began to focus on a lowly captain. More than a decade later at a party a woman asked the old man who, she asked, had indeed had won the battle of Tannemburg. “Madam,” he replied, “I don’t know who won the battle of Tannenburg, I only know who would have lost it.”
Luddendorf who seems to have been the real mabn in charge at Tanenberg while visiting the battlefield with some friends well after the hour pointed to ahouse and told: “There it is where Hindenurgh slep before the battlle. He also slept here after the battle and during the battle. He did nothing but sleep and his presence made no differnce at all”
McArthur was militarily wise enough to know that China and the USSR were our real enemies and that they had attacked our army in Korea. The pathetic hack, Truman, was so busy covering up for the Soviet spies everywehere in his government that he hardly noticed the Far East. Like Patton, McArthur believed in attacking your enemy’s heart instead of dancing around with his proxies. In the situation in Korea, 1950, attacking and destroying China was the moderate approach. The minimal response would’ve been to destroy North Korea, the putative invader. Limiting the war to South Korea was insane, and the proof is that we are still confronting North Korea (now with nukes) 60 years later. It also established the precedent that the Communists could take any action against the US and our allies and, even if they failed, would suffer no consequences. There come the Hungarian Revo put-down, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Berlin Wall success, the Central American Revos, Viet Nam, Lebanon (twice) Grenada, etc. The reason Truman sacked McArthur was that McArthur was making it plain that Truman wasn’t going to respond effectively to the invasion of Korea. Considering his advisers, that solicitude for Soviet well-being was hardly a surprise, which Truman was also at pains to conceal from the public.
Your abyssmal ignorance of General Mac Arthur’s career is unparalleled! A tactical, logistical and strategic genius, and a statesman nonpareil, he
repeatedly accomplished veritable military miracles. In the Phil he was NOT given adequate resources and had to improvise much. In Korea Truman deliberately lost the war, which we had already won, by refusing to allow Mac Arthur to deal with the gazillions of CCF massing for the attack across the Yalu. Most of our people lacked winter gear, which even Mac could not pry out of the Pentagon. Our communications were sub-primitive; again, a Pentagon responsibility. The NKA attacked first in late june, ’50, and by mid September we kicked their butts out of South Korea and chased them to the Yaluright after that. Millions of Chinese massed just across the border, and came at us in late October or early November.Truman knew it, because Mac pleaded with him to allow the use of maximum force. But Truman sacrificed our guys to avoid hurting the delicate, tender feelings of Stalin and Mao, both genocidists.
A lot of our guys froze to death in “Frozen Chosen”; but Harry T will never have to worry about cold weather in his eternal residence.
Your whitewash celebration of McArthur’s career is as silly as the haters’ attacks. Sure he planned some brilliant campaigns – including Inchon. But he had two tremendous flaws that more mundane Generals like Ridgeway didn’t.
1. Mac was a terrible peace-time General – he was a politician. Yes Truman and the despicable SecDef Louis A. Johnson were cutting the military budget to bone. Still Mac should have required his Eighth Army to train. Marching and weapons familiarization don’t cost anything. While playing Emperor, he let his army become an occupation force with little ability to fight.
2. He missed the infiltration of TWO CHINESE ARMY GROUPS into Korea. Unforgivable. Can’t blame Truman (who I despise) for that one. Blaming Willoughby is still blaming Mac. It’s McArthur who chose to surround himself with incompetent, bum-kissing toadies like Willoughby.
We are talking about Dugout Doug right? My uncle was at Bataan in the beginning and for the extent of hostilities.
The “dugout doug” tag is stupid and evil. Look at Mac Arthurs’ decorations, read his commendations and you will see that name does not begin to fit.
PFCs with low IQs may not realize that Generals do not lead bayonet charges; they command. They use their brains; not submachine guns.Whenever I hear that silly slur I always ask, “When and where did you personally see the General act in a cowardly manner?” The reply is always an admission that the dumbelino did not see such. One such encounter was with a pathetic clown who was an “in the rear with the gear” guy, had never seen General Mac and had never been within a hundred miles of the MLR.
Other than small excursions North Korea will not fan the fire and violate the cease fire agreement by moving toward South Korea. If North Korea attacks again, Seoul will be lost again. But then the North is out of ammunition, fuel and most importantly out of food. Then there will be one Korea.
China will not intervene again in an attempt to overrun South Korea because China would lose too much face in the world and Asian communities. China is trying to be uptown and to support an aggressive move against South Korea would put an end to all she has worked for recently.
North Koreans are exfiltrating into China causing numerous immigration problems. The North Koreans do so at the risk of death for themselves and hard labor for their families. They are working at extremely low wages and three square meals a day in Northern China, Bejing, Shanghai and other large cities. The Chinese are trying to quell this immigration and are concerned about a huge refuge problem should North Korea start the war up again.
This is not 1950 and the world situation has changed. Our leaders want us to be afraid of North Korea so they can use that fear to avoid hard problems such as our economy. A hot war with North Korea is an extremely low probability scenario.
I give you an alternate scenario.
NK invades and pushes as far as it can in seven days (or maybe little longer) which includes capturing Seoul. Before the US can organize a response since its troops are scattered all over the world, NK stops and declares a unilateral ceasefire. Any other hostile action or reinforcements south of new ceasefire line will be considered a breach and NK will use the nukes that it has.
Japan goes all crazy at the sound of nukes and demands that all parties abide by the ceasefire (of course China and Russia are supporting NK) and offers to be the go-between in any negotiations.
Does the US risk a nuclear war that could also affect Japan?
Lobo, that wouldn’t happen. On or before the 7th day the ROKs would be sitting on the Yalu. They are waiting for the North to attack so they can run all the way. If the North wants to pop a bomb they put themselves on the chopping block in world opinion as does any nation supporting that action.
The ROKs are tough and are ready to go even if North Korea bombs Seoul.
I agree that the ROKs are tough but they’re outmanned and outgunned … at least that is what I’ve been told by the by some of my fellow soldiers who have served on the DMZ. In fact, he told me that the Koreans attached to their units as translators were deemed unreliable. Further he told me that the US soldier’s on the DMZ life expectancy was pretty shore since the NKs had every meter already plotted.
But if you’re correct, then why are we there? If the ROK is fully capable of defending itself … and it should be … Then we do we need a division there to serve as a tripwire to guarantee our involvement? If the ROK is waiting for its opportunity, then I say let’s pull out and let them have it.
LoboSolo
Remember Desert Storm? The present ROK Army and Marine Corps is equipped with newer, better stuff than we had twenty years ago and their troops are as well-trained as ours. (check out the K2 Black Panther tank – makes the Abrams look like a Model-T) Meanwhile, North Korea has older stuff than the Iraqis did and their army is literally starving to death. Butter meet red-hot knife.
North Korea has the ability to kill a lot of civilians around Soeul on day 1 – then die in place as the South Koreans and Americans roll up the pennisula.
Dave, North Korea could care less about world opinion. They are only deterred by their own incompetence. If they could, they would.
I hope you are right about todays ROKs. In 1950-53 they were awful. Many of their outfits were split up and inserted into US units in order to force them to fight. Specially trained contingents were many times parachuted well behind enemy lines- and simply disappeared. Selfinflicted injuries were not uncommon.
Beyond all that is the question as to whether the current administration would actually help the South against the North. Trading on precedent, Oscumbo would certainly attack the South and hand billions to the Communists in the North.
China will barf and die if the USA stops importing it’s crap. That is our number one step in case of a Korean/Asian war. US consumers know and understand this. China will immediately implode if we stop consuming their goods but we can happily import from Vietnam or Thailand, India, Pakistan or not at all.
China holds less than 20% of ONE years US GDP. Trivial.
Substantially less than 20%, actually. The Chinese hold 8% of the total US public debt ($1.15 trillion [April 2011 number] out of $14.32 trillion [May 2011 number]), which works out to 7.8% of the US’s 2010 GDP ($14.66 trillion).
China of course is moving toward becoming a sea power and among other areas looks to the east but see herself somewhat blocked by antagonistic “castles” i.e. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. How cooperative would you imagine China might become if an American diplomat known to be lush, drunkenly let slip to some foreign peer that we were about to announce that SK would be given a dozen small nukes for self defense and that the Japanese were to be given the go ahead to join the club and it was even being wondered if three or four those “bad boys” might be released to Taiwan? What would it cost us, nothing, but the “swag” in cooperation might be dramatic.
As far as playing with their dollar holdings, any damage China causes in this area will be immediately reflected in the value of their own holdings.
I will suggest that it is the Chinese who are riding a tiger not us. What if we were to give all the above mentioned and the Philippines five or more of the most silent diesel electric subs existent. Big fanfare. Now the bully of the western Pacific has a much bigger calculation to make. But they continue and send more ships to the Spratleys or where ever and at some point a torpedo wake passes by one of the major Chinese ships causing a full ten pucker factor on the bridge of that ship. But who’s sub? What to do?
To save face of course the Chinese would move to be more aggressive but we need to understand that aggressive and a high level of anti-sub warfare are two different things. However they’ve backed themselves into a corner here so they bring on the dragon talk.
But consider this China is in a situation very much akin to France before the revolution. The latter case, the middle class was willing to give up political power as long as the economy stayed good and they could buy all the “stuff” they wanted. But when they couldn’t they wanted political power and they sought to give their bid weight by allying with the French peasant.
What do you suppose the “Beamer” generation would do, after all the lean years, when they see their leaders stamping their feet and talking about military action at sea over some islands with some oil when they have the money to buy oil at a dozen other places? They might, does the leadership want to take this bet, become super patriots and then again they might want some important political say at this juncture and want it now! The Chinese peasant? It’s the Chinese government who wakes up every morning wondering if a Chinese Spring has arrived not the US.
Just a thought.
The submarines are a good idea but a better idea would be a few squadrons of F-16s. The PAF right now is more of anti-guerilla AF. The “fighters” are pretty much of a joke against the Chinese. The Chicoms would sweep them aside.
The F-16s would be a better item and more bang for the buck. With positive control of the airspace they can drive back any Chinese ships with the older fighters while the F-16s keep control of the airspace.
Since we’re on the subject of the Korean war, I have to say one thing.
The TV show MASH did not always do a good job depicting South Korea at the time. You can totally tell the writers paralleled the Korean War to the conflict in Vietnam, which was the wrong thing to do. I could not stand Hawkeye’s incessant “What the heck are we doing here” complaints. The North Koreans were more of a nuisance while the real villains were overbearing American military types and stereotyped right wingers.
The media back then as it does now, has an agenda which it has always pushed through entertainment and humor. It does so to cause mind change, to sway opinion, to gather souls for the anti-American left. Humor alway belittles God and family values for a reason -they know their enemy well. Why do you think they so attacked Dan Quayle when he exposed their moral corruption of the culture, by taking Judeo-Christian and family values down with Murphy Brown.
Why is their smarmy clown, Jon Stewart from comedy central, so upset because someone dared to call him a comic? Because he knows the real work he does is as a propagandist, leading the ignorant masses into oblivion with his game of deliberatly confusing news with entertainment.
Read the goals of the American Communist Party and you’ll see all that they do and why they do it. They have infiltrated every important organization and profession, including the “social justice” churches.
Too many people don’t understand what you are saying is literally correct 100%. I had to work my way through college and through some odd situations ended up working for a card carrying communist professor at an elite college who happened to be blind. Since I was on unlimited work study we struck a deal where I would read and physically write his books and letter. In that two year process I came to understand that the underground army of communists were not only very real but even then had been in place for decades and this was in 1970-1972. I can only say that we all should take these current “progressives” as serious threats or we will be a forgotten memory soon.
MASH was one of the first tv shows I quickly learned to ignore for the reasons you cite.
Its popularity undoubtedly encouraged others to pollute the airways with anti-conservative anti-American propaganda.
Valuable perspective.
But talk about not learning from history.
Who was the woman from the State Department who met with Saddam Hussein, and gave him the wrong signal about invading Kuwait?
I don’t know that, but certainly when Sddam lined his troops up on the Kuwaiti border and and waited three weeks for Bush to respond – and then came in when the “paper tiger” failed to respond with proper toughness, might have been the real cause of that war.
Nothing causes more wars than the appearance of being unwilling to protect yourself from international bullies or Jihadists. The planet is really little more than a giant playground where bullies roam and few teachers protect you.
Peace requires eternal vigilance/ with God always on your side. Not sure if we have either these days.
That would be April Glaspie, damn her stupidity.
I say that, as my sister and three of my nieces ended up as some of the “unsecured” American hostages in Kuwait until just prior to our ground invasion; they had to hide out in Kuwait City for months. She then bribed an Iraqi border guard to let them get into Jordan.
Korea was also the death of American national liberty. Korea was the first undeclared American war after World War II and it was fought on a multinational level under the auspices of the United Nations, although the United States provided the bulk of the troops who fought and died there. Now it seems that every war America fights has to have multinational support and every president has to build a “consensus” or a “coalition” with other nations before actually going to war. The UN and NATO have ursurped the role of Congress to declare war and now we have to go along with whatever a “multinational coalition” wants to do. And we can see how well that is turning out for us in Libya right now. Military operations under the UN have also turned out to be disasters too, whether it was in Rwanda, Bosnia, the Sudan, or just about anywhere else in Africa. Congress should have the right to declare war for this country, as the Constitution says, and NOT some “multinational coalition.”
I was a starry-eyed youngster in the Navy back then off of Korea, and I knew enough to recognize that just before that, the WWII was fought and won with international alliances -not by ourselves. Working with the UN seemed sensible.
However, since then, the UN has become freedom’s enemy seeking to erase all sovereign borders and doing the will of America’s enemies. Its vote against Israel and for her Jihadist enemy provides all the proof we need of that. Toss in their clear attempt to manipulate the world with their AGW scam and poof -get rid of them, please! They now seek our guns, our wealth, our sovereignity. The next candidate for president could well point out the danger and withdraw from such an organization before it’s too late.
Like the federal government -it has overstepped its original purpose and has become freedom’s enemy.
I spent a total of seven years serving at a couple of different duty stations in the Republic of Korea and if you haven’t been to Korea or if you’re a Korean War Vet who hasn’t been back since the war you need to go. Korea is a vibrant society filled with hard working and industrious people who seem to genuinely like Americans regardless of what you might read in the news media. Try this for an exercise; use google earth to locate a satellite picture of the peninsula of Korea taken at night. The North looks completely black with a pinpoint of light at what is probably Pyongyang. South Korea is lit up like a Christmas tree. Whatever else you might say or think about S. Korea our intervention in the Korean War enabled the South Korean people to throw off the shackles of tyranny and communism and become the free people they are today. And don’t forget that the Koreans sent troops to Vietnam during the war there; the First Rok Mardiv and the Korean Army White Horse Division, among others. Our only failure in Korea was that we didn’t kick the communists out of the North and enable the entire peninsula to be united, free and a formidable ally.
I was in the Army JAG corps for four years, 1966-70, and had two tours of duty in Korea separated by a tour in Washington. Between my two tours in Korea, the changes were astonishing. When I arrived the first time, it was common to see ox-drawn carts in Seoul. They were far less common when I arrived the second time. Although I haven’t been back since 1970, I try to stay up to date and understand that the changes have been remarkable. Korea has a vibrant economy.
The only substantial need I see for a continued U.S. military presence, now about half the size it was when I was there, is to get the United States involved militarily should the DPRK invade. Due to treaty obligations, we should regardless of a troop presence, but with them there the likelihood seems greater. I’m reminded of a discussion between French General Foch and British General Wilson during the latter’s visit to France in 1910:
With President Obama, the public pressure to assist South Korea militarily in the event of an invasion would probably be overwhelming with a continued U.S. troop presence. Without it, not so much.
Mr. Miller, your presentation of Foch’s marvelous one-liner, and its juxtaposition with the World According to Obama, could easily become the seed from which a whole ‘nuther essay — on war and national honor — could be written.
I hadn’t seen it before, so thank you for sharing it.
(Actually, I’m sure I have previously seen Foch’s quote, because I read Tuchman’s book some years ago; but that quote apparently it didn’t register on my consciousness then, alas for me.)
Thanks. I’ll think about it.
I’m not a big MacArthur fan, but his career deserves a little more discussion than some of the comments above.
Whose idea was the Inchon landing? I’m not sure you can pick out any one person. (Success has a thousand fathers….) Based on his operational decisions in the Pacific, MacArthur almost always chose end around amphibious landings. Until 1944, he had parity at best in ground forces. I think his inclination was the indirect approach. His more critical decision was to limit the commitment of forces to the Pusan perimeter so the Marines were available for Inchon. If you go back and read TR Fehrenbach (among others) you begin to realize how much Pusan was a close run thing.
As to the readiness of the US forces in Japan, they weren’t much different than the state of US forces in Europe. American Army of occupation forces in post WWII were largely there to show the flag. Premium training time was spent on appearance (spit and polish) not weapons training and field exercises. Most of the men were draftees and a constant source of complaint by their combat vet NCOs. (Fehrenbach again) American national military strategy could be summed up in a few short sentences. We’ve got the bomb and we’ve demonstrated we will use it.
There is no doubt that MacArthur completely misread the enemy situation once they approached the Yalu. More critical in my eyes is the failure to exercise unity of command. Walker’s 8th Army and Almond’s X Corps should have been one and the same. While one can appreciate the desirability of making another landing through Wonsan, the reality is that X Corps had to be withdrawn from operations, re-organized and then moved from the west to the east coast of the peninsula to make the amphibious assault. Losing that much combat power during a critical phase of the battle, plus the loss in unity of effort (if X Corps had been subordinated to Walker, despite his flaws) seems a tremendous waste. Of course we have the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, especially knowing that the war ended nearly where it started in 1950.
While I would not rank MacArthur as a Great Captain, he was a consequential and important figure in American military history.
There is much else to criticize MacArthur for; in fact he is a high disputable ‘military genious.’ He bungled the defense of the Phillipines, failing to train and deploy the Phillipine army. He failed to assemble needed logistical support on Bataan, even though the defense plan called for the peninsula to be the key defense element of Luzon. This and more after he had sent optimistic communiques to Chief of Staff Marshall regarding his abilitiy to defend against a Japanese invasion.
He ignored and insulted the Australians as key allies. He was responsible for the invasion of Cape Glouster, a total waste of 1st Marine division lives since it had already been determined that we would bypass Rabaul. He attempted to communicate directly with Churchill with bizarre plans and proposals, including the claim that a cross Channel invasion was doomed to failure, proposing instead that we join the Russians on the southern end of their front against the Germans. (This prompted Churchill to remark that “the man has no idea about supplies and logistics).
There is much more to relate. In total his contribution to WW2 was nil. His major contribution came AFTER the war with the administration of Japan and the development of democratic institutions there. His finest hour was his brilliant speech at the signing ceremony on USS MIssouri, which set the tone for post war reconciliation.
He was a far better peacemaker than military figure.
Wikileaks has already shown that China and South Korea have agreed that South Korea may take over in the event of a North Korean collapse as long as US troops do not move north. It remains to be seen whether or not they will stand by this agreement.
Missing Pieces:
1 – Taiwan supposed to fall to Mao in 1949. Mao trained amphibious landing troops, practicing in a river estuary. Troops caught Chinese Liver Fluke from the water, had to be invalided out. New troops allocated for amphibious landing training to attack Taiwan in 1950, but complications prevented that attempt.
2 – Formation of the independent USAF in 1948 decapitated the military. Heads of services were rolled into the Joint Chiefs, an advisory body. Heads replaced with civilian Secretaries. JFK thought this such an excellent idea he added a second layer of civilians. Third person down is a uniformed officer. Joint Chiefs finally understood they were to advise when asked a question, otherwise reflect White House line. MacArthur replaced for intellectual disobedience. Catastrophic was Truman’s order that henceforth there will be no more amphibious landings in the Korean peninsula. USN-US Army had a series of six (6) amphibious landings about to be unleashed that would have turned the Chinese army into hysterical pieces of suchi. Military was furious at the order but could not comment unless willing to be civilians in 24 hours. Enraged Navy did a raid anyway (Hungnam?). It was a day excursion, burned mountains of expensive stuff. Chinese Army in region in a state of panic and rout for about a week.
3 – Korea after MacArthur was the triumph of civilian control of the military.
US military operations after that demonstrated the mess this creates. Note that Adolph Hitler is the poster boy for Civilian Control of the Military. His military expertise derived from being in WWI a regimental message person who clung to the regimental chateau and who with his communications officer was known as a rear area “person.” The sensational happy part of the formation of an independent USAF was there were so many high-paying Federal jobs opened up for VIP party members who lost elections or made big donations. Note that government supervision is unskilled work.
Throwing all the ‘fluff’ aside, the U.S. has long, since post WWII, been meddling into nations business for any variety of populist reasoning but the real underlying reasons never change. Globally, there are only three game pieces on the gameboard…Russia, China and the U.S. Which of those three spend more on their military and have been militarily involved around the world more over the past 65 years? Thats all I’m going to say!
This is a very fine piece, and I agree entirely with its premise that the Korean War experience ought be instructive today.
I’m going to quibble with one line, however: “Stalin was a clever rascal; he could have given lessons to Machiavelli.”
Stalin was certainly deceitful. I don’t think there’s persuasive evidence that he was “clever,” however, and there is lots of evidence that he was instead quite foolish. The most obvious example would be his refusal to believe British intelligence, and the warnings of his own military and intelligence forces, who saw Operation Barbarossa coming. This inexcusable, inexplicable foolishness — in which there was no hint of cleverness to redeem it — very nearly cost the USSR the war.
Stalin very cleverly purged much of his military leadership right before WWII – making it easy for the Germans to shatter Russian fomations during Barbarossa.
Just a note for wishkah39:
The United StateS Air Force was designated as such on September 18th, 1947. I was there and remember it well. Ridgeway was our hero. Mac used to make the trip to Seoule for two days every other month for tax purposes. Matt had his boots on the ground “in country.”
You missed connecting a dot.
Yes, Stalin considered any improvement in U.S – China relations as very dangerous for Russia, potentially ruining his strategic calculations.
But that is exactly why he did not want the North to conquer the South. Quick victory would not perpetuate China’s dependence on the USSR. Just the opposite — Stalin wanted a long, drawn out war, in which China fought America while the USSR stood aside. And Stalin was in a position to make that result come to pass.
See Richard Thornton’s “Odd Man Out” for the full story.
Remove North Korea from the council on nuclear disarmament.The UN is proving it is irrelevant if it allows this decision to stand.
Thank you for the auspicious writeup. It if truth be told was once a amusement account it. Glance complex to far delivered agreeable from you! By the way, how could we communicate?