Jerry: Well here’s your chance to try the opposite. Instead of tuna salad and being intimidated by women, chicken salad and going right up to them.
George : Yeah, I should do the opposite, I should.
Jerry : If every instinct you have is wrong, then the opposite would have to be right.
By Barry Rubin
Just your normal Middle East policy day in which every instinct the Obama administration has is wrong. Allied forces in Libya accidentally drop bombs on civilians. I thought the NATO forces were in Libya to protect civilians. Libya didn’t attack the United States. When Israel is attacked, responds directly, and accidentally kills civilians it is called a “war crime”; when the United States and its allies do it thousands of miles away in an unnecessary and ill-defined mission that’s an excusable accident. What are Western forces doing in Libya? And if they are really there to overthrow dictator Muammar Qadhafi why is he still in power?
But someone did attack America: al-Qaida with the help of the Taliban. Now it’s revealed that the United States is holding secret negotiations with the Taliban, the very same Taliban that participated in the September 11 attacks. Supposedly this is the moderate wing. What does that mean, they favored attacking only one of the World Trade Center towers? Naturally, the Afghan government’s leaders aren’t happy that the United States is negotiating with its enemy that would gladly cut off their heads.
Incidentally, how about stretching the U.S. military among three wars and then appointing an anti-military secretary of defense?
Meanwhile, Steven Simon is the new Middle East director at the National Security Council. He advocates negotiations with Hizballah. And what should the U.S. policy be toward Hizballah according to him? Why, to ask it to demilitarize voluntarily!
The common theme here is that U.S. policy simply doesn’t take radicalism seriously. Perhaps it thinks the only dangerous revolutionary organization around today is the Tea Party. When someone says that they want an Islamist revolution, murder opponents, commit terrorism, daily broadcast their profound hatred for America, attack neighbors, and so on, the Obama Administration appears to believe the answer is to ask them to stop. And if that doesn’t work, to give them gifts in exchange for stopping.
Actually, in Libya and Yemen at least, U.S. policy is now on the same side as al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood. In Egypt, it seems to be on the same side asthe Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, so far, it has been close to Iran’s policy. It also bashes Israel; tolerates a Fatah-Hamas merger (the point isn’t that they are bickering but that they are trying to work together); accepts a Hizballah-dominated government in Lebanon, alienates Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states; dumps a U.S. ally in Egypt virtually overnight; ignores growing repression and Islamism in Turkey; and won’t get tough on a Syrian regime that sends terrorists to kill Americans in Iraq.
Let’s make it simple: Revolutionary Islamist movements and governments are bad for Western interests and the local people. The United States should be allied with Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the opposition movements in Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon.
It should be working against Iran, Syria, Hamas (which now governs the Gaza Strip), Hizballah and the other Iran-Syria clients that now run Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood(s), and the Taliban. It should be very critical of the government in Turkey.
I’ve certainly had criticisms of U.S. and other governments’ Middle East policies over the years. But I’ve never seen anything close to a policy that is oriented precisely in the opposite direction from what it should be.
people are strange when you are a stranger, faces look ugly when you’re alone..
Obama is trying to correct a three trillion dollar mistake and it ain’t easy..
a radical is a dangerous simpleton.. everything is simple to a simple minded singleton.. if you are a hammer everything looks like a nail..
where was mr. rubin when dubya was committing the strategic blunder of the century.. he was right up there with the other neo-cons, cheer-leading the liberation of free iraq.. what foresight, what strategic genius…
rubin knows nothing.
Can you make any cogent argument that actually addresses any topic mentioned in the article or are you limited to insulting Jim Morrison’s intelligence and spouting strings of one line ad hominem attacks?
Sure, I’ll oblige. My point is that Barry Rubin, Daniel Pipes, Mike Rubin were all active members of the chorus all parroting how easy it was going to be to invade a country which had posed no threat to the US. A cakewalk they said. The war turned out to a catastrophic strategic blow back. Obama at the time warned and that is partly why he is the president. And Rubin calls him a simpleton, a radical. Shame on Rubin.
You’re still not addressing any point made in Rubin’s article.
As for your assertion that he enthusiastically supported the Iraq gambit and thought it would be very easy, can you provide any links to Rubin’s articles that say that? The earliest Rubin’s article on Iraq I googled up so far is from May 2004 and is very pessimistic about the results there. A few quotes:
…
Now will you address the points made in the article you responded to? It’s not about Obama trying to solve Iraq, but about Obama’s policies in the region in general:
- The war in Lybia (do you blame this one on Bush too?)
- Negotiations with the Taliban which aided al-Qaida and which the US toppled, undermining the Afghan government that replaced the Taliban.
- Stretching the U.S. military among three wars and then appointing an anti-military secretary of defense.
- The new Middle East director at the National Security Council recommending as a solid American policy negotiations with Hizballah (Iran’s proxy, a violent Islamist organization that took over Lebanon through assassinations and intimidation, and that is determined to destroy Israel, and according to its leader, Hassan Nassrallah, also exterminate the Jews) and “asking” it to demilitarize voluntarily.
- The Amercian interventions in Libya and Yemen are actually assisting al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Obama’s policy on Egypt assisting the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Obama’s policy on Syria is assisting Iran.
- Obama’s policy is generally tough on allies and relatively soft or even conciliatory on radicals and enemies.
- Conclusion: “The common theme here is that U.S. policy simply doesn’t take radicalism seriously.”
Do you have any arguments with the above points?
The world does not lend itself to this simple dualism of democracies and radicals.
first, democracies can be stable domestically but not so peaceful internationally. Israel is a democracy but at the same time she is occupying west bank an d gaza. It is true that it is not totally her fault that she is, but nonetheless she is at war with some of her neighbors. The fact that the neighbors are human right abusers, though it certainly does not help the situation is nonetheless not an excuse not to seek peace. Any objective observer of the conflict between arabs and israel conclude that the gist of the fight is that both parties have overlapping claims on the same real estate. That is the, conflict is POLITICAL so that with proper give and take a just solution can be found if the parties are interested in it.
Mr. Rubin casts his nest wider and makes the conflict intractable. he wants us to believe that the gist of problem is IDEOLOGICAL in other words between jewish Israel and muslim arabs. so this is religious between muslims and jews. this is very problematic. This simplistic view of the world might find some support from evangelical christians (not that they care about wellbeing of the jewish israel but rather that a war between jews and muslims would hasten the end of the world.. what to worry, the righteous will be saved..) yes there are extremist muslims who hate israel and the US.. and there are dangerous muslim extremists who believe they would be “saved” if they harm israel and the US.. but, this never falls so neatly into rubin’s world of radicals and democracies.. Yes, Iran is a religious theocracy, but then so is saudi arabia.. why iran is radical but not saudi arabia? why is syria radical but not mobarak’s egypt.. why is turkish muslim democracy radical but israel’s jewish democracy not?
this taxonomy is not only wrong but it is strategically foolish.. the first rule of war is to increase the number of your friends while reducing your enemy’s. rubin’s use of religion to classify leaves israel without any muslim friend. not very smart.
mstr,
You’re still not addressing any of the points made by Barry Rubin in the above article. Instead you’re trying to divert the debate into an Israel-bashing fest though Israel was hardly mentioned in the article.
You’re also wrong on all accounts. You misrepresent what Rubin says, and you misinform on the Arab-Israeli conflict. These tactics are quite tiresome and I don’t think you should get away with them, so please stay on topic or find some other article or thread that discusses the topics you wish to discuss.
Do you think that negotiating with the Taliban, which undermines the Afghan government, is helpful?
Do you think that negotiating with Hizballah, which lends legitimacy to an organization that is an Iranian proxy, that has taken over Lebanon on behalf of Iran and Syria by assassinations (most nutoriously of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) and intimidation (see, for instance, the attack on the Druze on Mount Chouf and threats on Druze leader Walid Jumblatt), is helping Assad kill revolting civilians in Syria, is dedicated to the destruction of Israel, and whose leader talked about exterminating the Jews, has a chance of persuading that organization to disarm itslef for this or that pathetic carrot? Or maybe a better idea is to support the more moderate Lebanese opposition in its quest for independence from Syria and Iran, which used to be the American policy?
Do you think the US should strengthen the more moderate states and forces in the region (according to Rubin, “Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the opposition movements in Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon”) or that it should weaken them by strengthening the more radical forces and states?
Though I don’t know why I bother because you’re not going to respond to any of these questions that actually deal with what was said in the article. Instead you will bash Rubin, bash Israel and copy-paste general platitudes.
One has to admire your patience: how many times you’ll ask this guy to address a point? He clearly doesn’t have any in mind, except maybe for hatred and slogans.
guess who wrote this article?
Middle East Update:
What Does Post-Saddam Mean?
by Barry Rubin Jerusalem Post (Internet Edition)
PURSUE THIS TOPIC:
RESOURCES
Roots of War
Jihad: America’s New War
Let’s assume that the United States and its allies have overthrown Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. What types of issues and problems will follow?
Looking ahead like this is not merely an exercise in prophecy. It is an attempt to think through probable and possible developments as a guide to what policies should be adopted, how they should be implemented, and how to plan for dealing with future contingencies.
Here are some ideas, and their implications:
Once the regime is overthrown it will not make a comeback. The Ba’ath party is a relic of the past, kept in place by its control over the state. No one is going to rebuild the current regime, if for no other reason than that people seek power for themselves and want to avoid the stigma of the past. Iraq may again be a dictatorship but who needs Saddam to recreate that?
After the regime’s downfall, U.S. forces will be able to take journalists on tours of hidden Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) facilities, hidden arms arsenals, torture chambers and prisons. They will be able to show them documents and interviews about Iraq’s secret backing for terrorists and a connection with Osama bin Laden if one existed. Iraqis will speak out on how much they hated the regime and how much it oppressed them. If the war does not go on too long and casualties aren’t too high, there will probably be an outpouring of retrospective feeling that the attack on Saddam was a good thing to do.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction would then be easily discovered and removed or destroyed.
A key issue from the start will be whom the United States backs to rule Iraq. Clearly, the democratic-minded exiles led by Ahmad Chelabi are in a favorable position, but how will they be mixed with “insider” groups including high-ranking military officers? Will the returning exiles be able to maintain unity? How will they be received by those who never left Iraq, how much power will the U.S. government give the new regime, how competent would they be at ruling, and how long will the honeymoon last?
Timing is critical and it might be the factor which trips up the American effort. The United States must stay long enough to establish a stable regime but not too long to wear out its welcome. Indications are that U.S. leaders envision a long stay, and this decision might prove far more dangerous than the choice of going to war in the first place. The longer U.S. forces stay in control and in large numbers, the more likely there will be antagonisms of Iraqi nationalism, Arab sentiment, and Islam. Equally, a prolonged stay would undercut the legitimacy of a successor regime.
Just one example of how this would work: Let’s say there are 20 applicants for a cabinet-minister position. The U.S. authorities could pick the most competent and honest candidate, but the other 19, along with all their families and supporters, would still hate them for it. They’d have every interest in labeling their successful rival an American puppet and mobilizing all sorts of lies and nationalist and Islamist appeals, even trying to find foreign sponsors on behalf of their own ambitions.
How will the three key communities – Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish – get along? Will a federal solution, with more autonomy for the regional provinces, be acceptable and workable? The Sunnis will have to accept that they no longer rule the country. The Kurds will have to deal with their own unity – they are now split into two rival regimes in the north – and accept a more limited territory than they want. The Shi’ites will have to create a new leadership altogether, somehow balancing secularist and Islamist factions.
None of these tasks will be easy.
In terms of economic reconstruction, Iraq will probably be able to pay for itself fairly quickly with expanded oil exports, but there is a massive and long-term series of projects necessary to rebuild this sector and other damage to infrastructure.
Then there are all the international factors involved.
European states would quickly seek lucrative contracts with the new Iraq and want everyone to forget they were opposed to the war in the first place.
Turkey does not want a Kurdish state or anything approaching one. It is interested in protecting the ethnic Turks in northern Iran and ensuring that neither Kurdish refugees nor guerrillas cross into its territory. On the positive side, Saddam’s overthrow could signal an economic bonanza large enough to pull Turkey out of its recession. The Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline would run full every day, thousands of trucks would cross the border with Turkish exports, and Turkish manufacturers and construction companies would provide a lot of the equipment and labor to rebuild Iraq. Ironically, the Islamist government in Turkey could gain huge support for its “success” in improving its country’s economy.
Iran will be happy to see its enemy, Saddam and his regime, thrown out of office, but less happy to find large numbers of U.S. troops and a pro-U.S. government on its border. The problem is not so much whether Iran can control the Iraqi Shi’ites – it cannot – but the extent to which Tehran will try to subvert the new regime by backing terrorist groups among Kurds and Shi’ites. In the parallel case of Afghanistan, Iran liked the downfall of the Taliban but then made problems for the new government. But the Iranian opposition might see the Iraq outcome as an inspiration to heighten its own struggle against the hardliners.
The Arab world will no doubt quickly recognize a new government in Iraq once U.S. control recedes a bit. The Saudis will want to assure its friendship, Jordan will want to deal with it economically, Egypt will want to explain why Baghdad should follow Cairo’s lead, and Syria will want to make sure the new regime is not hostile to it.
The effect on Arab-Israel issues and Palestinian politics? That requires another article.
Toward the United States there will probably be a curious mixed response in the Arab world. Arab regimes concluding that the United States was too powerful to challenge will seek to avoid confrontation. At the same time these rulers will be determined to show their peoples that what happened in Iraq was bad, to mobilize support lest America comes after them, and to deter their citizens from seeking democracy or other types of things the Iraqi exiles and United States hope to institute in Iraq.
Finally, there is the question that might come to dominate Middle East history for the first half of the 21st century: Will Iraq be a model for moderation and democracy in the same way Egypt has been for Arab nationalists and Iran has been for Islamists? We will be spending many years discussing that point.
* * *
1995-2003, The Jerusalem Post – All rights reserved, used bypermission – http://www.jpost.com.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at the Interdisciplinary University.
If Barack Obama was spending most of his time actually dealing with domestic economic problems and as a result had effectively confronted the economic crisis’ in the States, then it would be possible to excuse his utter and complete failures in the Middle East and the rest of the international arena.
But Obama doesn’t deal effectively with anything, indeed about the only things he is good at is playing golf and basketball, going on vacation, and raising funds for his campaign in 2012.
This is because Barack Obama is the Peter Pan President, the boy who never grew up, the boy who took his father’s and mother’s New Left anti America, anti Israel, pro Third World, pro Socialist, and Black racist narrative to heart, and now can only perform as an ignorant and arrogant little boy.
Barack Obama knows only how to play and lie around, and live off his parent’s money, while maintaining his opulent residence in Never Never Land.
And by the way, none of Obama’s puerile and misinformed meddling has served to improve the situation in the Middle East. The situations in Syria and Libya continue to deteriorate with massive loss of life and destruction of property with no end in sight, Turkey is quickly becoming an Iranian outpost, and Obama’s personal intervention has so hardened the Palestinian hard line positions that he has effectively murdered any chances of Palestinian Israeli peace talks ever starting again.
And yet, without a single success under Obama’s political and diplomatic belt, his sycophants, court Jews, and Democrat voters still manage to delude themselves that Obama knows what he is doing.
Fortunately, in 2012 American voters will be all too aware of the incompetence and blind stupidity of Obama and kick his sorry butt out of office.
Re the failure in both the economic sphere and international affairs, in the leftist/neo-Marxist case they are related since both are based on the wrong premise that any inequlity in results between people is always a product of oppression, that the failure of the failed is always the fault of the successful, and therefore that any violence by the failed or weak or just weaker is always a response to oppression and a result of legitimate grievances. So the cure to all problems is to address the grievances, to eliminate all “oppression”, and to eliminate inequalities by taking from the successful and giving to the failed. Since that premise is wrong the policies based on it are likely to fail in any field where they’re implemented.
Of course, some failures are a result of oppression and injustice, some inequlities are the result of oppression and exploitation, some violence is a response to oppression or to legitimate grievance that can be addressed, but not ALL, not ALWAYS.
That reminds me of a very honest book by a Jewish gangster (don’t think it was translated to English). He was born to a poor family in Algeria that lived in a “red light” neighborhood. Yet he notes that while he chose the path of crime, his brother chose the path of Torah and was a good boy who dedicated himself to religious studies, another brother became a laywer, and none of his other brothers became criminals. He also made a distinction between “career criminals” which is how he defined himslef, and people who drift into crime by a combination of circumstances and weakness. He said the latter should be helped in the early stages because then they can be rehabilitated and build a new life away from crime, but that “creer criminals” like him can’t be rehabilitated because they chose this path. Well, he did rehabilitate his life after 18 years in prison, during which nearly all of his friends were killed in the mafia wars, and after belatedly realizing how he hurt his children. But he said it’s a daily battle against his powerful urges.
The challenge, of course, is to be able to tell the difference between the “career criminals” and the ones that can be saved. But the hard left doesn’t recognize the existence of “career criminals” because they don’t recognize individual responsibility in the case of the failed or the weak. To them all criminals are victims of society. And it’s the same for every other type of violence and failure. Succes is in itself evidence of oppression. Failure or weakness are in themselves evidence of victimization. Violence on the part of the weaker party is intself evidence for the crimes of the stronger party, and the more violent the weaker side is the more guilty the stronger side is assumed to be because violence can only be a response, so it’s proportionate to the crime.
So if Iran is weaker than the US it can’t be assumed to have its own imperialist asspirations or to be motivated by a fanatic violent religious vision, even if it’s in your face. And if Hizaballah and Hamas are weaker than Israel they can’t be assumed to be motivated by the desire to destroy Israel, exterminate the Jews and impose an Islamic state wherever possible, even though they’re not being shy about it in Arabic. If the Muslim Brotherhood was weaker than Mubarak it can’t be assumed to aspire for a global caliphate, even if that is the purpose for which it was founded. What they say to Westerners in their own language, their complaints, accusations, justifications and lies, are taken at face value without scrutiny because they reinforce the leftist belief in the leftist fundamental dogmas, which is also why any evidence to the contrary is vehemently rejected.
The result will be that these aggressive ideologies will become stronger and stronger, and by the time they will be recognized in the West for what they are it’ll be much harder to defeat them.
Back in 2003-2004 here in Canada we had all kinds of so-called PeaceMaker teams (in reality they’re nothing more than neo-fascists ideologues in support of Arab dictators) racing over to Iraq so they could act as human shields for dear, dear Herr Dictator, Saddam. So, why the zero response for Qaddafi? What is he, chopped liver? I mean, seriously, I just don’t get it. The darling Green Book author, the Leftist so idealized, they now want to see him dead? Oh, wait. It’s Obama’s war — and being that it’s just Obama’s War, that makes dropping bombs on unarmed civilians A-Ok, besides it’s just a “kinetic military operation”…
We should not allow Leaders to murder their own people, or anyone else.
Qaddafi said he would turn the country into a graveyard, we joined with NATO to stop the murder of civilians.
This is exactly what the UN and NATO and the U.S. should be doing.
We are not doing this in Iran or Syria but we probably should be.
I agree with Professor Rubin about the tactical and strategic mistakes, however there are others who have their own reasons, economic or political etc. for thinking that the Obama strategy is a good one.
Rubin is not a part of a chorus of parrots, as mstr stated.
The professor is one of the most objective columnists out there.
OTOH, there is no moral equivalence between Israel and her enemies.
Israel is a Democracy, her enemies are dictatorships and or violent theocracies.
Any thinking person aware of the situation in the Mid-East would be Pro-Israel, in light of available facts.
I hardly ever read what I’ve been writing for over a decade.
Islam is satanic garbage.
Bomb the madrasses.
Destroy AL Manar, and Al Jazeera, and Al Jolson, all the Als
Deport the muzzies
Nuke 250 sand monkeys.
‘Nuff said.
I meant 250 MILLION sand monkeys.
Middle East Update:
What Does Post-Saddam Mean?
by Barry Rubin Jerusalem Post (Internet Edition)
PURSUE THIS TOPIC:
RESOURCES
Roots of War
Jihad: America’s New War
Let’s assume that the United States and its allies have overthrown Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. What types of issues and problems will follow?
Looking ahead like this is not merely an exercise in prophecy. It is an attempt to think through probable and possible developments as a guide to what policies should be adopted, how they should be implemented, and how to plan for dealing with future contingencies.
Here are some ideas, and their implications:
Once the regime is overthrown it will not make a comeback. The Ba’ath party is a relic of the past, kept in place by its control over the state. No one is going to rebuild the current regime, if for no other reason than that people seek power for themselves and want to avoid the stigma of the past. Iraq may again be a dictatorship but who needs Saddam to recreate that?
After the regime’s downfall, U.S. forces will be able to take journalists on tours of hidden Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) facilities, hidden arms arsenals, torture chambers and prisons. They will be able to show them documents and interviews about Iraq’s secret backing for terrorists and a connection with Osama bin Laden if one existed. Iraqis will speak out on how much they hated the regime and how much it oppressed them. If the war does not go on too long and casualties aren’t too high, there will probably be an outpouring of retrospective feeling that the attack on Saddam was a good thing to do.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction would then be easily discovered and removed or destroyed.
A key issue from the start will be whom the United States backs to rule Iraq. Clearly, the democratic-minded exiles led by Ahmad Chelabi are in a favorable position, but how will they be mixed with “insider” groups including high-ranking military officers? Will the returning exiles be able to maintain unity? How will they be received by those who never left Iraq, how much power will the U.S. government give the new regime, how competent would they be at ruling, and how long will the honeymoon last?
Timing is critical and it might be the factor which trips up the American effort. The United States must stay long enough to establish a stable regime but not too long to wear out its welcome. Indications are that U.S. leaders envision a long stay, and this decision might prove far more dangerous than the choice of going to war in the first place. The longer U.S. forces stay in control and in large numbers, the more likely there will be antagonisms of Iraqi nationalism, Arab sentiment, and Islam. Equally, a prolonged stay would undercut the legitimacy of a successor regime.
Just one example of how this would work: Let’s say there are 20 applicants for a cabinet-minister position. The U.S. authorities could pick the most competent and honest candidate, but the other 19, along with all their families and supporters, would still hate them for it. They’d have every interest in labeling their successful rival an American puppet and mobilizing all sorts of lies and nationalist and Islamist appeals, even trying to find foreign sponsors on behalf of their own ambitions.
How will the three key communities – Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish – get along? Will a federal solution, with more autonomy for the regional provinces, be acceptable and workable? The Sunnis will have to accept that they no longer rule the country. The Kurds will have to deal with their own unity – they are now split into two rival regimes in the north – and accept a more limited territory than they want. The Shi’ites will have to create a new leadership altogether, somehow balancing secularist and Islamist factions.
None of these tasks will be easy.
In terms of economic reconstruction, Iraq will probably be able to pay for itself fairly quickly with expanded oil exports, but there is a massive and long-term series of projects necessary to rebuild this sector and other damage to infrastructure.
Then there are all the international factors involved.
European states would quickly seek lucrative contracts with the new Iraq and want everyone to forget they were opposed to the war in the first place.
Turkey does not want a Kurdish state or anything approaching one. It is interested in protecting the ethnic Turks in northern Iran and ensuring that neither Kurdish refugees nor guerrillas cross into its territory. On the positive side, Saddam’s overthrow could signal an economic bonanza large enough to pull Turkey out of its recession. The Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline would run full every day, thousands of trucks would cross the border with Turkish exports, and Turkish manufacturers and construction companies would provide a lot of the equipment and labor to rebuild Iraq. Ironically, the Islamist government in Turkey could gain huge support for its “success” in improving its country’s economy.
Iran will be happy to see its enemy, Saddam and his regime, thrown out of office, but less happy to find large numbers of U.S. troops and a pro-U.S. government on its border. The problem is not so much whether Iran can control the Iraqi Shi’ites – it cannot – but the extent to which Tehran will try to subvert the new regime by backing terrorist groups among Kurds and Shi’ites. In the parallel case of Afghanistan, Iran liked the downfall of the Taliban but then made problems for the new government. But the Iranian opposition might see the Iraq outcome as an inspiration to heighten its own struggle against the hardliners.
The Arab world will no doubt quickly recognize a new government in Iraq once U.S. control recedes a bit. The Saudis will want to assure its friendship, Jordan will want to deal with it economically, Egypt will want to explain why Baghdad should follow Cairo’s lead, and Syria will want to make sure the new regime is not hostile to it.
The effect on Arab-Israel issues and Palestinian politics? That requires another article.
Toward the United States there will probably be a curious mixed response in the Arab world. Arab regimes concluding that the United States was too powerful to challenge will seek to avoid confrontation. At the same time these rulers will be determined to show their peoples that what happened in Iraq was bad, to mobilize support lest America comes after them, and to deter their citizens from seeking democracy or other types of things the Iraqi exiles and United States hope to institute in Iraq.
Finally, there is the question that might come to dominate Middle East history for the first half of the 21st century: Will Iraq be a model for moderation and democracy in the same way Egypt has been for Arab nationalists and Iran has been for Islamists? We will be spending many years discussing that point.
* * *
1995-2003, The Jerusalem Post – All rights reserved, used bypermission – http://www.jpost.com.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at the Interdisciplinary University.
Barry Rubin is doing an invaluable job clarifying what’s up re Israel, the Middle East, and Obama. I’m grateful to him and to PJM for lining him up as a steady contributor. After my forwarding his stuff, a number of the recipients subscribed to his reports themselves, some of them former voters for Obama who have as a result wised up to him at long last.
I still have two bones to pick with Barry Rubin, however.
Briefly, after all of Obama’s ass-backward moves so dangerously inimical to our interests in the region, Rubin cannot bring himself to regard those moves as anything other than a result of an ideological fixation, rather than, as I think, his malice aforethought. In a respectful email exchange with him, we did agree that, either way, Obama’s acts were dangerously inimical to our interests and likely to turn out badly. But I still maintain that we could put a halt to them much more quickly if we could acknowledge he’s someone deliberately out to do us harm, instead of just an idiot.
The second is the infinite patience he has expressed elsewhere and often toward the “peace process” and a PA state.